联合运输虚拟企业服务链协调运作的研究

发布时间：2018-06-18 15:49

本文选题：联合运输 + 虚拟企业　；参考：《兰州交通大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：随着经济的发展，竞争的加剧和动态的环境变化，不但使联合运输多运输方式、多独立主体参与的服务型、网链状结构特征日益明显，而且对敏捷性的要求也逐渐增强。多独立主体的参与以及由此形成的分散化决策，，业已成为联合运输服务链运作的显著特点。为了实现全运输过程的协调，要求构建联运服务链的各独立参与方之间需充分合作，形成“合力”。由于在分散化决策中，“个人理性”同“集体理性”之间天然矛盾的存在，以及由此演化、发展出的不协调行为所导致的一系列冲突，必然阻碍联合运输的健康发展。因此，科学分析不同独立主体之间的行为关系，揭示交互决策下的行为规律，尤其揭示快变环境下动态合作的行为规律，对于联运服务链的协调运作具有积极的现实意义。论文结合快变环境的约束，从虚拟企业组织结构的视角，从网链状组织成员之间的行为关系入手，以横向关系和纵向关系作为两条基本的协调路线，研究了核心运输企业之间、运输代理人同分运人企业之间、运输代理人之间和运输代理人联盟同运输企业之间的博弈策略和协调机制。研究中以博弈理论（合作博弈、非合作博弈）和现代优化理论作为主要研究工具，采用定性和定量分析相结合、定量分析为主的研究方法。论文的主要内容如下： 1．研究了联合运输虚拟企业服务链中，上下游运输企业间的竞争与合作关系。设计了基于投资——定价两阶段同时行动的基本动态博弈，研究了接续运输中两家运输企业之间的博弈行为和关系策略。在模型中将整个联运产品视为独立企业提供互补性运输服务的综合体，考虑了需求的不确定性影响。通过对博弈模型的推导和分析发现，企业相互之间并非简单的合作关系或者对抗关系，更多呈现出一种纵向合作和竞争相互交融的动态关系，即竞合关系。在均衡状态下，企业不但收益增加，而且降低了风险。论文进一步探寻了提高均衡效率的改进之道。研究发现：企业间的竞合关系呈现出多样性的特点。只要找到合适的分配机制，通过重复博弈就可以有效的改善均衡。同传统的研究不同，论文不但研究了无限次博弈时的合作演化，而且研究了有限次博弈时的合作演化。当采用有限次重复博弈时，发现博弈次数的奇偶性对结果有直接的影响。当博弈次数为偶数时，局中人策略选择的次序对个人收益没有影响。而当博弈次数为奇数时，局中人选择策略的先后次序（首选策略）将影响其个人的得益。此时，博弈企业的协商能力将对最终的决策产生影响。当采用无限次重复博弈时，设计了合适的触发策略。证明了在设计触发策略的激励下，双方由对抗走向合作，最终实现了集体理性下的Pareto效率。 2．研究了纵向间的信息协调传递问题。在联合运输服务链中，货运代理人和运输企业之间形成了纵向关系。考虑到需求的不确定性，不同的成本结构和外生服务水平约束，建立了代理人企业同运输企业关于能力分配决策的Stackelberg博弈模型。模型分析显示，在能力分配博弈中两运输企业之间具有矛盾和冲突：由于服务水平的约束，代理人企业（企业I）往往会传递过多的能力需求信息给分运人企业（企业II），因此具有过度估计的动机。而由于考虑机会成本的限制，企业II又往往分配低于企业I所报的能力需求，因此会产生供应不足的动机。结果造成最终实现较低的能力分配计划。为了提高决策的效率，论文设计了基于第三方的惩罚机制以协调双方的行为。接着论文讨论了集中系统中的最优行为，并以此最优决策为标杆，根据服务水平约束分两种情况研究了制定惩罚机制协调两运输企业的行为。研究显示，通过合理惩罚参数的设计，可以使分散系统中的企业行为得到协调。论文还对不同服务水平约束下惩罚参数的合理边界和适用范围进行了探讨。 3．联合运输服务链虚拟企业运作中横向和多边关系协调的研究。运用合作博弈理论讨论了货运代理人横向合作联运联盟的构建和货运代理人和运输企业合作构建联合运输大联盟的问题。该问题的实质是合理收益分配机制的设计。首先考虑了不同区域内不同代理人之间形成横向联盟联合发货的问题。以发货频率作为决策变量，结合二部制定价机制，定义了代理人联盟联合运输的收益分享博弈。证明了该博弈的凸博弈性质，并利用Shapley值法对联盟收益进行了分配。接着在货代联盟的基础上加入运输企业讨论了构建联合运输大联盟及其收益分配机制的设计。考虑将运输企业的运输组织成本分为固定组织成本和可变组织成本两部分，并据此定义了组建大联盟下的收益分享博弈。证明了联盟博弈的超可加性质和联盟核心的非空性性质。接着探讨了联运大联盟内的收益分配机制。采用排列序的方法，首先设计了满足核心性质的分配——利他初始分配，即货运代理人分享联盟收益，并将此分配作为基础分配加以改进。在利他初始分配的基础上按照平均边际收益贡献的原则，由货运代理人对运输企业进行补偿。通过分析证明了该改进方案依然属于核配置。但更加公平合理，更具有现实性和可操作性。
[Abstract]:With the development of the economy, the intensification of competition and the dynamic environment change, it not only makes the multi transport mode of joint transportation, the service type of the independent subject, the network chain structure is increasingly obvious, and the demand for agility is gradually enhanced. The participation of the independent subject and the decentralization decision made by this have become a joint transport suit. In order to achieve the coordination of the whole transport process, in order to achieve the coordination of the whole transport process, the need to cooperate fully between the independent participants of the service chain is required to form a "joint force". Due to the natural contradiction between "personal rationality" and "collective rationality" in the decentralization decision, the evolution and the evolution of the incoordination behavior A series of conflicts inevitably impede the healthy development of joint transport. Therefore, the scientific analysis of the behavior relations among the different independent subjects, revealing the behavior laws under the interactive decision-making, especially the behavior law of dynamic cooperation under the fast changing environment, has a positive practical significance for the co transport of the service chain of the joint transport.
This paper, based on the constraints of fast changing environment, starts with the behavior relationship between the members of the network chain organization from the visual angle of the virtual enterprise organization structure, and takes the horizontal and vertical relations as the two basic coordination routes, and studies the core transportation enterprises, the transportation agents and the sub transport enterprises, the transportation agents and the transportation agents. The game strategy and coordination mechanism between the human alliance and the transportation enterprise. In the study, the main research methods are the game theory (cooperative game, non cooperative game) and modern optimization theory as the main research tools, the qualitative and quantitative analysis and quantitative analysis are the main research methods. The main contents of the thesis are as follows:
1. the competition and cooperation relationship between the upstream and downstream transportation enterprises is studied in the virtual enterprise service chain of joint transportation. The basic dynamic game based on the two stage of investment pricing and the simultaneous action is designed. The game behavior and the relationship strategy between two transport enterprises in the continuous transportation are studied. The whole product of the combined transport is considered as independence in the model. The enterprise provides a complex of complementary transport services and considers the uncertainty of demand. Through the deduction and analysis of the game model, it is found that the enterprise is not a simple cooperative or antagonistic relationship between each other, and more presents a dynamic relationship between vertical cooperation and competition, that is, competing relations. In a balanced state, Enterprises not only increase the income, but also reduce the risk.
