地方财政杠杆的激励机制、增长绩效与调整取向研究

发布时间：2019-07-10 15:57

【摘要】：本文运用空间滞后Tobit和非线性动态门槛等前沿计量模型,从时、空两个维度重新审视了地方财政杠杆的激励机制和增长绩效。结果发现:(1)地方政府传统融资模式隐含着双重卸责动机,即"隐性担保"诱发的跨域卸责和"期限错配"诱发的跨期卸责,受传统政绩考评机制激励,"卸责组"省区形成相互仿效卸责的区域传染效应;(2)纵向失衡的财权事权配置框架、渐进放松的显性融资约束及地方政府同金融机构基于利益互联的隐性授信契约,成为卸责融资行为难以忽略的制度背景;(3)侧重增长绩效而非福利配置的制度安排,诱导地方政府扩张杠杆主要以市政建设和公共资产积累为导向,但西部落后省区表现出更强烈的短视卸责融资倾向,形成流动性风险的区域失衡;(4)卸责融资诱发非线性增长绩效门槛效应,跨越门槛的杠杆绩效趋降,但尚未明显阻滞增长,显性门槛值高于现行流动性风险警戒线,中长期执行警戒线仍有上调空间。本文的研究结论为新常态下的地方财政杠杆调整提供了依据。
文内图片：

图片说明：中国地方财政杠杆率的演化趋势及区域布局
[Abstract]:In this paper, the spatial lag Tobit and nonlinear dynamic threshold are used to re-examine the incentive mechanism and growth performance of local fiscal leverage from the dimensions of time and space. The results show that: (1) the traditional financing model of local government implies double shirking motivation, that is, the cross-domain discharge induced by "implicit guarantee" and the intertemporal unloading caused by "time mismatch". Inspired by the traditional performance evaluation mechanism, the provinces and regions of the "unloading group" form the regional contagion effect of imitating each other; (2) the vertically unbalanced framework of financial power allocation, the gradual relaxation of explicit financing constraints and the implicit credit contract between local governments and financial institutions based on the interconnection of interests have become the institutional background of shirking financing behavior. (3) the institutional arrangement, which focuses on growth performance rather than welfare allocation, leads local governments to expand mainly under the guidance of municipal construction and the accumulation of public assets, but the backward provinces and regions in the west show a stronger tendency to shirk their responsibilities and finance, resulting in a regional imbalance of liquidity risk. (4) the nonlinear growth performance threshold effect is induced by unloading financing, and the leverage performance across the threshold tends to decline, but it has not obviously blocked the growth. The dominant threshold is higher than the current liquidity risk warning line, and there is still room for the medium and long term implementation of the warning line to be raised. The conclusions of this paper provide a basis for the adjustment of local fiscal leverage under the new normal.
【作者单位】：南开大学经济学院;中国特色社会主义经济建设协同创新中心;华南理工大学经济与贸易学院;中央财经大学税务学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71203106) 国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDB124);国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CJY074) 中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(63172003)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F812.7

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