非对称信息下闭环供应链质量控制的契约协调研究

发布时间：2018-05-09 07:57

本文选题：闭环供应链 + 质量控制　；参考：《重庆理工大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在近十几年里,人们的环保意识增强并且国家的环保法规也日渐完善,企业在追求经济利润的同时也越来越重视对自身所产生的社会责任,开始对本公司的废旧产品进行回收管理,注重循环经济模式对企业的可持续发展。而闭环供应链的管理使得整个系统达到可持续经济模式,在保持经济增长的同时进行循环利用,正符合了循环经济的理念。在闭环供应链的逆向回收管理中,企业进行创收的同时,也正向强化了自身的企业社会责任,提高了企业的核心竞争力。在闭环供应链中,各节点都是独立进行决策,要达到闭环供应链的收益最大化,则要通过各节点的合作来完成整个闭环供应链的目标。因此,本文研究了不同主体负责回收时,影响回收产品质量管理的回收水平和质量预防水平对各节点和闭环供应链期望收益的影响,通过设计质量激励契约来达到闭环供应链的协调。在前人研究的基础上,本文从质量管理角度,探讨在非对称信息条件下,对影响回收产品质量的因素进行分析,建立委托代理模型,并通过对比各节点和闭环供应链的收益,建立质量激励契约来实现闭环供应链的质量控制管理。本文使用maple18对模型数据进行数值仿真分析。本文的主要研究工作及其结论有:(1)在销售商作为回收主体时,质量检测水平同质量预防水平因素呈反比,同回收水平因素呈正比;在再制造商作为回收主体时,质量检测水平同质量预防水平因素和回收水平因素都成反比。(2)在销售商负责回收时,选择回收水平进行信号传递比选择质量预防水平进行信号传递的效果更好。(3)在再制造商负责回收时,销售商进行质量控制后,能促进再制造商质量预防水平和回收水平的提高,此时闭环供应链有最优期望收益,销售商和再制造商的期望收益也同时达到最优。对比已有的国内外文献,本文的创新之处有:(1)本文是在非对称信息的条件下,研究闭环供应链的质量管理问题。在已有的质量管理文献中,多以完全信息为前提进行模型构建,基于回收产品质量的不确定性,在实际应用中有一定局限性。非对称信息条件下研究闭环供应链质量管理更符合实际。(2)在研究废旧电子产品的回收质量控制问题中,进行道德风险的讨论。在回收和再制造过程中,本文不仅研究了再制造件制造前逆向选择的道德风险问题,同时也研究了再制造件制造后,再制造商有隐藏再制造件质量的道德风险问题。(3)本文引入双因素影响下的质量激励机制。分析了回收水平因素和质量预防水平因素在分别作用和共同作用下,对各节点和闭环供应链的整体期望收益影响。
[Abstract]:In the past ten years, people's environmental awareness has been strengthened and the national environmental protection laws and regulations have been gradually improved. Enterprises are also paying more and more attention to their own social responsibility while pursuing economic profits. Start recycling management of the company's waste products, pay attention to the sustainable development of the recycling economy model for enterprises. The management of the closed-loop supply chain makes the whole system achieve the sustainable economic model, while maintaining economic growth and recycling, which is in line with the concept of circular economy. In the reverse recovery management of closed-loop supply chain, while enterprises generate income, they also strengthen their own corporate social responsibility and improve their core competitiveness. In the closed-loop supply chain, each node makes the decision independently. In order to maximize the profit of the closed-loop supply chain, the goal of the whole closed-loop supply chain must be accomplished through the cooperation of each node. Therefore, when different agents are responsible for recycling, the influence of recovery level and quality prevention level on the expected income of each node and closed-loop supply chain is studied. The coordination of closed-loop supply chain is achieved by designing quality incentive contract. On the basis of previous studies, this paper discusses the factors affecting the quality of recycled products under asymmetric information conditions from the point of view of quality management, establishes a principal-agent model, and compares the benefits of each node and the closed-loop supply chain. Establish quality incentive contract to realize quality control management of closed-loop supply chain. In this paper, maple18 is used to simulate the model data. The main research work and conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) when the seller is the main body of recycling, the quality detection level is inversely proportional to the quality prevention level factor, and is directly proportional to the recovery level factor, and when the manufacturer is the recycling main body, the quality detection level is inversely proportional to the quality prevention level factor. The quality detection level is inversely proportional to the quality prevention level factor and the recovery level factor) when the seller is responsible for the recovery, Selecting the recovery level for signal transmission is better than selecting the quality prevention level for signal transmission.) when the re-manufacturer is responsible for the recovery, the seller can promote the improvement of the quality prevention level and the recovery level of the re-manufacturer after the quality control. At this time, the closed-loop supply chain has the optimal expected return, and the expected return of the seller and the re-manufacturer is also optimal. Comparing with the domestic and foreign literature, the innovation of this paper is to study the quality management of closed-loop supply chain under the condition of asymmetric information. In the existing quality management literature, most of the models are constructed on the premise of complete information. Based on the uncertainty of the quality of recycled products, there are some limitations in practical application. The study of closed-loop supply chain quality management under asymmetric information is more in line with the reality. (2) in the study of recycling quality control of used and end-of-life electronic products, moral hazard is discussed. In the process of recycling and remanufacturing, this paper not only studies the moral hazard of adverse selection before remanufacturing, but also studies the problem after remanufacturing. The re-manufacturer has the moral hazard problem of hidden remanufactured part quality. (3) this paper introduces the quality incentive mechanism under the influence of two factors. The effect of recovery level factor and quality prevention level factor on the overall expected income of each node and closed-loop supply chain is analyzed.
【学位授予单位】：重庆理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

【参考文献】