民间审计的博弈均衡和失衡——对美国萨班斯法案经济后果的一种解读

发布时间：2018-02-15 02:38

本文关键词： 民间审计博弈均衡萨班斯法案经济后果　出处：《审计与经济研究》2010年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：采用历史研究和博弈论相结合的方法对美国萨班斯法案的负面经济后果进行解读后发现,萨班斯法案的负面经济后果并不意味着萨班斯法案的失败,民间审计不是一项公共产品,其本质仍是一种私立秩序,政府和法律主要作用在于对其缺陷的弥补,而不应是过多替代。萨班斯法案负面经济后果产生的表面原因是具体监管方法的问题,而其产生的深层原因是民间审计的私序本质,其诱因则是过度的"压力和诱惑"。因此,解决不良经济后果的措施除了进一步改进具体监管方法,还需要在监管中让私序和公共制度更加和谐共生,并进一步减轻不必要的"压力和诱惑"。
[Abstract]:After analyzing the negative economic consequences of the Sarbanes Act in the United States through the combination of historical research and game theory, it is found that the negative economic consequences of the Sarbanes Act do not mean the failure of the Sarbanes Act. Folk auditing is not a public product, its essence is still a private order, the main role of the government and the law is to remedy its shortcomings. The superficial reason for the negative economic consequences of the Sarbanes Act is the problem of specific regulatory methods, while the underlying cause is the private order nature of private auditing, and the inducement is excessive "pressure and temptation." In addition to further improving specific regulatory methods, measures to address adverse economic consequences also require a more harmonious coexistence of private order and public institutions in regulation, as well as further mitigation of unnecessary "pressures and temptations".
【作者单位】：福州大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(70872020) 福建省教育厅基金项目(JA09032S)
【分类号】：F239.43;F224.32

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