贸易信贷对供应商偷工减料生产行为的影响研究

发布时间：2018-05-09 06:44

  本文选题：供应链 + 供应链风险　； 参考：《南京大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着全球化的发展和推动,供应链在全球范围内的延伸,企业之间的竞争越来越表现为企业所在供应链之间的竞争,同时技术进步和需求的多样化也使得产品周期不断缩短,企业面临缩短交货期、降低产品成本、维持产品质量的压力。由此,供应链上的产品偷工减料问题愈发频繁,也越来越难以控制。在产品质量问题日益严峻的今天,产品偷工减料导致了许多产品质量事故,造成了严重的经济和健康损失。在管理生活和研究中,贸易信贷,作为一种控制产品偷工减料的控制手段,被广泛使用并得到不断发展。贸易信贷是指企业间由于产品或者服务交易而发生的商业信用,包括贸易信贷信用和预付货款信用。贸易信贷具有缓解资金约束、传递产品质量信息、充当非价格竞争手段以及协调供应链的功能,贸易信贷也是企业短期融资的主要来源和重要手段,因此交易信用在实践中得到了广泛的应用。贸易信贷的普遍存在及其对企业运营的重要影响引起了学术界的密切关注,目前已有研究从运营管理的视角分析了贸易信贷与控制产品质量之间的关系。本文从供应链管理的视角研究了贸易信贷对上游供应商的偷工减料的生产行为的影响,具体的研究内容包括:在斯坦科尔伯格博弈下,在给定贸易信贷合约时,销售商使用贸易信贷可以防止供应商的偷工减料的生产行为,并获得最优的销售利润。研究最优的贸易信贷合同,我们可以得到如下结论:(1)当供应商偷工减料的成本相对降低时,供应商偷工减料的动机也相对升高,销售商可以通过增加最优付款期限来管理供应商的偷工减料的生产行为;(2)当供应商偷工减料的成本相对较低时,贸易信贷合同管理供应商偷工减料的生产行为的效果也较好;(3)当供应商的偷工减料动机高时,供应商的偷工减料的生产行为也会使得销售商乃至整个供应链系统更难获得更大的利润;(4)销售商的最优利润和供应商和供应商和销售商的融资成本之差越小,销售商也更有可能获得最优利润水平,则更有动机去使用贸易信贷合同。
[Abstract]:With the development and promotion of globalization and the extension of the supply chain in the global scope, the competition among enterprises is more and more manifested in the competition among the supply chains in which the enterprises belong. At the same time, the technological progress and the diversification of demand also make the product cycle shorter and shorter. Enterprises face the pressure of shortening delivery time, reducing product cost and maintaining product quality. As a result, product jerry-building in the supply chain is becoming more frequent and more difficult to control. Nowadays, the problem of product quality is becoming more and more serious, which results in a lot of product quality accidents and serious economic and health losses. In management life and research, trade credit, as a control means to control product jerry-building, has been widely used and continuously developed. Trade credit refers to the commercial credit between enterprises due to the transaction of products or services, including trade credit and advance payment credit. Trade credit has the functions of relieving financial constraints, transmitting product quality information, acting as a non-price competitive means and coordinating supply chain. Trade credit is also the main source and important means of short-term financing for enterprises. Therefore, transaction credit has been widely used in practice. The widespread existence of trade credit and its important influence on the operation of enterprises have attracted close attention in academic circles. At present, the relationship between trade credit and product quality control has been analyzed from the perspective of operation management. From the perspective of supply chain management, this paper studies the influence of trade credit on the production behavior of upstream suppliers. The specific research contents include: under the condition of Steinkelberg game, when the trade credit contract is given, Vendors use trade credit to prevent suppliers from underperforming production and to achieve optimal sales profits. By studying the optimal trade credit contract, we can draw the following conclusion: 1) when the cost of shoddy by suppliers is relatively low, the incentive for suppliers to cut corners is also relatively higher. Vendors can manage suppliers' shoddy production behavior by increasing the optimal payment period.) when the cost of shoddy is relatively low, Trade credit contracts also have a better effect on the production behavior of suppliers in the management of shoddy production.) when suppliers have a high incentive for cutting corners, The less productive behavior of suppliers also makes it more difficult for vendors and the entire supply chain system to obtain greater profits.) the smaller the difference between the optimal profits of vendors and the financing costs of suppliers and vendors, the smaller the difference between the optimal profits of vendors and the financing costs of suppliers and vendors. Vendors are also more likely to achieve optimal profit levels and are more motivated to use trade credit contracts.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274;F275;F832.4
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本文编号：1864994