债务融资、股权结构与中国旅游业上市公司非效率投资研究

发布时间：2019-03-02 19:35

【摘要】：自1958年Modigliani与Miller提出MM理论以来,企业债务融资、股权结构与非效率投资的关系一直是现代企业理论研究的重要问题之一。国外学者基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论等从不同的角度对此进行了理论分析,并结合公司治理的实践进行了大量的实证研究。随着中国资本市场的发展和公司治理实践的不断深化,这一问题也越来越受到国内学者的关注。本文以32家中国旅游业上市公司2003至2011年的非平衡面板数据为样本,考察中国旅游业上市公司债务融资与股权结构对非效率投资的影响。实证结果表明：中国旅游业上市公司非效率投资与总资产负债率存在显著的负相关,债务融资对投资过度具有显著的治理效应,对投资不足表现出显著的融资约束效应；中国旅游业上市公司非效率投资与第一大股东持股比例存在负相关,公司第一大股东持股比例的上升未能显著的抑制投资不足,也未能显著的缓解投资不足；第一大股东持股比例和总资产负债率的交乘项系数与非效率投资存在负相关,中国旅游业上市公司非效率投资对总资产负债率的敏感程度随着第一大股东持股比例的上升而降低。控股股东性质和总资产负债率的交乘项系数与非效率投资存在显著的负相关,控股股东性质为国有控股的中国旅游业上市公司相比较控股股东性质为非国有控股的中国旅游业上市公司而言,公司非效率投资对总资产负债率的敏感程度显著增加。为了促进中国旅游业上市公司健康持续发展,针对中国旅游业上市公司债务融资、股权结构和非效率投资的情况,本文提出以下建议：第一,积极发展债券市场,丰富企业债务融资渠道。第二,放宽股权转让条件,促进企业股权结构多元化发展。第三,提升公司治理水平,防止非效率投资问题加深。
[Abstract]:Since the MM theory was put forward by Modigliani and Miller in 1958, the relationship between corporate debt financing, equity structure and inefficient investment has been one of the important issues in modern enterprise theory research. On the basis of principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and so on, foreign scholars have carried on theoretical analysis from different angles, and have carried on a lot of empirical research in combination with the practice of corporate governance. With the development of Chinese capital market and the deepening of corporate governance practice, this problem has been paid more and more attention by domestic scholars. In this paper, the effects of debt financing and equity structure on inefficiency investment of 32 Chinese tourism listed companies from 2003 to 2011 are studied by taking the unbalanced panel data from 2003 to 2011 as a sample to investigate the effects of debt financing and equity structure on inefficiency investment of Chinese tourism listed companies. The empirical results show that there is a significant negative correlation between inefficient investment and total asset-liability ratio of listed companies in China's tourism industry. Debt financing has a significant governance effect on over-investment and a significant financing constraint effect on underinvestment. There is a negative correlation between the inefficient investment of Chinese tourism listed companies and the proportion of the largest shareholder, and the increase of the proportion of the largest shareholder of the company has not significantly inhibited the underinvestment, nor has it significantly alleviated the underinvestment. There is a negative correlation between the intersection coefficient of the first largest shareholder's shareholding ratio and the total asset-liability ratio and the inefficiency investment. The sensitivity of inefficient investment to the total asset-liability ratio of Chinese tourism listed companies decreases with the increase of the share holding ratio of the largest shareholder. There is a significant negative correlation between the nature of controlling shareholders and the ratio of total assets and liabilities and the inefficiency investment. Compared with Chinese tourism listed companies whose controlling shareholders are non-state-owned, the sensitivity of inefficient investment to total asset-liability ratio is significantly increased in Chinese tourism listed companies whose controlling shareholders are state-owned. In order to promote the healthy and sustainable development of China's tourism listed companies, in view of the debt financing, equity structure and inefficient investment of Chinese tourism listed companies, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: first, actively develop the bond market; Enrich corporate debt financing channels. Second, relax the conditions of equity transfer, promote the diversified development of enterprise ownership structure. Third, improve the level of corporate governance and prevent inefficient investment from deepening.
【学位授予单位】：海南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F590.66;F592.6

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