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地方政府质量、融资约束及企业投资

发布时间:2018-10-15 11:50
【摘要】:1958年,Modigliani和Miller提出了著名的MM定理,创建了现代资本结构理论。其指出,在完美市场的假设条件下,企业的筹资决策不影响企业市场价值,并且企业的投资与资本结构无关。然而,完美市场假设条件太过苛刻,信息不对称和委托代理等问题的存在使得企业的筹资成本因资本来源不同而不同,企业的投资策略与资本结构相关,企业普遍面临融资约束问题。国家实行财政改革以来,省级政府被授予较大的处理辖区内相关经济事务的权力,同时重GDP的官员考核晋升制度也提升了地方政府对经济活动的干预动机。对企业经济活动的干预离不开对资源的掌控,地方政府一方面通过掌控金融、能源等核心资本间接控制企业活动,另一方面又通过制定相关政策或依赖政企的依附关系直接干预企业经济活动。因此,政府质量的高低对企业资源配置能力与效率有着重大的影响。本文以沪深两市A股市场1333家非银行上市公司2006~2012年间的面板数据为研究对象,通过托宾Q投资理论模型考察了省级地方政府质量对上市公司投、融资的影响,并进一步研究了不同产权性质上市场公司其投、融资受地方政府质量影响的情况。本文结果显示,上市公司投资支出与表征投资机会的托宾Q值成正相关关系,这种正相关关系随着政府质量的提高而加强,托宾Q值能代表投资机会;上市场公司的投资支出与企业经营现金流量成正相关关系,这种正相关关系随着政府质量的提高得减弱,中国上市公司普遍存在融资约束现象。为进一步深入研究企业产权性质对投、融资的影响,本文分别考察了省级地方政府质量对国有、非国有上市公司以及中央国有和地方国有上市公司投、融资的影响,结果发现,相较于国有上市公司,省级地方政府质量对非国有上市公司投、融资影响较大;相较于中央国有上市公司,省级地方政府质量对地方国有上市公司投、融资有较大影响。在投资的效果分析中,本文发现,地方政府质量较高的地区,上市公司投资能带来企业销售收入更大的增长。最后,本文从政府、企业两个角度出发,提出改善上市公司投、融资现状的政策建议。
[Abstract]:In 1958, Modigliani and Miller put forward the famous MM theorem and established the modern capital structure theory. It points out that under the assumption of perfect market, the financing decision of the enterprise does not affect the market value of the enterprise, and the investment of the enterprise is independent of the capital structure. However, the perfect market assumption is too harsh, the information asymmetry and the principal-agent problems make the financing cost of the enterprise vary according to the capital source. The investment strategy of the enterprise is related to the capital structure. Enterprises generally face financing constraints. Since the implementation of fiscal reform, provincial governments have been given greater powers to deal with economic affairs within their jurisdiction, and the system of assessing and promoting GDP officials has also enhanced the incentive for local governments to intervene in economic activities. Intervention in the economic activities of enterprises cannot be separated from the control of resources. On the one hand, local governments indirectly control enterprise activities by controlling core capital such as finance, energy, etc. On the other hand, it directly interferes with the economic activities of enterprises by making relevant policies or relying on the dependence of government and enterprises. Therefore, the quality of the government has a significant impact on the ability and efficiency of enterprise resource allocation. Based on the panel data of 1333 non-bank listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2006 to 2012, this paper investigates the impact of provincial local government quality on the investment and financing of listed companies through Tobin Q investment theory model. Furthermore, the paper studies the influence of local government quality on the investment and financing of market companies with different property rights. The results show that there is a positive correlation between the investment expenditure of listed companies and the Tobin Q value, which is strengthened with the improvement of government quality, and the Tobin Q value can represent the investment opportunity. There is a positive correlation between the investment expenditure of the listed companies and the cash flow of the enterprises, which weakens with the improvement of the government quality, and the phenomenon of financing constraints exists in the listed companies in China. In order to further study the influence of the property right of enterprises on investment and financing, this paper investigates the influence of the quality of provincial local government on the investment and financing of state-owned, non-state-owned listed companies, as well as central and local state-owned listed companies, respectively. Compared with the state-owned listed companies, the quality of provincial local governments has a greater impact on the investment and financing of non-state-owned listed companies, while compared with the central state-owned listed companies, the quality of provincial local governments has a greater impact on the investment of local state-owned listed companies. In the analysis of the effect of investment, it is found that the investment of listed companies can bring more growth of sales income in the areas with high quality of local government. Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to improve the current situation of investment and financing of listed companies from the two angles of government and enterprise.
【学位授予单位】:南京财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:D630;F275;F832.4

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