政府补贴对京津冀雾霾防控策略的区间博弈分析

发布时间：2018-03-10 09:45

本文选题：合作博弈　切入点：雾霾防控策略　出处：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文利用模糊数学理论和合作博弈论,分别从民众、企业以及政府的角度综合考虑治理雾霾需要的直接治理成本、经济发展成本、社会稳定成本以及社会健康成本,建立京津冀雾霾非合作治理模型以及区间合作治理博弈模型,分别计算了京津冀在非合作与合作情况下雾霾的治理成本、不治理成本以及治理策略,并考虑政府补贴对京津冀治理策略的影响,利用区间Slhapley值对最小的政府补贴进行分配.结论表明:没有政府补贴,京津冀三地均无法负担雾霾治理成本;相对于非合作治理模式,合作治理雾霾时政府所需的补贴最少.
[Abstract]:Based on fuzzy mathematics theory and cooperative game theory, this paper considers the direct cost of governance, the cost of economic development, the cost of social stability and the cost of social health from the perspective of people, enterprises and government, respectively. The non-cooperative governance model of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei haze and the interval cooperative governance game model are established, and the governance cost, non-governance cost and governance strategy of haze are calculated respectively. Considering the influence of government subsidy on the governance strategy of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, the minimum government subsidy is allocated by using interval Slhapley value. The conclusion shows that without government subsidy, the three places of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei can not afford the cost of haze governance; Compared with the non-cooperative governance model, the government needs the least subsidies when the haze is co-operated.
【作者单位】：首都师范大学管理学院;北京工商大学商学院;北京交通大学经济管理学院;北京物资学院;
【基金】：北京市自然科学基金(9152002) 北京市教委社科计划面上项目(0142132014) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(17YJC630203)~~
【分类号】：D630;X513

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