食品企业诚信缺失的规制研究

发布时间：2018-02-26 00:14

  本文关键词： 食品安全 诚信缺失 博弈 规制　出处：《江南大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：食品安全问题不仅关系到人民群众的身体健康和生命安全,还事关经济发展和社会稳定。近年来,食品安全事件屡见报端,表明食品企业诚信缺失严重。对食品企业诚信缺失的研究是弘扬诚信文化,完善食品安全监管体系,保障食品安全的需要。在对诚信缺失食品企业的规制研究中,主要采用了列举归纳法、博弈分析法等研究方法,以信息不对称理论和博弈理论作为研究的理论基础,采用建立博弈模型的方法,分析博弈双方策略选择的影响因素,寻求规制路径。食品企业诚信缺失现象在生产加工领域和销售流通领域的表现尤为突出,广泛分布在生产、加工、销售的各个环节。食品市场上的信息不对称是引发市场机制失灵,造成食品企业诚信缺失的主要原因。此外,食品行业竞争激烈和监管机制不健全致使食品市场的诚信经营环境进一步恶化。在消费者和食品企业的博弈中,消费者举报可以促进食品企业诚信经营,但是高额的举报成本会降低消费者举报的积极性。借助Matlab软件对食品企业之间信用失衡的演化过程进行模拟,发现随着对失信经营企业惩罚力度的加强,食品企业失信经营的概率不断下降。然而,受制于监管成本太高,监管效率低下,监管部门对失信经营食品企业的惩罚力度不足。但是,随着消费者监督的不断加强,监管部门的信息劣势得到改善,监管成本降低。基于消费者监督的食品企业和监管部门的演化博弈结果表明,在长期的演化过程中,监管部门将加强监管,食品企业趋向于诚信经营。根据相关的博弈理论分析结果,对诚信缺失食品企业的规制可以从以下四个方面入手:第一,加强对监管缺失人员的责任追究,降低监管成本,提高政府部门的监管效率;第二,提高惩罚金和赔偿金的数额,发挥诚信评价体系的激励作用,提高食品企业诚信经营的自觉性;第三,增加食品安全信息投资,完善食品信息披露制度,建立食品安全信息分享机制;第四,改善消费者维权的外部环境,完善食品安全举报制度以提高消费者监督的积极性。
[Abstract]:Food safety is not only related to the health and safety of the people, but also to economic development and social stability. In recent years, food safety incidents have been frequently reported. The research on the lack of good faith in food enterprises is to carry forward the culture of good faith, perfect the supervision system of food safety, and ensure the safety of food. This paper mainly adopts the methods of enumeration induction and game analysis, taking the information asymmetry theory and the game theory as the theoretical basis, using the method of establishing the game model to analyze the influencing factors of the strategy choice of both sides of the game. The phenomenon of lack of good faith in food enterprises is particularly prominent in the field of production and processing and sales circulation, widely distributed in production, processing, processing, The information asymmetry in the food market is the main reason for the failure of the market mechanism and the lack of good faith in the food enterprises. The fierce competition in the food industry and the lack of a sound regulatory mechanism have further worsened the good faith operating environment in the food market. In the game between consumers and food enterprises, consumer reporting can promote the good faith management of food enterprises. But the high cost of reporting will reduce the enthusiasm of consumers to report. With the help of Matlab software to simulate the evolution process of credit imbalance between food enterprises, it is found that with the punishment of dishonest enterprises strengthened, However, due to the high cost of regulation, inefficient supervision, and inadequate penalties for food companies, however, as consumer supervision continues to increase, The information inferiority of regulators has been improved and the cost of supervision has been reduced. The evolutionary game between food companies and regulators based on consumer supervision shows that in the long-term evolution process, regulators will strengthen supervision. Food enterprises tend to operate in good faith. According to the analysis results of relevant game theory, the regulation of food enterprises without good faith can be started from the following four aspects: first, to strengthen the accountability of the lack of supervision, reduce the supervision costs, To improve the efficiency of government supervision; second, to increase the amount of punishment and compensation, to give play to the incentive role of the integrity evaluation system, and to improve the consciousness of food enterprises to operate in good faith; third, to increase the investment in food safety information, Improve food information disclosure system, establish food safety information sharing mechanism; 4th, improve the external environment of consumer rights, improve food safety reporting system to improve consumer supervision enthusiasm.
【学位授予单位】：江南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F203
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本文编号：1535737