我国煤电产业链纵向关系研究

发布时间：2018-06-09 14:51

本文选题：煤电 + 产业链　；参考：《南京财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：煤炭、电力产业作为我国国民经济的基础性能源产业，两者产品的价格和供给的大幅波动将波及下游相关产业和居民生活，阻碍国民经济的健康发展。随着政府对煤炭、电力产业市场化改革的实施进程，以及加入WTO后经济高速增长对煤炭、电力能源需求的带动，紧密相连的这两个上下游产业间的矛盾愈加凸显。自2002年起，连续几年个别地区甚至全国范围内普遍爆发了“煤荒”和“电荒”，拉闸限电成为常事，煤电产业间的冲突越演越烈。由于我国能源消耗结构以及发电技术经济的限制，未来在很长一段时间内国内大部分的电力生产将仍以消耗煤炭的火力发电为主。随着现代经济发展对电力能源需求逐步提高，中国日益严峻的煤电冲突使较高水平的用电量无法得到满足，这严重影响到中国的经济良性发展和百姓正常生活。对此，政府曾先后采取多种煤电治理模式以及措施，如煤炭产运需衔接会、煤电价格联动、提倡煤电企业联营和一体化等纵向合作形式，以期缓解煤电矛盾。近年来，煤电一体化成为该产业链上、下游企业之间进行纵向合作的主流。因而探讨煤电矛盾形成的深层原因和煤电纵向关系的最优选择形式，成为近几年学术界关注的热点。为彻底理清煤、电产业紧张关系的成因和探究合理可行的煤电矛盾治理模式，本文在总结和借鉴前人研究的基础上，运用基于交易成本的纵向关系选择理论、政府规制、博弈论以及定量分析等研究方法，，首先简要回顾了煤炭、电力产业的市场化改革历程，并实证分析了政策调控下煤炭和电力市场的结构、绩效和价格关系的变化。其次理顺了两者紧张关系的历史演进，并构建有限次和无限次重复博弈模型去分析煤电冲突的形成机理，结论认为煤电双方的利益之争和纵向价格双轨制是煤电冲突的实质和根本原因，由此提出煤电双方要进行纵向合作。之后通过构建政府纵向规制背景下的模型，对比分析了电煤重点合同并轨前后的纵向一体化与纵向分离的效应，着重提出在未来电煤市场完全放开后，采用纵向一体化合作模式（尤其是电力企业后向一体化）以改善两者的紧张关系的形势将更为紧迫。最后提出了一些建议和展望，希望能对其他类似产业提供一定的借鉴意义。
[Abstract]:The coal and electric power industry is the basic energy industry of our national economy. The large fluctuation of the price and supply of the two products will affect the downstream related industries and residents' lives and hinder the healthy development of the national economy. With the implementation of the market-oriented reform of the coal and power industry, and the rapid economic growth of the coal and power energy demand, the contradiction between the two industries is becoming more and more prominent. Since 2002, "coal shortage" and "electricity shortage" have broken out in some regions and even all over the country for several years in succession. It is common to limit electricity by pulling the gate, and the conflicts between the coal and power industries are becoming more and more serious. Due to the limitation of energy consumption structure and power generation technology and economy in China, most of the domestic electric power production will still be coal-consuming thermal power generation for a long time in the future. With the development of modern economy, the demand for electricity and energy has gradually increased, and China's increasingly severe coal and electricity conflicts have made the higher level of electricity consumption unsatisfied, which has seriously affected the healthy economic development of China and the normal life of its people. The government has adopted a variety of coal and power management models and measures, such as coal production and transportation to link up, coal and electricity price linkage, promote coal and electricity enterprise association and integration and other vertical forms of cooperation, in order to alleviate the contradiction between coal and electricity. In recent years, the integration of coal and electricity has become the mainstream of vertical cooperation among downstream enterprises in the industrial chain. Therefore, the discussion of the deep causes of coal power contradiction and the optimal choice of vertical relationship between coal and electricity has become a hot topic in academic circles in recent years. On the basis of summing up and drawing lessons from previous studies, this paper applies the theory of vertical relationship selection based on transaction cost to government regulation. Game theory and quantitative analysis. Firstly, the paper briefly reviews the market-oriented reform of coal and electricity industry, and empirically analyzes the changes of the structure, performance and price relationship of coal and electricity market under policy control. Secondly, the paper straightens out the historical evolution of the tension between the two, and constructs the finite and infinite repeated game models to analyze the formation mechanism of coal power conflict. It is concluded that the conflict between coal and electricity is essentially and fundamentally caused by the conflict between coal and electricity, and the vertical cooperation between the two sides should be carried out. Then, by constructing the model under the background of government longitudinal regulation, this paper compares and analyzes the effects of vertical integration and vertical separation before and after the merger of key coal contracts, and puts forward emphatically that after the future coal market is completely liberalized, It will be more urgent to adopt the mode of vertical integration cooperation (especially backward integration of electric power enterprises) to improve the tense relationship between them. Finally, some suggestions and prospects are put forward, hoping to provide some reference for other similar industries.
【学位授予单位】：南京财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F426.21;F426.61

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