重农抑商与官商经济成对出现的模型揭示
发布时间：2019-05-01 06:54
【摘要】：在人类历史进程中的漫长的封建社会时期,曾经出现过"重农抑商"和"官商经济"成对出现的特殊现象,引起众多学者对这特殊现象的研究。研究聚焦于两个方面:一是对"商"的争论,究竟是"抑"还是"重"?迄今尚无定论;二是为何不选择经济效率更优的"私商经济",而要选择经济效率较差的"官商经济",这种困惑尚未得到合理的解释。讨论"抑商"时,无一例外的都涉足到当时的商人把盈利用于购置土地,却从未涉足私商为何不把盈利用于"商经济"的投资。言及"重商"时,一个绕不过去的问题是——既然"抑商",为何又要兴办"官商",这岂不是"重商"的行为吗?如若从"投资经济"的视角出发,既然"私商"不愿意投资"商经济",那么为何不允许"官商"进行投资呢,"官商经济"的存在,至少可以使"商经济"得到维持并发展,并且不会用盈利去购置土地。在讨论低效率的"官商经济"时,无一例外的也都涉及到当时政权运行中出现的"财政饥渴"。我们知道,政权运行所需费用来源于税赋,若税赋不足,还可设置"专卖"制度予以补充。当我们无法解开为何选择低效率的"官商经济"的困惑时,把"官商经济"用于解决"财政饥渴",不失为一个看是合理的解释。本文继续选择基于供需平衡原理而建立起来的数学模型,对"重农抑商"和"官商经济"成对出现的现象进行诠释。研究方法是选择"资源"和"制度"两个视角,从数学模型中分解出"公产权"、"私产权"、"经济活动"、"经济方式"、"经济投资"、"经济劳动"和"政权劳动"等函数表述,然后以制度排序和劳动时序建立起各函数之间的关联关系,得到以下结论。第一、"重农抑商"和"官商经济"均发生在以农业经济为主要经济方式的封建社会时期,由此解释了这两种现象为何成对出现;第二、"政权劳动"的函数揭示,"财政饥渴"现象仅发生在封建社会时期;第三、"经济投资"函数中的"资本投资"子函数指出,在封建社会时期,"私产权"资本是不会进行"资本投资"的,这就解释了私商盈利为何用来购置土地的现象,同时也揭示只有"公产权"资本才会用于"资本投资";第四、"经济投资"函数中的"制度投资"子函数揭示,产权经济的发展,遵循"公产权→私产权→公产权→私产权→公产权"的演变规律,"官商经济"是这个演变规律中的一个环节,与"财政饥渴"现象无任何关联;第五、进一步地,结合"经济方式"函数,厘清封建社会时期的"商经济",其实就是基于非再生资源的"工业经济"。
[Abstract]:In the long period of feudal society in the process of human history, the special phenomenon of "emphasizing agriculture and suppressing commerce" and "government business economy" appeared in pairs, which caused many scholars to study this special phenomenon. The research focuses on two aspects: one is the argument about "quotient", is it "suppression" or "heavy"? So far, there is no definite conclusion. Second, why not choose the "private business economy" with better economic efficiency and the "official business economy" with poor economic efficiency, this confusion has not yet been reasonably explained. In the discussion of "suppressing business", it was always involved that the merchants at the time used their profits to buy land, but never involved in the private sector why they did not use the profits to invest in the "business economy". When it comes to "heavy commerce", a question that cannot be circumvented is: since "business is restrained", why should "government and business" be set up?. Is this not an act of "heavy commerce"?. If, from the perspective of "investment economy", since "private business" is unwilling to invest in "business economy", then why not allow "government and business" to invest? the existence of "government and business economy" can at least sustain and develop the "business economy". And will not use profit to buy land. In discussing the inefficient "government and business economy", there is no exception to the "fiscal hunger" that appeared in the operation of the regime at that time. We know that the operating expenses of the regime come from tax. If the tax is insufficient, we can set up a monopoly system to supplement it. When we cannot solve the confusion why we choose the inefficient "government-business economy", it is a reasonable explanation to use the "government-business economy" to solve the "fiscal hunger and thirst". This paper continues to choose the mathematical model based on the principle of balance of supply and demand to explain the phenomenon of "emphasizing agriculture and suppressing quotient" and "government and business economy". The research method is to choose "resources" and "system" to separate "public property rights", "private property rights", "economic activities", "economic modes", "economic investment" from the mathematical model. The functions of "economic labor" and "power labor" are expressed, and then the relationship between the functions is established by institutional ordering and labor sequence, and the following conclusions are obtained. First, both "emphasizing agriculture and suppressing commerce" and "government and business economy" took place in feudal society with agricultural economy as the main economic mode, which explained why these two phenomena appeared in pairs. Second, the function of "regime labor" reveals that the phenomenon of "financial hunger and thirst" only occurs in feudal society; Third, the "capital investment" sub-function of the "economic investment" function points out that in the feudal society, "private property rights" capital will not make "capital investment", which explains why the profits of private businesses are used to purchase land. At the same time, it also reveals that only "public property rights" capital will be used for "capital investment"; Fourth, the sub-function of "institutional investment" in the "economic investment" function reveals that the development of property rights economy follows the evolution rule of "public property rights and private property rights and public property rights". "official business economy" is a link in this evolution law, and has nothing to do with the phenomenon of "financial hunger and thirst"; Fifthly, combining the function of "economic mode" to clarify the "commercial economy" in feudal society, it is actually the "industrial economy" based on non-renewable resources.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F129
