自愿审计、公司治理与代理成本

发布时间：2018-04-06 06:37

本文选题：半年报　切入点：自愿审计　出处：《江西财经大学学报》2014年03期

【摘要】：管理当局与股东之间的代理冲突是公司治理领域内最为重要的问题之一,而审计被认为是能够缓解信息不对称、降低代理成本的一种机制。虽然上述观点一直被广泛引用,但至今还未有文献为此提供系统性的经验证据。利用中国资本市场独特的制度背景,手工搜集了上市公司2002-2009年半年报自愿审计的数据,实证研究了半年报自愿审计是否能够降低代理成本这一问题。无论是Heckman二阶段模型、OLS模型、配对研究还是公司层面的固定效应回归,研究结果都一致地表明,半年报自愿审计的确显著降低了上市公司管理当局与股东之间的代理成本,从而揭示了审计所具有的信息价值和公司治理作用。进一步,公司选择"四大"与"非四大"进行的半年报自愿审计,在降低代理成本方面并不存在着系统差异,说明选择半年报自愿审计比选择何种审计师进行审计更为重要。
[Abstract]:The agency conflict between management and shareholders is one of the most important problems in the field of corporate governance, and audit is considered to be a mechanism to alleviate information asymmetry and reduce agency costs.Although these arguments have been widely cited, there is no systematic empirical evidence for this.Based on the unique institutional background of Chinese capital market, this paper collects the data of semi-annual voluntary audit of listed companies from 2002 to 2009 by hand, and empirically studies whether semi-annual voluntary audit can reduce the agency cost.Regardless of the Heckman two-stage model, pairing study or firm level fixed effect regression, the results show that semi-annual voluntary audit does significantly reduce the agency cost between the management and shareholders of listed companies.Thus, it reveals the information value and corporate governance function of audit.Furthermore, there is no systematic difference in reducing agency cost between "four major" and "non-four" semi-annual voluntary audit, which indicates that it is more important to choose semi-annual voluntary audit than which auditor to audit.
【作者单位】：厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：2012年高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(博导类)“半年报自愿审计、代理成本与公司价值:基于中国上市公司的经验证据”(20120121110007) 国家自然科学基金项目“制度环境、政治联系、会计信息质量与审计行为”(71072053)
【分类号】：F239.6;F231.5;F224

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