征地补偿机制与失地农民保障研究

发布时间：2018-01-13 05:15

本文关键词：征地补偿机制与失地农民保障研究　出处：《天津商业大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：改革开放三十多年我国的经济社会得到了飞速发展,现如今我国已经进入了城市化的快速发展阶段,城市化的快速发展带动了对于土地的大量需求,城市的土地已经不能满足经济发展的需求,为此各地政府就会征用农村的土地,将农村的集体土地转变为城市中的建设用地,如此一来便会产生大量的失地农民。征地补偿机制的不完善和单一的货币安置方式使得农民在失去土地后的生活得不到应有的保障,为了捍卫自己的权利,农民常常采取过激的方式来阻止征地。如何妥善的解决失地农民的补偿和安置保障问题,已经成为我国在经济“新常态”下的一项重要的任务,为此本文通过查阅大量的文献和研究资料,以经济理论和产权理论为基础,对征地补偿机制和失地农民保障从制度和法律两个角度进行了分析,希望可以找出其不完善的原因所在,并提出相对应的政策建议。全文主要有六个章节,第一章主要介绍了所研究问题的背景、国内外对于相关问题的研究进展,说明了研究征地补偿机制与失地农民保障的理论和现实意义。接着第二章阐述了本文所用到的相关的理论包括马克思主义地租理论、制度变迁理论、征地补偿理论、征地补偿原则、巴泽尔产权不完全界定理论和土地价格评估理论。第三章将征地补偿制度的发展分为三个阶段,分析了每个阶段征地补偿的特点和计算依据,通过回顾征地制度的发展历史,找出其发展和改革的趋势,并分析现阶段的农民在失去土地后的生活状况,发现农民在失去土地后就业、生活水平都出现了不同程度的下滑。第四章主要分析了造成失地农民生活水平下降的原因,主要有集体产权主体虚置、产权功能受到限制、征地过程的非市场化特征显著;通过供求模型分析得出征地补偿机制的缺陷主要在于政府在征地过程中的垄断地位,垄断的优势可以使得政府低价征地高价出让,巨大的土地出让收益是政府扩大征地范围的动机;通过征地过程中的博弈模型分析得出,政府处于博弈的优势地位,如果不能完善失地农民的申诉机制,加大对于政府违规征地的处罚力度,那么政府便会选择不合理的补偿侵害农民的权益。第五章主要分析了征地补偿机制中的对于失地农民的补偿标准的制定,现阶段的征地补偿标准是比较低的,它的测算依据主要是产值倍数法,产值倍数法没有考虑到工农业产品的“剪刀差”,也没有将土地附带的保障功能的价值考虑在内,这种方法不符合自由市场经济的要求,为此有必要构建合理征地补偿标准的理论模型,提出合理的征地补偿应该包括土地的资源价值、社会保障价值和部分土地增值的分配。利用构建的模型对天津市进行实证分析,得出天津市现行的区片综合定价法虽然在补偿标准上有所提高,但是其本质依旧是以产值倍数法为依据的计算结果,未将土地的社会保障价值和增值收益考虑在内,而且产值倍数法没有考虑工农业产品的“剪刀差”对于土地资源价值的影响。最后根据前面分析的原因提出完善征地补偿机制和失地农民保障的几点政策建议,通过法律的手段来规范产权主体的行为,明确公共利益,完善征地的程序和申诉机制;以市场为导向,通过赋予农民土地的转让权和收益权来推进土地流转进程,促进集体土地的入市,达到以市场“无形的手”来调节征地过程,采取多种手段保障农民能够充分的参与到征地的过程中,增强农民的博弈力量,以多元化的安置方式来保障失地农民的生活。
[Abstract]:Thirty years of reform and opening up China's economy and society has been rapid development, now our country has entered a stage of rapid development of city urbanization, the rapid development of the city led to a huge demand for land, city land has been unable to meet the needs of economic development, the local government will expropriate rural land will change the rural collective land for construction land in the city, so it will produce a large number of landless peasants. The land requisition compensation mechanism is not perfect and the single currency allocation makes farmers can not be guaranteed in life after losing land, in order to safeguard their rights, farmers often take drastic measures to prevent land expropriation. How to properly solve the landless peasants compensation and resettlement security problem has become one of the most important tasks in the economy under the new normal in China, this paper through The literature and research data, using economic theory and property right theory as the foundation, to the farmer land requisition compensation mechanism of landless peasants and security are analyzed from two aspects of system and law, hoping to find out the reason is not perfect, and puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations. This thesis consists of six chapters, the first chapter a description of the research background, research progress on related issues at home and abroad, the study on land expropriation compensation mechanism and protection of landless peasants in the theoretical and practical significance. The second chapter expounds some related theories including Marx's rent theory, institutional change theory, compensation theory, compensation principle, Barzel the property right is not completely defined theory and land price appraisal theory. The third chapter will be the development of land expropriation compensation system is divided into three stages, analyzes each stage of land expropriation compensation The features and calculation basis, through reviewing the history of the development of the land expropriation system, find out the development and reform trend, and the analysis of the present stage of farmers lost their land after the living conditions of farmers' employment, found after the loss of land, living standards have suffered different degrees of decline. The fourth chapter mainly analyzes the causes of farmers' living standards lost down, mainly in the main body of collective property fause, the function of property rights restrictions, non market characteristics of the land requisition process significantly; the model of supply and demand analysis of defects by compensation mechanism was mainly lies in the expedition to the monopoly of the government in the process of land expropriation, the government monopoly advantages can make cheap land sale prices, huge land revenue is the government to expand the scope of land expropriation motivation; through the game model in the process of land requisition analysis, the government in the game's dominant position, if not perfect yet The mechanism of farmers, increase penalties for violations of land in the government, then the government will choose not reasonable compensation for infringement of the interests of farmers. The fifth chapter mainly analyzes the mechanism of compensation in land expropriation compensation standard for land expropriated farmers to develop, at this stage of the land expropriation compensation standard is relatively low, according to its estimates the main is the multiple output method, multiple output method does not take into account the industrial and agricultural products "price scissors", nor will the security function of land collateral value into account, this method does not meet the requirements of the free market economy, it is necessary to construct a theoretical model of reasonable compensation standard, put forward rational land acquisition compensation should include land the distribution of resource value, social security value and part of the land value-added. The empirical analysis of Tianjin city using the constructed model, the current Tianjin City District Although the pricing method to improve compensation standard, but its essence is still the calculation results based on multiple output method, the social security value of land and value-added benefits into account, and multiple output method without considering the industrial and agricultural products "price scissors" for land resources value. Finally according to the above analysis reason the put forward several policy suggestions for land acquisition compensation mechanism of landless peasants and security, through legal means to regulate the behavior of property rights, clear public interests, improve the land acquisition procedures and complaint mechanism; market oriented, by giving farmers land transfer rights and income rights to promote the process of land circulation, promote collective land in the market, to market "invisible hand" to regulate the process of land expropriation process, take a variety of means to ensure farmers can fully participate in land acquisition, enhance agricultural The power of the people's game is to guarantee the life of the landless peasants by a diversified way of resettlement.

【学位授予单位】：天津商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F323.89

【参考文献】