旅游服务供应链中的激励机制设计研究

发布时间：2018-07-09 10:32

本文选题：旅游服务供应链 + 机制设计　；参考：《湖南工业大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着服务经济时代的到来,旅游业在全球经济中的占比越来越大,旅游服务供应链作为一个新的研究领域也逐渐兴起。旅游产品综合性的特点决定了旅游服务供应链的运作离不开旅行社和服务供应商之间的衔接和协调,然而,旅游业中企业异质性的特征决定了它们的利益目标并不一致。服务供应商一般不会主动向旅行社汇报它所拥有的诸如旅游市场状况和服务能力等私有信息,此外,在为游客服务过程中的偷懒和怠工等行为将共同导致旅行社的利益受损。因此,如何对服务供应商实施有效激励是旅行社面临的实际问题。本文综合运用管理学、经济学、博弈论、委托代理理论和机制设计理论等多学科理论与方法,对旅行社如何运用激励机制来防范上述问题进行了系统研究。首先,阐述了旅游服务供应链的研究背景,指出了加强旅游服务供应链激励机制设计研究的必要性；回顾与述评了相关研究,理清了旅游服务供应链中的委托代理关系,论证了旅行社的核心地位。其次,提出了防范服务供应商道德风险的旁支付激励机制。证明了旁支付激励机制不仅能诱导服务供应商提高服务努力水平,还能增加旅行社的收益并提高旅游服务供应链的运作效率。此外,针对旅行社如何激励服务供应商努力工作并获取真实旅游市场信息,进而制定旅游报价问题,设计了具有多目标激励功能的甄别合约,并分析了各因素对博弈方最优策略和收益的影响。进一步,以服务供应商的服务能力具有连续特征为拓展假设,设计了既能甄别服务供应商的真实能力信息,又能激励其提高服务努力水平的混合型激励机制；提出了一种限制策略实现了对部分低能力服务供应商的排除,并讨论了由该策略而导致的类“柠檬市场”现象。最后,总结了全文并指出了几个进一步研究的方向。
[Abstract]:With the arrival of service economy, tourism accounts for more and more in the global economy. As a new research field, tourism service supply chain (TSC) is emerging gradually. The comprehensive characteristics of tourism products determine that the operation of tourism service supply chain can not be separated from the connection and coordination between travel agencies and service providers. However, the heterogeneity of enterprises in tourism determines their interests and objectives are not the same. Service providers generally do not actively report private information such as tourism market conditions and service capabilities to travel agencies. In addition, idle and idle activities in the process of serving tourists will jointly cause damage to travel agencies' interests. Therefore, how to implement effective incentives to service providers is a practical problem faced by travel agencies. Based on the theories and methods of management, economics, game theory, principal-agent theory and mechanism design, this paper makes a systematic study on how travel agencies use incentive mechanism to prevent these problems. First of all, the research background of tourism service supply chain is expounded, and the necessity of strengthening the incentive mechanism design of tourism service supply chain is pointed out, and the principal-agent relationship in tourism service supply chain is clarified by reviewing and reviewing relevant research. The core position of travel agency is demonstrated. Secondly, it puts forward the side payment incentive mechanism to prevent the moral hazard of service providers. It is proved that the incentive mechanism of side payment can not only induce service providers to improve their service efforts, but also increase the income of travel agencies and improve the operational efficiency of tourism service supply chain. In addition, aiming at how travel agencies motivate service providers to work hard and obtain real tourism market information, and then formulate tourism quotation, a screening contract with multi-objective incentive function is designed. The influence of various factors on the game party's optimal strategy and income is analyzed. Furthermore, based on the hypothesis that the service provider's service capability has continuous characteristics, a hybrid incentive mechanism is designed, which can not only discriminate the true capability information of service provider, but also stimulate the service provider to improve the level of service effort. In this paper, a restriction strategy is proposed to eliminate some low-capacity service providers, and the "lemon market" phenomenon caused by this strategy is discussed. Finally, the paper summarizes the full text and points out several further research directions.
【学位授予单位】：湖南工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F590

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