单向主导财政事权划分的悖论与化解:一个激励相容分析框架

发布时间：2018-04-29 19:37

本文选题：财政事权 + 支出责任　；参考：《北京行政学院学报》2017年03期

【摘要】：单向主导财政事权划分的模式保证了上级意志的体现,但是忽略了作为委托方的民众变量,出现了财政事权划分的维护中央权威与激发地方积极性、财力集中与责任下移、单向主导决策与地方信息优势、等级分明与权力差等、民生导向与晋升激励等五大悖论,改变了地方政府的激励模式,不能有效满足当地居民的公共需求。因此,需要在事权划分中加入民众这一变量,通过公共服务事责、规范转移支付、明确共同事权主体责任、加强纵向协商、地方考核民主化等措施建构起以中央、地方、当地居民为主体的三方激励相容制度,化解单向主导财政事权划分的悖论。
[Abstract]:The mode of unidirectional leading the division of financial affairs power ensures the embodiment of the superior will, but neglects the public variable as the entrusting party, and it appears that the division of financial affairs authority maintains the central authority and stimulates the local enthusiasm, and the financial resources centralize and the responsibility moves down. The five paradoxes of one-way leading decision-making and local information superiority, hierarchy and power difference, livelihood orientation and promotion incentive have changed the incentive mode of local government and can not meet the public needs of local residents effectively. Therefore, it is necessary to add this variable to the division of administrative power, to establish a central and local government by means of public service responsibility, regulating transfer payment, clarifying the responsibility of the subject of common administration, strengthening vertical consultation, and democratizing the local assessment, and so on. Local residents as the main body of the tripartite incentive compatibility system to resolve the unilateral dominant financial power division paradox.
【作者单位】：中南财经政法大学公共管理学院;
【基金】：湖北省2016年度软科学面上项目(2016ADC103) 中南财经政法大学研究生创新教育计划资助项目
【分类号】：D630

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