港口横向和纵向整合发展策略研究

发布时间：2018-06-18 21:47

本文选题：港口竞合 + 博弈论　；参考：《曲阜师范大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文研究了港口与港口之间的横向合作,以及港口与陆上运输公司之间的纵向合作。在港口的横向合作方面,通过建立区域内三港口竞合模型探究了两种不同港口合作机制对合作港口与“旁观者”第三个港口的港口价格和利润以及消费者剩余和社会福利的影响,并考虑港口污染分析何种港口合作机制是政府的首选。在港口的纵向合作方面,基于港口与陆上运输商之间采用港口对运输公司参股的合作方式,探究港口对运输公司不同情形下最优的参股比例,以及随参股比例的变化而发生运输公司定价权的转移会对两者的影响。本文的结构安排如下:第一章,绪论部分,介绍了本文的选题背景和研究现状,以及主要研究内容和创新点。第二章,港口间横向合作对其定价策略的影响。探究差异化定价和统一化定价两种不同合作机制对港口合作联盟与“旁观者”港口之间竞争以及绿色社会福利的影响。研究发现:两种合作机制都对港口合作联盟以及“旁观者”港口有利,却不利于区域内消费者剩余和社会福利;当运输成本相对较低或足够高时,港口联盟采用差异化定价策略更为有利,而运输成本适中时,统一定价策略将是其更为明智选择。然而,港口和消费者始终无法达成共赢。最后,港口污染并对该地区产生相对较大的影响时,港口合作将是一个不错的选择。第三章,港口与陆上运输公司之间纵向合作的研究。构建港口与陆上运输公司之间的Stackelberg博弈模型和港口间的Bertrand博弈模型,考虑到参股比例的变化所引起的定价权的变更,探究不同的参股比例下港口与运输公司利润的变化以及合作策略的优选。研究表明:港口会争取运输公司的定价权,并在取得定价权后将港口与运输公司的两部分收费合并;港口对运输公司股份购买费用的高低以及对手港口策略的选择会直接影响到港口均衡策略的选择。第四章,总结与展望。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the horizontal cooperation between ports and ports, and the vertical cooperation between ports and land transport companies. With regard to horizontal cooperation in ports, Through the establishment of the model of competition and cooperation between the three ports in the region, this paper explores the effects of two different port cooperation mechanisms on the port price and profit, consumer surplus and social welfare of the cooperative port and the third port of "bystander". And consider the port pollution analysis which port cooperation mechanism is the government's first choice. In the aspect of port vertical cooperation, based on the mode of cooperation between port and land carrier, this paper explores the optimal proportion of port to transport company under different circumstances. And with the change of share participation, the transfer of pricing power of transport companies will affect both. The structure of this paper is as follows: the first chapter, the introduction, introduces the background and research status of this paper, as well as the main research content and innovation. The second chapter, the impact of horizontal cooperation between ports on its pricing strategy. This paper explores the effects of two different cooperation mechanisms, differential pricing and unified pricing, on the competition and green social welfare between port cooperation alliance and "bystander" ports. The study found that both cooperation mechanisms are beneficial to port cooperation alliances and "bystander" ports, but are not conducive to consumer surplus and social welfare in the region; when transport costs are relatively low or high enough, It is more advantageous for the port alliance to adopt differential pricing strategy, and when the transportation cost is moderate, the unified pricing strategy will be the wiser choice. However, ports and consumers have never been able to achieve a win-win. Finally, port cooperation will be a good choice when port pollution and a relatively large impact on the region. The third chapter is the research of vertical cooperation between port and land transportation company. The Stackelberg game model between port and land transportation company and the Bertrand game model between ports are constructed. This paper probes into the change of profit of port and transportation company and the choice of cooperation strategy under different proportion of share participation. The research shows that the port will strive for the pricing power of the transportation company and merge the two parts of the port and the transport company after obtaining the pricing power; The choice of port equilibrium strategy will be directly influenced by the purchase cost of port to transportation company and the choice of rival port strategy. Chapter four, summary and prospect.
【学位授予单位】：曲阜师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F552

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