服务商道德风险与资金限制下的研发外包契约选择:奖励还是惩罚

发布时间：2018-05-30 13:19

本文选题：研发外包 + 道德风险　；参考：《科研管理》2017年12期

【摘要】：针对研发外包中服务商道德风险防范与激励问题,在考虑服务商自有资金限制下,设计了奖励成功、惩罚失败、奖—惩混合的研发外包契约,并对三种契约的可行性与有效性进行了比较,得到各类契约的选择条件。研究表明,奖-惩混合契约完全等价奖励契约或者惩罚契约,而服务商资金实力是影响契约可行性与有效性的关键因素。具体而言,当服务商资金实力很差,具有较大负债时,奖励与惩罚契约均不可行,客户不应该把研发项目外包给此类企业;而随着服务商资金实力的增加,负债减少到一定程度时,首先是惩罚契约可行,此后当服务商资金实力继续增加到一定程度,奖励契约才可行,并且惩罚契约优于奖励契约;当服务资金实力强到一定程度后,奖励契约与惩罚契约均可行,且二者等价。
[Abstract]:Aiming at the problem of moral hazard prevention and incentive of service providers in R & D outsourcing, under the consideration of the limitation of service providers' own funds, the paper designs a contract of rewarding success, punishing failure, rewarding and punishing mixed R & D outsourcing. The feasibility and effectiveness of the three kinds of contracts are compared, and the selection conditions of various kinds of contracts are obtained. The research shows that the mixed contract of reward and punishment is equivalent to the contract of reward or punishment and the financial strength of the service provider is the key factor that affects the feasibility and effectiveness of the contract. Specifically, when the financial strength of the service provider is very poor and has a large debt, neither the incentive nor the punishment contract is feasible, and customers should not outsource R & D projects to such enterprises; and as the financial strength of the service provider increases, When the debt is reduced to a certain extent, the penalty contract is feasible first, and then when the financial strength of the service provider continues to increase to a certain extent, the reward contract is feasible, and the penalty contract is superior to the reward contract; when the service capital strength reaches a certain level, Both the reward contract and the punishment contract can be applied, and they are equivalent.
【作者单位】：电子科技大学经济与管理学院;重庆理工大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“知识密集型服务外包中的知识共享激励与知识资产争端协调机制研究”(71301182,2014.01—2016.12);国家自然科学基金项目“新一代信息技术产业“联盟组合”与创新能力研究:涌现、构型与治理”(71572028,2016.01—2019.12)
【分类号】：F273.1

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