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财政分权下环境治理的地方政府行为研究

发布时间:2018-09-09 11:54
【摘要】:近年来,环境经济学界逐步达成新的有关EKC的共识,即环境污染水平和财政分权程度之间的关系要经历一个正相关向负相关转变的过程,而这个临界点就是地方政府的财政能力水平。在这个拐点值到来之前,环境只不过是全球分权化改革浪潮中的牺牲品。对于我国来说,目前面临的实证分析是,不仅在全国范围,而且各省份的面板数据分析都显示,我国的人均财政能力与倒U曲线的拐点值相去甚远,因此对于环境品质的提升不能寄希望于人民财富的增加,否则会陷入“先污染后治理,先发展经济再治理环境”的恶性循环中。其实中央政府作为公共利益的最高代表,已经认识到“环境污染”这一关系到人类福祉的重要议题,但是在政策下达和执行的过程中,地方政府在财政分权和政治激励的双重驱动下,一味追求经济利益, “经济—社会—环境”多任务锦标赛变成“唯经济是从”的单任务锦标赛。近年来,人们逐渐认识到财政分权对人类环境产生的负面效应。作为一种“制度安排”,地方政府环境治理行为方式的功利性造成了我国经济增长和环境现状的不确定性。本文章基于此来探讨财政分权与环境污染的“中间环节”一地方政府环境治理行为。运用了规范分析和实证分析、经验分析和历史分析相结合的方法。除了第一章绪论外,本文包含五个章节,具体如下:第一部分,理论考察,对政府环境治理失败的现状基于制度设计理论的视角进行了学理上的考究,以期找到隐藏在当前困境背后的深层次的制度原因。第二部分,从历史的角度出发,首先对不同财政体制下所延伸出来的政府环境治理的行为方式以及各个时期的环境政策工具进行了线性的脉络梳理和回顾,发现财政分权对政府行为主要是从“财政支出结构”、“中央转移支付”、“产业结构”三个方面进行影响和作用,在此基础上重点解读了分税制后地方政府环境治理行为的作用机制。第三部分,实证考察,主要是选取我国五个代表省份作为研究对象,分析这五个省份的财政分权度和财政收入与环境污染治理投资之间的关系,数据来源于2004-2013年《中国统计年鉴》与国家统计局网站,使用的计量分析软件是Stata.12,统计结果显示:以支出分权度衡量的财政分权对于环境治理具有显著的反向相关关系;以省级地方本级财政收入衡量的财政分权没有显著性:国内生产总值、外商直接投资、工业化水平等控制变量对环境的作用程度也存在差异。第四部分,引入美国、日本等国家在财政分权和环境污染方面的经验,旨在通过对中国和一些发达国家在财政改革方面经验的介绍和对比,特别是关于环境治理支出、中央转移支付和产业结构等方面的差异分析,探讨财政分权影响环境治理的国际经验,以期为我国未来的制度设计提供经验借鉴。第五部分,对如何走出困境主要是从环境污染的根源—制度层面进行了安排,并从建立健全的财政收支管理体制,调整地方政绩考核办法,转变地方政府的行为方式,加强社会公众参与环保监督等方面给出了具体建议。本文创新之处:1、作为一项政策和制度安排,财政分权有正的外部性和负的外部性,现在国内关于财政分权与正外部性(如医疗卫生、教育、基础设施建设等方面)的关系探讨上比较全面系统,而且一些改进措施对于问题的解决起到了实质性的推动作用。但是对于财政分权体制所导致的负面效应一环境污染,虽然也有不少学者对两者关系进行了探讨,也从经验角度出发,提出了一些走出困境的建议,如创新干部考核机制,创新公共管理体制等,但这些措施都没有抓住问题的本质,无法从根本上解决问题。本文的创新之处在于考察了环境污染背后的制度原因,从财政分权制度入手,分析这种经济制度对地方政府环境治理行为的影响,并从制度方面给出了一些措施和建议,理论视角和研究视角独到。2、在研究方法上,本文采取描述性研究和探索性研究相结合的方法,三角交叉检证,以提升研究的效度和信度。
[Abstract]:In recent years, environmental economists have gradually reached a new consensus on EKC, that is, the relationship between environmental pollution and fiscal decentralization will undergo a process of positive correlation to negative correlation, and this critical point is the level of fiscal capacity of local governments. For China, the current empirical analysis is not only nationwide, but also the provincial panel data analysis shows that China's per capita financial capacity and inverted U curve inflection point value is far from each other, so the improvement of environmental quality can not be expected to increase the wealth of the people, otherwise it will fall into " In fact, the central government, as the highest representative of the public interest, has realized that "environmental pollution" is an important issue related to human well-being, but in the process of policy delivery and implementation, local governments are driven by fiscal decentralization and political incentives. In recent years, people have gradually realized the negative effects of fiscal decentralization on the human environment. As a kind of "institutional arrangement", the utilitarianism of local government's environmental governance behavior has caused me. Based on this, this paper discusses the "intermediate link" between fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution-the behavior of local government environmental governance. It combines normative analysis with empirical analysis, empirical analysis with historical analysis. The second part, from the historical point of view, first of all, the government environmental governance extended from different financial systems. This paper makes a linear review of the behavioral patterns and environmental policy instruments in different periods, and finds that fiscal decentralization has an impact on government behavior mainly from the following three aspects: fiscal expenditure structure, central transfer payment and industrial structure. On this basis, this paper focuses on the interpretation of local governments after the tax system. The third part, the empirical study, mainly selected five representative provinces in China as the research object, analyzed the relationship between fiscal decentralization and fiscal revenue and environmental pollution control investment in these five provinces, data from 2004-2013 < China Statistical Yearbook > and the website of the National Bureau of Statistics, the use of accounting. Quantitative analysis software is Stata.12, the statistical results show that fiscal decentralization measured by expenditure decentralization has a significant inverse correlation with environmental governance; fiscal decentralization measured by provincial and local fiscal revenue has no significant impact on the environment: GDP, foreign direct investment, industrialization level and other control variables on the role of the environment The fourth part introduces the experience of the United States, Japan and other countries in fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution, aiming at discussing finance by introducing and comparing the experience of China and some developed countries in fiscal reform, especially the differences in environmental control expenditure, central transfer payment and industrial structure. The fifth part is about how to get out of the predicament mainly from the source of environmental pollution - the system level, and how to establish a sound fiscal revenue and expenditure management system, adjust the local performance evaluation method, and change the local government's administration. In order to strengthen the public participation in environmental protection supervision and other aspects of specific recommendations. This paper innovations: 1, as a policy and institutional arrangements, fiscal decentralization has positive externalities and negative externalities, and now on the domestic fiscal decentralization and positive externalities (such as health care, education, infrastructure construction, etc.) on the relationship between the discussion Although many scholars have discussed the relationship between environmental pollution and fiscal decentralization, they have also put forward some suggestions to get out of the predicament from the perspective of experience, such as innovative work. The innovation of this paper is to examine the institutional reasons behind environmental pollution, start with the fiscal decentralization system, analyze the impact of this economic system on local government environmental governance behavior, and from the system. In order to enhance the validity and reliability of the research, this paper adopts the method of combining descriptive research with exploratory research and triangular cross-examination.
【学位授予单位】:华中师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:F812.2;D630

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