“项目下乡”中的共谋行为与分利秩序

发布时间：2018-04-22 12:34

本文选题：项目制 + 项目下乡　；参考：《探索》2017年03期

【摘要】：当前,"项目下乡"现象成为理论界关注的热点。围绕田野观察和已有研究可以发现,基层政府及其直接上级行政部门之间构成的"条块关系"因"项目"的介入而发生一些新的变化。项目申请中的"共同包装"、项目落地中的"共同摆平"和项目评估中的"共同应付"行为共同构成了"项目下乡"中的"条块共谋"现象。这一现象实际上是基于"条""块"之间的分利逻辑。分利逻辑引发的共谋行为使基层政府间的行为日益嵌入一种"分利秩序"中,这易引发一些政策设计者原初所意想不到的消极结果。因此,规制基层政府间的"共谋"行为与分利秩序需要走向"参与式治理"。
[Abstract]:At present, the phenomenon of "project going to the countryside" has become the focus of attention in the field of theory. It is found that some new changes have taken place in the "strip relationship" between the grass-roots government and its direct higher administrative departments as a result of the intervention of the "project". The "joint packing" in the project application, the "joint handling" in the landing of the project and the "joint coping" behavior in the project evaluation constitute the "collusion" phenomenon in the "project going to the countryside". This phenomenon is actually based on the profit-sharing logic between "articles" and "blocks". The collusive behavior caused by the profit division logic makes the behavior of the grass-roots government embedded in a kind of "profit sharing order" day by day, which can easily lead to some negative results that the policy designers had not expected at the beginning. Therefore, the regulation of "collusion" behavior and profit sharing order between grass-roots governments needs to move towards "participatory governance".
【作者单位】：武汉大学政治与公共管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年项目“农民政治支持与乡村社会管理的路径选择研究”(12CZZ048),项目负责人:刘伟
【分类号】：D630

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