基于利益博弈的中央政策执行阻滞分析与对策研究

发布时间：2018-01-25 06:46

本文关键词： 中央政策执行阻滞地方利益利益博弈　出处：《安徽大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：改革开放以来,我国在经济、政治等各方面都取得了重大成就,这与公共政策的正确制定和有效实施是分不开的。但是,政策的制定到政策的有效实施及政策目标的实现之间还有一段相当长的距离,政策在贯彻落实的过程中往往会出现“有令不行、有禁不止”,“上有政策、下有对策”等政策执行阻滞,导致政策目标难以实现、中央的宏观调控难以落实、损害了公共利益,也削弱了党和政府的权威性。如何治理中央政策执行阻滞是公共政策研究中的重要问题。影响政策实施效果的因素是多方面的,包括政策本身的质量(如政策的完备性、科学性、可行性等)、政策执行主体、政策目标群体、政策资源、政策执行环境等。笔者认为政策执行主体是影响政策有效实施的最重要因素。计划经济体制向市场经济体制的转型促使人们利益意识觉醒,非制度化的放权让利扩大了地方政府的自主权,地方政府日益成为独立的行为主体和利益主体,地方利益显性化并日益膨胀。地方利益对于推进地方经济社会快速发展起到了积极的作用,但是过度追求地方利益就会导致地方保护主义、“短视效应”等现象。受逐利动机的驱使,在中央政策的执行过程中,当中央政策与地方利益冲突时,地方政府就会变通执行,导致中央政策执行阻滞。本文运用利益分析法和博弈分析法,以地方政府和中央政府作为行为主体对中央政策执行阻滞现象进行研究,探析问题产生的原因,并试图提出治理中央政策执行阻滞的对策。论文分为五章,主要内容如下：第一章：绪论。首先介绍了本文的选题背景、梳理了国内外学术界相关研究综述,接着介绍了本文的研究思路与研究方法,最后介绍论文的主要内容与结构安排。第二章：中央政策执行阻滞的主要表现形式及其危害性。首先介绍了政策执行的概念及其在政策运行过程中的地位和重要作用,然后结合实践中存在的事例分析中央政策执行阻滞的表现形式及其危害。第三章：利益博弈视角下的中央政策执行阻滞。首先界定利益及博弈的概念和内涵,然后选取地方政府和中央政府作为博弈主体,分析地方政府与中央政府之间的利益博弈和地方政府间的利益博弈。第四章：中央政策执行阻滞产生的原因分析。中央政策执行阻滞产生的根本原因是地方政府的自利性,而地方利益消极作用的发挥在很多情况下是现行体制不健全和制度供给缺失使然。第五章：治理中央政策执行阻滞的基本对策。本章结合前面的原因分析提出几点治理中央政策执行阻滞的基本对策。治理中央政策执行阻滞首先应该对不同利益主体间的利益进行整合,促进合作博弈；同时,应健全职能配置,合理分配中央和地方利益,做到责权利相一致,减少利益冲突；再次,应完善制度,优化博弈规则,限制地方利益消极作用的发挥；最后应培育执行文化,弱化地方政府的逐利动机。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China has made great achievements in economy, politics and so on, which is inseparable from the correct formulation and effective implementation of public policy. There is still a long distance between the formulation of policies and the effective implementation of policies and the realization of policy objectives. The implementation of policies such as countermeasures has been blocked, which has led to the difficulty of achieving the policy objectives, and the difficulty of implementing the central macro-control and control, thus harming the public interests. It also weakens the authority of the Party and the government. How to manage the block of central policy implementation is an important issue in the public policy research. The factors that affect the effect of policy implementation are various. Including the quality of the policy itself (such as policy completeness, science, feasibility and so on), policy implementation of the main body, policy target groups, policy resources. The author thinks that the main body of policy implementation is the most important factor that affects the effective implementation of policy. The transition from planned economy system to market economy system promotes people's interest awareness. The non-institutionalized devolution of power has enlarged the autonomy of local government, which has become an independent subject of action and interest. Local interests are becoming dominant and expanding day by day. Local interests have played a positive role in promoting the rapid development of local economy and society, but excessive pursuit of local interests will lead to local protectionism. The phenomenon of "short-sighted effect" is driven by the motive of banishing interest. In the process of implementing the central policy, when the central policy conflicts with the local interests, the local government will carry out the policy adaptively. This paper uses interest analysis and game analysis to study the phenomenon of central policy execution block with local government and central government as the main body to explore the causes of the problems. The paper is divided into five chapters, the main content is as follows: chapter one: introduction. First, introduced the background of this paper, combed the domestic and foreign academic circles related research summary. Then it introduces the research ideas and methods of this paper. Finally, the main contents and structure of the thesis are introduced. Chapter two:. The main forms of the central policy execution block and its harmfulness. Firstly, the concept of policy implementation and its position and important role in the process of policy operation are introduced. Then it analyzes the manifestation and harm of the central policy execution block in the light of practical examples. Chapter three: the central policy execution block from the perspective of interest game. Firstly, define the concept and connotation of interest and game. Then choose the local government and the central government as the main game. Analysis of the interest game between the local government and the central government and the interest game between the local government. Chapter 4th:. The root cause of the central policy execution block is the self-interest of the local government. In many cases, the negative effects of local interests are caused by the unsound system and the lack of institutional supply. Chapter 5th:. In this chapter, the author puts forward some basic countermeasures for managing the block of central policy implementation in combination with the reasons mentioned above. First of all, the management of central policy execution block should be directed against the different interest parties in the first place. The interests are integrated. Promoting cooperative game; At the same time, the allocation of functions should be improved, the central and local interests should be allocated rationally, the responsibility and rights should be consistent, and the conflicts of interests should be reduced. Thirdly, we should perfect the system, optimize the game rules and limit the negative effects of local interests. Finally, the executive culture should be cultivated and the local government's motive of pursuing profit should be weakened.
【学位授予单位】：安徽大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630

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