考虑自有品牌与直销渠道情形下的合作广告模型研究

发布时间：2018-08-07 08:38

【摘要】： 近些年来,零售商自有品牌成为供应链管理的热点之一。像沃尔玛,家乐福这样的大型连锁超市,越来越多地开始销售自有品牌产品。而同时随着网络的普及,网上直销也成为制造商的一个重要销售渠道。当供应链同时存在自有品牌与直销渠道时,合作广告策略也比原来变得更加复杂,诸多因素之间纷繁杂糅,使管理者凭借直觉与经验的应对措施难保可靠。本文尝试通过建立整体概念模型,综合考虑各种因素,详尽计算比较了五种可能的博弈模型:制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型,零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型,制造商决定分担比例的Nash博弈模型,零售商决定分担比例的Nash博弈模型以及外生给定分担比例模型,求解出各个博弈模型下的均衡解,然后对比利润函数,得到了如下结论:a)具有足够强市场势力的博弈方,在Stackelberg博弈下的利润高于其他博弈情形;b)双方市场势力相差不多时,并且广告的边际利润也相差不多时,广告支出分担比例的决策权非常重要;c)在单边补贴的情形下,外生给定分担比例是一个系统利润最大的折中策略。此外本文还将模型进行了扩展,分别讨论了零售商引入自有品牌和制造商采取直销渠道,对供应链所产生的影响。最后本文给出了双边合作广告补贴合同措施,得出外生给定分担比例的双边广告补贴可以使供应链协调,系统的整体利润达到最大。
[Abstract]:In recent years, retailer's own brand has become one of the hot spots in supply chain management. Large supermarket chains like Wal-Mart and Carrefour are increasingly selling their own brands. At the same time, with the popularity of the network, online direct selling has become an important sales channel for manufacturers. When the supply chain has its own brand and direct marketing channel at the same time, the cooperative advertising strategy becomes more complex than before, and many factors are mixed, which makes it difficult for managers to rely on intuition and experience to deal with the problem. In this paper, five possible game models are calculated and compared: Stackelberg game model led by manufacturer and Stackelberg game model led by retailer. The Nash game model in which the manufacturer decides to share the proportion, the Nash game model in which the retailer decides to share the proportion and the exogenous given share model are used to solve the equilibrium solution under each game model, and then the profit function is compared. We get the following conclusion: (a) if the game has strong enough market power, the profit in Stackelberg game is higher than that in other game cases (b) the market power between the two parties is not much different, and the marginal profit of advertising is not much different. The decision power of the proportion of advertising expenditure is very important. In the case of unilateral subsidy, the exogenous shared proportion is a compromise strategy with the greatest profit. In addition, the model is extended to discuss the influence on supply chain caused by retailers introducing their own brands and manufacturers adopting direct marketing channels. Finally, this paper gives the measures of bilateral cooperative advertising subsidy contract, and draws the conclusion that the bilateral advertising subsidy with a given proportion of exogenous advertising can make the supply chain coordinate, and the overall profit of the system reaches the maximum.
【学位授予单位】：清华大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F713.8;F224.32

【共引文献】