本文编号：2469093
[Abstract]:In the long period of feudal society in the process of human history, the special phenomenon of "emphasizing agriculture and suppressing commerce" and "government business economy" appeared in pairs, which caused many scholars to study this special phenomenon. The research focuses on two aspects: one is the argument about "quotient", is it "suppression" or "heavy"? So far, there is no definite conclusion. Second, why not choose the "private business economy" with better economic efficiency and the "official business economy" with poor economic efficiency, this confusion has not yet been reasonably explained. In the discussion of "suppressing business", it was always involved that the merchants at the time used their profits to buy land, but never involved in the private sector why they did not use the profits to invest in the "business economy". When it comes to "heavy commerce", a question that cannot be circumvented is: since "business is restrained", why should "government and business" be set up?. Is this not an act of "heavy commerce"?. If, from the perspective of "investment economy", since "private business" is unwilling to invest in "business economy", then why not allow "government and business" to invest? the existence of "government and business economy" can at least sustain and develop the "business economy". And will not use profit to buy land. In discussing the inefficient "government and business economy", there is no exception to the "fiscal hunger" that appeared in the operation of the regime at that time. We know that the operating expenses of the regime come from tax. If the tax is insufficient, we can set up a monopoly system to supplement it. When we cannot solve the confusion why we choose the inefficient "government-business economy", it is a reasonable explanation to use the "government-business economy" to solve the "fiscal hunger and thirst". This paper continues to choose the mathematical model based on the principle of balance of supply and demand to explain the phenomenon of "emphasizing agriculture and suppressing quotient" and "government and business economy". The research method is to choose "resources" and "system" to separate "public property rights", "private property rights", "economic activities", "economic modes", "economic investment" from the mathematical model. The functions of "economic labor" and "power labor" are expressed, and then the relationship between the functions is established by institutional ordering and labor sequence, and the following conclusions are obtained. First, both "emphasizing agriculture and suppressing commerce" and "government and business economy" took place in feudal society with agricultural economy as the main economic mode, which explained why these two phenomena appeared in pairs. Second, the function of "regime labor" reveals that the phenomenon of "financial hunger and thirst" only occurs in feudal society; Third, the "capital investment" sub-function of the "economic investment" function points out that in the feudal society, "private property rights" capital will not make "capital investment", which explains why the profits of private businesses are used to purchase land. At the same time, it also reveals that only "public property rights" capital will be used for "capital investment"; Fourth, the sub-function of "institutional investment" in the "economic investment" function reveals that the development of property rights economy follows the evolution rule of "public property rights and private property rights and public property rights". "official business economy" is a link in this evolution law, and has nothing to do with the phenomenon of "financial hunger and thirst"; Fifthly, combining the function of "economic mode" to clarify the "commercial economy" in feudal society, it is actually the "industrial economy" based on non-renewable resources.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F129
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