地方政府与旅游企业的演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-04-23 06:51

本文选题：旅游企业 + 地方政府　；参考：《北京工业大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：受管理与资金两方面的制约，许多旅游景区都走上了转让经营权的行列，使景区资源得到了有效的开发，经营权转让已成为全国旅游景区发展的趋势。虽然旅游景区经营权成功转让的案例很多，但在具体实践中也产生了许多问题。例如不合理开发造成的环境污染、国有资产的流失与毁损、旅游企业可能为了逃避处罚或获得政策优惠而向地方政府展开寻租引起社会资源浪费、甚至景区经营权转让计划还会出现中途流产等。学者们对景区经营权转让的关注越来越高，并已经开始利用博弈论来分析相关问题，其核心的博弈主体是地方政府与获得经营权的旅游企业，具体的博弈问题有旅游企业在经营权转让后是否会进行合理开发以及是否为了获得政策优惠或规避处罚而向地方政府进行游说，地方政府是否会有效监管旅游企业的违规开发以及是否会为了短期政绩和个人私利而受贿等等。文章在借鉴现代产权理论、寻租理论及演化博弈理论的基础上，以对旅游景区市场化经营的必要性与可行性、旅游景区市场化经营中出现的主要问题进行分析为切入点，通过建立地方政府与获得经营权的旅游企业间的演化博弈模型，对地方政府与旅游企业的行为策略进行分析，并利用复制动态方程与演化稳定策略的方法求出二者在这些问题中的优势策略组合以及实现优势策略组合所需要的条件，，进而提出相应的政策建议，为今后旅游景区资源的开发规划提供理论与实践指导。
[Abstract]:Restricted by two aspects of management and capital, many tourist attractions have taken the ranks of the right of transfer and management, which have made the resources of scenic spots effectively developed, and the transfer of management rights has become the trend of the development of the national tourist attractions. Although there are many cases of the successful transfer of the management rights of tourist attractions, many problems have also been produced in concrete practice. For example, there are many problems in the specific practice. The environmental pollution caused by irrational development, the loss and damage of state-owned assets, tourism enterprises may seek rent from local governments to escape punishment or obtain preferential policy, and cause the waste of social resources, even the transfer plan of the scenic spots will appear midway abortion, etc. scholars pay more and more attention to the transfer of management rights in scenic spots, The game theory has begun to use the game theory to analyze the related issues. The core of the game is the local government and the tourist enterprises that obtain the right to operate. The specific game problem is whether the tourism enterprise will develop the reasonable development after the transfer of the management rights and whether the local government is lobbying for the preferential policy or the avoidance of punishment. Whether the government will effectively supervise the illegal development of tourism enterprises and whether it will accept bribes for short-term performance and personal interests and so on.
On the basis of modern property rights theory, rent-seeking theory and evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the necessity and feasibility of the market management of tourist attractions, analyzes the main problems in the market management of tourist attractions, and establishes an evolutionary game model between local government and tourist enterprises. The behavior strategy of local government and tourism enterprise is analyzed, and the method of replicating dynamic equation and evolutionary stabilization strategy is used to find out the combination of advantages and Strategies of the two in these problems and the conditions needed to realize the combination of advantages strategy, and then the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward to provide a rational plan for the development and planning of tourist attractions in the future. The guidance of the theory and practice.

【学位授予单位】：北京工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D630;F592.7;F224.32

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