The paper further explores the ways to improve the efficiency of equilibrium. The research finds that the competition relationship among enterprises is characterized by diversity. As long as the suitable distribution mechanism is found and the game is repeated, the equilibrium can be effectively improved. When the number of game times is even number, the order of strategy selection has no effect on individual income. When the number of games is odd, the people in the Bureau choose the order of the strategy (the first choice strategy). It will affect the benefit of the individual. At this time, the bargaining power of the game enterprise will affect the final decision. When using the infinite repeated game, the appropriate trigger strategy is designed. It is proved that under the incentive of the design trigger strategy, the two sides are from the confrontation to the cooperation, and finally the Pareto efficiency under the collective rationality is realized.
2. in the joint transport service chain, the longitudinal relationship between freight forwarders and transportation enterprises is formed. Considering the uncertainty of demand, the different cost structures and the constraints of the level of external service, the Stackelberg game between the agent enterprise and the transportation enterprise on the decision-making of capacity allocation is established. Model analysis shows that there are contradictions and conflicts between two transport enterprises in the ability distribution game: because of the constraints of the service level, the agent enterprise (enterprise I) often passes too much information on the capacity demand to the distributor enterprise (enterprise II), so it has overestimated motivation. And because of the limitation of opportunity cost, enterprise II It also often assigns less than the capabilities required by the enterprise I, thus creating a lack of motivation. The result leads to a lower capacity allocation plan. In order to improve the efficiency of the decision, the paper designs a third party based punishment mechanism to coordinate the behavior of both parties.
Then the paper discusses the optimal behavior in the centralized system, and takes the optimal decision as the benchmarking, and studies the behavior of coordinating the two transportation enterprises by the penalty mechanism according to the service level constraints. The research shows that the enterprise behavior in the decentralized system can be coordinated by the design of the reasonable penalty parameters. The thesis is also different. The reasonable boundary and application scope of penalty parameters under service level constraint are discussed.
3. research on the coordination of lateral and multilateral relations in the operation of the joint transport service chain virtual enterprise. The cooperation game theory is used to discuss the construction of the lateral cooperative alliance of freight forwarders and the problem of the cooperation of freight forwarders and transportation enterprises to build a major alliance of transportation. The real quality of the problem is the design of the rational income distribution mechanism.
This paper first considers the joint consignment of different agents in different regions. Taking the delivery frequency as a decision variable and combining the two-part pricing mechanism, this paper defines the revenue sharing game of joint transportation of agent alliance, and proves the property of the convex game of the game, and uses the Shapley value method to divide the income of the alliance. Then, on the basis of the freight forwarding alliance, we join the transport enterprise to discuss the design of the joint transportation major alliance and its income distribution mechanism. It divides the transportation organization cost into two parts: the fixed organization cost and the variable organization cost, and then defines the income sharing game under the formation of the alliance. The super additive nature of chess and the non empty property of the union core.
Then we discuss the income distribution mechanism in the major alliance. First, we design the allocation of the core nature, the altruism distribution, that is, the freight agent shares the income of the alliance, and improves it as the base allocation. On the basis of the initial allocation of altruism, the contribution of the average marginal revenue is the original. On the other hand, the freight forwarder compensates the transportation enterprise. Through analysis, it is proved that the improvement scheme still belongs to the nuclear configuration. But it is more fair and reasonable, more realistic and operable.
【学位授予单位】：兰州交通大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F512.4;F224.3

【参考文献】