农村征地冲突的RDEU鹰鸽博弈均衡分析
发布时间：2019-02-15 18:44
【摘要】：将等级依赖期望效用理论模型与非对称鹰鸽博弈模型相结合,构建农村征地冲突的RDEU鹰鸽博弈模型,同时探讨心理情绪因素和非对称因素对博弈参与者行为策略的影响。研究表明,地方政府或农民的行为不仅受对方策略选择影响,还受情绪和非对称程度的影响。地方政府或农民越乐观,越倾向于和平解决冲突问题,地方政府或农民越悲观,越倾向于采取极端性对抗行为,且悲观情绪更容易影响地方政府或农民的行为抉择;而非对称程度越大,地方政府越倾向于采取强硬策略,农民越倾向于采取妥协策略。MATLAB的数值模拟情况进一步验证了这一结论,且为寻求可行性的冲突治理策略提供了参考方向。
[Abstract]:This paper combines the expected utility model of rank dependence with the game model of asymmetric hawk pigeon to construct the RDEU game model of rural land requisition conflict. At the same time, it discusses the influence of psychological and asymmetric factors on the game participants' behavior strategies. The research shows that the behavior of local government or farmers is influenced not only by the other side's strategy choice, but also by emotion and asymmetry. The more optimistic the local government or farmer, the more inclined to settle the conflict peacefully, the more pessimistic the local government or farmer, the more inclined to take extreme confrontation behavior, and the more easily the pessimism affect the behavior choice of local government or farmer; However, the greater the asymmetry, the more local governments tend to adopt tough strategies, and the farmers are more inclined to adopt compromise strategies. The numerical simulation of MATLAB further verifies this conclusion. It also provides a reference for a feasible conflict management strategy.
【作者单位】： 中南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“房地产征用补偿极端争议的组合性均衡评价及其实验研究”(71671187)
【分类号】：F224.32;F301.2
本文编号：2423627
[Abstract]:This paper combines the expected utility model of rank dependence with the game model of asymmetric hawk pigeon to construct the RDEU game model of rural land requisition conflict. At the same time, it discusses the influence of psychological and asymmetric factors on the game participants' behavior strategies. The research shows that the behavior of local government or farmers is influenced not only by the other side's strategy choice, but also by emotion and asymmetry. The more optimistic the local government or farmer, the more inclined to settle the conflict peacefully, the more pessimistic the local government or farmer, the more inclined to take extreme confrontation behavior, and the more easily the pessimism affect the behavior choice of local government or farmer; However, the greater the asymmetry, the more local governments tend to adopt tough strategies, and the farmers are more inclined to adopt compromise strategies. The numerical simulation of MATLAB further verifies this conclusion. It also provides a reference for a feasible conflict management strategy.
【作者单位】： 中南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“房地产征用补偿极端争议的组合性均衡评价及其实验研究”(71671187)
【分类号】：F224.32;F301.2
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