集体腐败成因与控制：实验经济学视角下的考察

发布时间：2018-08-17 17:22

【摘要】：本文有针对性地研究了由羊群行为造成集体腐败的内在机理,在前人研究的基础上,以大企业内部的挪用腐败为背景,根据集体腐败的特性,构建了羊群效应的理论模型并进行推导。发现在有公共信息的情况下,腐败决策者会不断修正自己对被查处风险的判断,并出于收益最大化的动机进行羊群行为,从而形成集体腐败。根据这一内在机理,本文提出控制羊群效应的一个方法是逐渐提高后进入腐败集团的腐败分子的处罚力度,以有效管理腐败分析对于期望罚金的预期,达到抑制腐败的目的。更进一步,本文在理论模型的基础上,设计并进行了实验室实验。尽管实验结果表明被试的行为并非完全理性,无法完全准确地被理论模型所预测,但实验结果仍然佐证了理论模型的预期:在有公共信息而处罚力度不变的实验中,被试的羊群行为比起没有公共信息的实验有显著提高。而处罚力度根据公共信息进行调整后,羊群效应又有显著降低。因此本文认为,现有的处罚政策可能并不能有效地抑制羊群行为,若要抑制羊群行为,需要逐渐加大对后来进入者的处罚力度。另外,实验发现,在仅有私人信号的时候,被试也不是完全依照私人信号进行决策,说明被试并不是完全理性的。而在羊群效应最为显著的实验中,被试进行理性决策的比例是最高的,说明羊群行为可以帮助被试实现收益最大化。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the internal mechanism of collective corruption caused by herding behavior is studied. On the basis of previous studies, taking the embezzlement of large enterprises as the background, according to the characteristics of collective corruption, The theoretical model of herding effect is constructed and deduced. It is found that in the case of public information, corrupt decision makers will constantly correct their judgment on the risk of being investigated and conduct herd behavior in order to maximize the benefits, thus forming collective corruption. According to this inherent mechanism, this paper puts forward a method to control herding effect is to gradually increase the punishment of corrupt elements who enter corruption group, so as to effectively manage the expectation of expected penalty for corruption analysis and achieve the purpose of restraining corruption. Furthermore, based on the theoretical model, laboratory experiments are designed and carried out. Although the experimental results show that the behavior of the subjects is not completely rational and can not be fully accurately predicted by the theoretical model, the experimental results still support the prediction of the theoretical model: in an experiment with public information and no change in the degree of punishment, The herd behavior of the subjects was significantly higher than that of the subjects without public information. After the punishment was adjusted according to the public information, the herding effect was significantly reduced. Therefore, the present punishment policy may not be able to restrain herding behavior effectively. If we want to restrain herding behavior, we should gradually increase the punishment of the later entrants. In addition, the experiment found that when there is only private signal, the participants do not make the decision according to the private signal, which shows that the subjects are not completely rational. In the most remarkable herding experiment, the proportion of rational decision is the highest, which indicates that herd behavior can help the participants to maximize the benefits.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D262.6;F069.9

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