大股东掏空与审计意见相关性研究
发布时间：2019-01-22 11:21
【摘要】： 良好的资本市场,拓宽了资金融通渠道,提高了资源配置效率,增强投资者的信心。而大股东掏空行为严重损害资本市场的发展完善,影响上市公司的正常经营活动,损害中小投资者的信心。注册会计师审计作为保护投资者的机制,应该能有效识别大股东掏空行为,出具恰当的审计意见!实践中大股东掏空与审计意见的关系到底如何,审计意见对于大股东掏空行为的鉴别能力怎样?本文试图用实证方法进行研究揭示大股东掏空与审计意见的关系。 本文首先从委托代理角度分析大股东掏空行为产生的理论渊源,进而分析了大股东掏空行为,并在此基础上分析了审计意见与大股东控制下的关联交易、资金占用及为大股东担保之间的关系。其次,结合对上述分析以实证研究的方法,以2005-2006年沪市数据检验大股东掏空与审计意见的关系。实证结果显示:以上市公司名义为大股东提供担保与审计意见存在显著的正相关;大股东占用上市公司资金与审计意见并不存在显著的相关性;但是,2005年大股东占用资金与审计意见存在显著的正相关;2006年大股东占用上市公司资金与审计意见存在显著的负相关。这说明2006年要求上市公司完成清欠工作取得了实质性的效果,《关于进一步做好清理大股东占用上市公司资金工作的通知》的执行效果很明显。但并未发现上市公司与大股东之间的关联采购和关联销售与审计意见存在显著的相关性。实证结果表明,审计意见是可以识别大股东占用上市公司资金和为大股东提供担保,但是对大股东与上市公司之间的关联交易却不能有效鉴别,这可能是由于他们之间的关联交易是公平公允的。最后,结合理论与实证研究,提出从提升上市公司盈利质量、加强资本市场的监管和完善注册会计师审计制度上来规避大股东掏空行为,提高审计质量。
[Abstract]:A good capital market broadens the channels of financing, improves the efficiency of resource allocation, and strengthens the confidence of investors. The tunneling behavior of large shareholders seriously damages the development and perfection of capital market, affects the normal operation of listed companies, and damages the confidence of small and medium-sized investors. CPA audit, as a mechanism to protect investors, should be able to effectively identify major shareholders tunneling behavior, issued appropriate audit opinion! In practice, what is the relationship between large shareholder tunneling and audit opinion, and what is the ability of audit opinion to distinguish large shareholder tunneling behavior? This paper attempts to reveal the relationship between large shareholder tunneling and audit opinion by empirical method. This paper first analyzes the theoretical origin of the tunneling behavior of large shareholders from the perspective of principal-agent, and then analyzes the tunneling behavior of large shareholders, and then analyzes the audit opinions and related transactions under the control of large shareholders. The relationship between the appropriation of funds and the guarantee for major shareholders. Secondly, combining the above analysis with the method of empirical research, using the 2005-2006 Shanghai Stock Exchange data to test the relationship between large shareholder tunneling and audit opinion. The empirical results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the guarantee provided to large shareholders in the name of listed companies and audit opinions, while there is no significant correlation between large shareholders' occupation of listed companies' funds and audit opinions. However, there is a significant positive correlation between the capital occupied by large shareholders in 2005 and audit opinions, and a significant negative correlation between the funds occupied by large shareholders and audit opinions in 2006. This shows that in 2006, the listed company was required to complete the work of clearing up the outstanding debts, and the implementation effect of the notice on cleaning up the funds of the listed company by major shareholders is very obvious. However, there is no significant correlation between the listed company and the major shareholders in the related purchasing, associated sales and audit opinion. The empirical results show that the audit opinion can identify the large shareholders to occupy the funds of the listed company and provide guarantee for the majority shareholders, but the related transactions between the majority shareholders and the listed companies can not be effectively identified. This may be because the affiliated transactions between them are fair and equitable. Finally, combined with theoretical and empirical research, this paper proposes to improve the quality of listed companies' profits, strengthen the supervision of capital market and improve the audit system of CPA to avoid the emptying of large shareholders and improve the audit quality.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F239.22
本文编号：2413166
[Abstract]:A good capital market broadens the channels of financing, improves the efficiency of resource allocation, and strengthens the confidence of investors. The tunneling behavior of large shareholders seriously damages the development and perfection of capital market, affects the normal operation of listed companies, and damages the confidence of small and medium-sized investors. CPA audit, as a mechanism to protect investors, should be able to effectively identify major shareholders tunneling behavior, issued appropriate audit opinion! In practice, what is the relationship between large shareholder tunneling and audit opinion, and what is the ability of audit opinion to distinguish large shareholder tunneling behavior? This paper attempts to reveal the relationship between large shareholder tunneling and audit opinion by empirical method. This paper first analyzes the theoretical origin of the tunneling behavior of large shareholders from the perspective of principal-agent, and then analyzes the tunneling behavior of large shareholders, and then analyzes the audit opinions and related transactions under the control of large shareholders. The relationship between the appropriation of funds and the guarantee for major shareholders. Secondly, combining the above analysis with the method of empirical research, using the 2005-2006 Shanghai Stock Exchange data to test the relationship between large shareholder tunneling and audit opinion. The empirical results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the guarantee provided to large shareholders in the name of listed companies and audit opinions, while there is no significant correlation between large shareholders' occupation of listed companies' funds and audit opinions. However, there is a significant positive correlation between the capital occupied by large shareholders in 2005 and audit opinions, and a significant negative correlation between the funds occupied by large shareholders and audit opinions in 2006. This shows that in 2006, the listed company was required to complete the work of clearing up the outstanding debts, and the implementation effect of the notice on cleaning up the funds of the listed company by major shareholders is very obvious. However, there is no significant correlation between the listed company and the major shareholders in the related purchasing, associated sales and audit opinion. The empirical results show that the audit opinion can identify the large shareholders to occupy the funds of the listed company and provide guarantee for the majority shareholders, but the related transactions between the majority shareholders and the listed companies can not be effectively identified. This may be because the affiliated transactions between them are fair and equitable. Finally, combined with theoretical and empirical research, this paper proposes to improve the quality of listed companies' profits, strengthen the supervision of capital market and improve the audit system of CPA to avoid the emptying of large shareholders and improve the audit quality.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F239.22
【引证文献】
相关期刊论文 前2条
1 林妍;裴源远;;上市公司治理结构对审计意见的影响[J];中国集体经济;2011年03期
2 林妍;;上市公司治理结构对审计意见的影响及实证研究[J];中国集体经济;2011年04期
相关博士学位论文 前1条
1 王维钢;公司控制权配置及各股东利益均衡机制的研究[D];南开大学;2010年
相关硕士学位论文 前2条
1 王绍娜;上市公司关联方交易会计监管问题研究[D];东北财经大学;2011年
2 任慧哲;外部审计质量与大股东“掏空”行为的实证研究[D];内蒙古财经大学;2012年
，本文编号：2413166
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