经济发展、劳动分工与最优社会契约
发布时间：2018-11-03 07:06
【摘要】： 本文以中国制度变迁特别是中国公共部门的改革为背景研究市场经济下当委托人与代理人之间存在信息不对称时的最优契约安排及其相应的缔约环境设计问题。从理论上讲，无论是最优契约的安排还是缔约环境的设计，所规划的只能是那些在法律上具有可执行性的正式合同或正式制度，并不包括以道德、习俗等方式存在的非正式合约，因为非正式合约都是不能为契约设计所左右的外生变量。然而，非正式合约和正式合同的作用既能相互替代，也能相互补充。正是基于此，本文一方面从劳动分工的角度采用实证方法研究了现代市场经济中最典型的非正式合约——商业道德，另一方面则从契约理论角度研究了现阶段我国公共部门的劳动契约设计问题。全文的核心内容可归纳为以下三个方面： (1)亚当·斯密认为，，专业化及社会劳动分工是人类所有进步的源泉。可是，劳动分工也有其负面效应，它妨碍每个专业化者对其专业领域之外的事物的理解，即导致信息在交易者之间分配的不对称。当交易双方拥有的信息不对称时，市场交易便需要商业道德抑制拥有私人信息一方的机会主义行为，以保证最优契约得以有效实施。本文给出两个模型来考察市场经济中的商业道德行为。 第一个模型，在假定商人对商业道德承诺的偏好是商人为获得更多物质利益而采取的一种手段这一前提下，分析了在没有政府干预的市场经济中，纯粹个体经济活动所产生的道德承诺与劳动分工的关系。该模型主要论证了三个重要命题：(a)在一个个体之间完全无分工的、市场经济，商业不道德行为会十分猖獗；(b)在一个个体之间存在固 西北大学经管学院博士学位论文 定性分工的市场经济，商业不道德行为将会由于惩罚的存在而大为收 敛；（C）在任何现实的市场经济中，纶大多数分工属于可流动性分工。 可流动性分工的固定性对于现实市场经济中商业道德的形成至关重 要，是稳定的商业道德在现代商业社会得以存在的基础。 第二个模型，试图测度某个竞争性劳动市场上劳动者商业道德承 诺约束力的大小。 （2）由于公共组织和私人组织在委托－代理关系上的差异，即不 同于私人组织，公共组织主管当局相对于全体社会成员来说充当代理 人的角色，而相对于公共组织雇员来说又以委托人的身份出现，所以 公共组织内雇员敬业激励机制的运行效率极易受损于作为委托人的主 营当局的渲德风险。本文通过对尽职激励契约和敬业激励契约制度界 区的划分，构造出一个完美信息博奕模型，解释我国公共组织委托人 的道德风险如何破坏敬业激励机制的激励功能，以期为公共部门深化 改革在机制设计上提供某种理论准则。 （3）随着我国非国有经济的不断发展壮大，人才流失己对许多国 有企业运行效率以及长期稳定发展造成严重影响。面对人才市场竞争， 绝大多数国有企业在人才引进、人事管理以及收入分配等诸多领域都 做出了适应性调整和改革、本文在一种委托－代理框架下，从契约理论 角度考察了国有企业为防止人dwt失所普遍实行的薪酬激励契约和阻 挠人才流失契约之间的内在关系，然后在此基础上研究了阻挠人才流 失契约如何影响社会总福利水平，并针对围绕国有企业劳动契约缔约 过程所安排的正式制度上的某些缺陷，提出若干改革建议。
[Abstract]:Based on the change of Chinese system, especially China's public sector reform, this paper studies the optimal contract arrangement and its corresponding environmental design problems when information asymmetry exists between principal and agent under the market economy. Theoretically, whether the arrangement of the optimal contract or the design of the contracting environment can only be the formal contract or formal system which is legally enforceable, and does not include informal contracts that exist in such a way as morality and custom, etc. Because informal contracts are external variables that cannot be designed for the contract design. However, the role of informal contracts and formal contracts can complement each other and complement each other. Based on this, this paper studies the most typical informal contract _ business ethics in modern market economy from the point of labor division of labor, on the other hand, studies the design of labor contract in public sector in our country from the perspective of contract theory. The core contents of the thesis can be summarized as follows: (1) Adam Smith believes that the division of specialization and social labor is The source of all human progress. However, the division of labor also has its negative effect, which prevents each specifier from understanding what is outside his profession, that is, to cause information to be traded When the information of both sides of the transaction is asymmetric, the market transaction requires the business ethics to suppress the opportunist behavior of one side of the private information, so as to ensure the most In this paper, two models are given to investigate the market. The first model, on the premise of assuming that the preference of businessmen to commercial moral commitment is a means by the merchant to obtain more material benefits, analyzes the pure individual in the market economy without government intervention. The relationship between moral commitment and labor division of labor is discussed. The model mainly demonstrates three important propositions: (a) there is no division of labor between individuals, market economy, and business immoral. To be very rampant; (b) in one by one. There is a solid between the bodies herba Pileae Scriptae A market economy, business, Immoral behavior will be greatly collected due to the existence of punishment (C) in any realistic market economy, the majority of the division of labour belongs to Liquidity division: fixity of liquidity division quotient of realistic market economy The formation of industry morality is the stable commercial morality. On the basis of the existence of modern commercial society, the second model Trying to measure the commercial morality of laborers in a competitive labor market. Size of non-binding force. (2) Due to public organization and private organizations are commissioned-the difference in the agent relationship, i.e., no Acting as an agent with respect to all members of society, in relation to private organizations and public organizations A person's character, rather than a public. In addition to the organization's employees, That's what happened, so The operation efficiency of employee engagement and incentive mechanism in public organizations is very easy to be damaged. Moral risk of the main camp authorities in the United States of America This article deals with due diligence The division and construction of the boundary region of incentive contract and dedicated incentive contract A perfect information game model is developed to explain the clients of our country's public organizations. How moral hazard undermines the incentive function of dedicated incentive mechanism, with a view to making public sector deep The reform of the system provides some theoretical criteria in the design of the mechanism. (3) With China The continuous development and development of non-state-owned economy The loss has had an enterprise operational efficiency for many countries.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2002
