基于利益相关者动态博弈的绿色建筑推进机制研究

发布时间：2018-07-24 17:57

【摘要】：绿色建筑是生态建筑、可持续建筑。发展绿色建筑是转变建筑业发展方式和城乡建设模式的根本途径。然而绿色建筑发展涉及政府、开发商、消费者等多个利益主体,彼此间相互依赖,又相互竞争。由于不同利益主体有不同的利益诉求,不同利益主体间缺乏共同的利益基础,缺乏有效的协作激励机制,严重制约了我国绿色建筑的发展。因此,分析绿色建筑发展路径及其经济特征,探究绿色建筑发展过程中供需两端利益主体间的利益诉求与博弈关系,以此建立推动绿色建筑发展的激励机制,对于促进绿色建筑健康可持续发展无疑具有重要意义。本文运用利益相关者理论,基于绿色建筑全生命周期分析了其发展路径,运用新兴产业生产函数模型,将绿色建筑发展过程划分为发展起步、快速发展和发展成熟三个阶段,并对其经济特征、优劣势进行了分析。以动态博弈模型为分析工具,构建了绿色建筑供给端与需求端动态博弈模型,运用逆推归纳分析法探究绿色建筑生命周期内各阶段自然条件下的利益相关者得益情况,并通过构建政策因素影响下的绿色建筑利益相关者演化博弈模型,研究了在有限理性不完全信息的绿色建筑利益相关者演化稳定策略,以及在供需两端,政策要素影响下复制形成的策略组合。绿色建筑供需各方动态博弈研究表明:从供给端来看,其市场壁垒(外部性)所增加的额外成本是成为开发商决定是否开发绿色建筑的关键因素。绿色建筑开发商的先行策略是决定后续开发商是否开发绿色建筑的重要依据与参考;而从需求端来看,不论消费者先行购买还是后续购买绿色建筑,对绿色建筑价值增值预期所增加的额外收益成为消费者决定是否购买绿色建筑的关键因素。由此可推断在自然推进状态下供需各方动态博弈的策略结果,不利于绿色建筑长期可持续发展。通过在演化博弈模型中引入政策因素,探讨各方演化博弈策略,为绿色建筑各阶段的推进机制提供思路:在发展起步期,负外部性占优,政策设计要针对开发传统建筑的开发商采取严苛的惩罚性措施,才能推进利益相关群体达到最优均衡;在快速发展期,正外部性占优,政策制定要倾向于对绿色建筑供需双方采取更多激励性举措,才能实现最优均衡;而在发展成熟期,外部性基本内化,政策制定要充分发挥市场的决定性作用,以满足税收收益、政绩收益与环境收益的平衡目标。
[Abstract]:Green building is ecological building, sustainable building. The development of green building is the fundamental way to change the development mode of construction industry and urban and rural construction mode. However, the development of green buildings involves the government, developers, consumers and other stakeholders, mutual dependence and competition. Due to the different interest demands of different stakeholders, the lack of common interest basis among different interest subjects and the lack of effective cooperative incentive mechanism, the development of green buildings in China is seriously restricted. Therefore, this paper analyzes the path of green building development and its economic characteristics, and probes into the interest demands and game relations between the interests of both ends of supply and demand in the process of green building development, so as to establish an incentive mechanism to promote the development of green building. Undoubtedly, it is of great significance to promote the healthy and sustainable development of green buildings. In this paper, based on the theory of stakeholders, the development path of green building is analyzed based on the whole life cycle of green building, and the development process of green building is divided into three stages: start, rapid development and mature development by using the production function model of new industry. And its economic characteristics, advantages and disadvantages are analyzed. Based on the dynamic game model, the dynamic game model of supply end and demand side of green building is constructed, and the benefit of stakeholders in each stage of the life cycle of green building is explored by using the inverse inductive analysis method. By constructing the evolutionary game model of green building stakeholders under the influence of policy factors, this paper studies the evolutionary stability strategy of green building stakeholders with limited rational incomplete information, as well as the two ends of supply and demand. Policy factors under the influence of the replication of the formation of a combination of strategies. The dynamic game study on the supply and demand of green building shows that the extra cost of the market barrier (externality) is the key factor for the developer to decide whether to develop the green building or not. The leading strategy of green building developers is the important basis and reference to decide whether or not the subsequent developers develop green buildings. From the demand side, whether consumers buy green buildings first or later buy green buildings, The additional revenue expected to be added to the value of green buildings is a key factor for consumers to decide whether to buy green buildings. It can be inferred that the strategic results of dynamic game between supply and demand parties in the state of natural propulsion are not conducive to the long-term sustainable development of green buildings. By introducing the policy factors into the evolutionary game model, this paper discusses the evolutionary game strategy of all parties, which provides ideas for the promotion mechanism of the green building in each stage: in the initial stage of development, negative externality dominates. The policy design must take severe punitive measures against developers who develop traditional buildings in order to promote the optimal balance of stakeholder groups; in the period of rapid development, positive externalities dominate. The policy making should be inclined to take more incentive measures to the supply and demand of green buildings in order to achieve the optimal equilibrium, while in the mature period of development, the externality is basically internalized, and the policy making should give full play to the decisive role of the market. In order to meet the tax revenue, performance income and environmental revenue balance goal.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.92;TU201.5

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