存货质押业务中银行与物流企业Stackelberg博弈行为分析

发布时间：2018-03-29 21:12

本文选题：存货质押融资　切入点：Stackelberg博弈模型　出处：《财贸研究》2012年03期

【摘要】：完全信息下的存货质押融资业务中,物流企业作为先行决策者决定风险承担比例,银行据此决定利率,对实践中双方博弈行为进行分析与求解的数值仿真研究表明:完全信息下由银行和物流企业"双边决定市场"的优势大于由银行单边决定的市场;借款企业高履约水平时,物流企业愿意通过提高自身的风险承担比例来换取银行减让利率;利率敏感度对均衡结果的影响较自有资金敏感度更为显著。
[Abstract]:In the financing business of inventory pledge under complete information, the logistics enterprise, as the leading decision maker, determines the risk-bearing ratio, and the bank determines the interest rate accordingly. The numerical simulation study on the game behavior of both sides in practice shows that the advantage of "bilateral decision market" between banks and logistics enterprises under complete information is greater than that of unilateral market determined by banks, and when the loan enterprises have high performance level, the advantages of "bilateral decision market" by banks and logistics enterprises are higher than those of unilateral market decisions by banks. Logistics companies are willing to increase their risk-taking ratio in exchange for bank concession interest rate; interest rate sensitivity has a more significant impact on equilibrium results than the sensitivity of their own funds.
【作者单位】：西南交通大学;复旦大学;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“基于多方交易行为分析的供应链金融集成风险管理研究”(71003082) 全国博士后基金“物流金融风险综合评价研究”(20080430602) 教育部博士点基金“基于多方交易行为的物流金融风险管理研究”(200806131007) 四川省科技计划软科学项目“物流金融风险综合评价与测度”(2010ZR0028) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金“供应链金融风险关键技术指标研究及应用”(SWJTU11CX081) 复旦大学经济学院985平台项目“供应链金融风险管理问题研究”
【分类号】：F253;F830.4;F224.32

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