【分类号】：F06
本文编号：2307059
[Abstract]:Based on the change of Chinese system, especially China's public sector reform, this paper studies the optimal contract arrangement and its corresponding environmental design problems when information asymmetry exists between principal and agent under the market economy. Theoretically, whether the arrangement of the optimal contract or the design of the contracting environment can only be the formal contract or formal system which is legally enforceable, and does not include informal contracts that exist in such a way as morality and custom, etc. Because informal contracts are external variables that cannot be designed for the contract design. However, the role of informal contracts and formal contracts can complement each other and complement each other. Based on this, this paper studies the most typical informal contract _ business ethics in modern market economy from the point of labor division of labor, on the other hand, studies the design of labor contract in public sector in our country from the perspective of contract theory. The core contents of the thesis can be summarized as follows: (1) Adam Smith believes that the division of specialization and social labor is The source of all human progress. However, the division of labor also has its negative effect, which prevents each specifier from understanding what is outside his profession, that is, to cause information to be traded When the information of both sides of the transaction is asymmetric, the market transaction requires the business ethics to suppress the opportunist behavior of one side of the private information, so as to ensure the most In this paper, two models are given to investigate the market. The first model, on the premise of assuming that the preference of businessmen to commercial moral commitment is a means by the merchant to obtain more material benefits, analyzes the pure individual in the market economy without government intervention. The relationship between moral commitment and labor division of labor is discussed. The model mainly demonstrates three important propositions: (a) there is no division of labor between individuals, market economy, and business immoral. To be very rampant; (b) in one by one. There is a solid between the bodies herba Pileae Scriptae A market economy, business, Immoral behavior will be greatly collected due to the existence of punishment (C) in any realistic market economy, the majority of the division of labour belongs to Liquidity division: fixity of liquidity division quotient of realistic market economy The formation of industry morality is the stable commercial morality. On the basis of the existence of modern commercial society, the second model Trying to measure the commercial morality of laborers in a competitive labor market. Size of non-binding force. (2) Due to public organization and private organizations are commissioned-the difference in the agent relationship, i.e., no Acting as an agent with respect to all members of society, in relation to private organizations and public organizations A person's character, rather than a public. In addition to the organization's employees, That's what happened, so The operation efficiency of employee engagement and incentive mechanism in public organizations is very easy to be damaged. Moral risk of the main camp authorities in the United States of America This article deals with due diligence The division and construction of the boundary region of incentive contract and dedicated incentive contract A perfect information game model is developed to explain the clients of our country's public organizations. How moral hazard undermines the incentive function of dedicated incentive mechanism, with a view to making public sector deep The reform of the system provides some theoretical criteria in the design of the mechanism. (3) With China The continuous development and development of non-state-owned economy The loss has had an enterprise operational efficiency for many countries.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2002
【分类号】：F06
【引证文献】
相关博士学位论文 前3条
1 王秀萍;明清茶美学思想研究[D];湖南农业大学;2010年
2 刘明宇;制度、分工演化与经济绩效——基于分工维度对农民贫困的制度分析[D];西北大学;2004年
3 杨淑君;所有者与经理人双向激励约束机制研究[D];天津大学;2004年
本文编号：2307059
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