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集组理论在批发价格契约中的应用研究

发布时间:2018-03-18 05:38

  本文选题:契约 切入点:集组理论 出处:《清华大学》2015年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:个体理性下的利益冲突长久以来制约了供应链契约的不断完善,而集组理论同时考虑到个体理性和集体理性,研究将集组理论引入完善供应链契约,继承并突破了传统博弈模型的经济人假设和分析范式,使博弈局中人在目标利益一致的情况下做出更加明智的决策,为理性合作提供更多可能。本文基于集组理论设计重构批发价格契约,在同时考虑到个体理性和集体理性的情况下分析需求依赖于批发价格的供应链契约,并将批发价格契约在现实经济环境中的博弈过程用数学方式表现出来,展开关于契约效果及影响的分析,深层次剖析批发价格契约的本质。针对影响博弈局中人集中决策或者分散决策概率的因素展开分析,分别包括批发价格、商品的市场需求弹性及此二者对概率的综合影响,确定促使供应链顺利集中决策的最优情况,以及在一般批发价格契约博弈中的批发价格通常出现的范围。讨论间接影响到契约的因素,分析供应商和零售商在新契约环境下不同行业的收入成本比及其对选择集中决策概率的作用影响。以花生油行业和中档次轿车行业为例,分别讨论了批发价格、商品的市场需求弹性、收入成本比等对供应商和零售商选择集中决策概率的影响,作出Mat Lab和SPSS等数据分析软件呈现出来的效果图,验证了供应链在新契约环境下的普遍规律及各个因素之间的内在联系。通过分析供应链的结构特征,市场结构和市场环境的特殊性对批发价格的影响,阐述了供应链使用新契约不断调整适应环境的可预见行为、新契约在不同条件下受到的发展限制因素及自我调整完善方向。设计并实施行为实验,讨论集中决策和分散决策对批发价格契约效果的影响,分别通过两个实验模拟讨论现实行业行情,讨论批发价格、核心企业、组间竞争等内部因素,和市场价格、商品特征、行业交流等外部因素对供应链企业的博弈选择影响。
[Abstract]:The conflict of interests under the individual rationality has restricted the continuous improvement of supply chain contract for a long time, and the set group theory takes into account both individual rationality and collective rationality, so the set group theory is introduced to perfect supply chain contract. It inherits and breaks through the economic man hypothesis and analysis paradigm of the traditional game model, which makes the people in the game make a more intelligent decision under the condition of consistent goal and interests. This paper designs and reconstructs the wholesale price contract based on the set group theory, and analyzes the supply chain contract in which demand depends on wholesale price, taking into account both individual rationality and collective rationality. The game process of wholesale price contract in the real economic environment is shown in mathematical way, and the effect and influence of the contract are analyzed. The essence of wholesale price contract is deeply analyzed. The factors that affect the probability of centralized or decentralized decision-making in game bureau are analyzed, including wholesale price, market demand elasticity of commodities and their comprehensive influence on probability. To determine the optimal conditions for the successful centralization decision of the supply chain and the range of wholesale prices that usually occur in the general wholesale price contract game. The factors indirectly affecting the contract are discussed. This paper analyzes the effect of the ratio of income to cost and its influence on the probability of centralization decision in different industries of suppliers and retailers under the new contract environment. Taking peanut oil industry and middle grade car industry as examples, the wholesale prices are discussed respectively. The impact of commodity market demand elasticity and ratio of income to cost on the decision making probability of suppliers and retailers, and the effect of data analysis software such as Mat Lab and SPSS. It verifies the general law of supply chain under the new contract environment and the internal relation between various factors. By analyzing the structural characteristics of supply chain, the influence of market structure and market environment particularity on wholesale price, This paper expounds the foreseeable behavior of the supply chain using the new contract to adapt to the environment, the development limitation factors and the direction of self-adjustment of the new contract under different conditions, and designs and implements the behavior experiment. This paper discusses the influence of centralization decision and decentralized decision on the effect of wholesale price contract, discusses the real industry price, wholesale price, core enterprise, competition among groups, and market price, commodity characteristics through two experiments, respectively. Industry exchange and other external factors affect the game selection of supply chain enterprises.
【学位授予单位】:清华大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:F274

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