持续经营审计意见、管理层自信与投资效率

发布时间：2019-01-22 14:41

【摘要】：文章以2003~2015年沪深A股上市公司数据为研究样本进行实证分析,研究我国上市公司持续经营审计意见与投资效率之间的关系,并检验管理层对持续经营审计意见导致的投资效率经济后果进行干扰的行为是否有效。研究发现:持续经营审计意见会抑制企业的投资过度行为,缓解投资不足;而管理层自信容易导致投资过度,恶化投资不足;被出具持续经营审计意见后,管理层自信导致的投资过度行为能受到良好的约束,而持续经营审计意见对投资不足的缓解作用并未受到管理层自信的显著影响,该现象在民营企业中表现得尤为突出。研究结果表明:持续经营审计意见对企业投资效率起到了良好的监督作用,能有效缓解代理冲突,优化资源配置效率。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2015, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the relationship between audit opinions and investment efficiency of listed companies in China. And check whether the behavior of the management interferes with the economic consequence of investment efficiency caused by the audit opinion of continuing operation is effective. It is found that the audit opinion of continuing operation will restrain the overinvestment behavior of the enterprise and alleviate the underinvestment, while the confidence of management will lead to overinvestment and worsen the underinvestment. After issuing an audit opinion on going concern, the overinvestment behavior caused by management confidence can be well restrained, while the effect of continuing management audit opinion on the mitigation of underinvestment is not significantly affected by management confidence. This phenomenon is especially prominent in private enterprises. The results show that the audit opinion of continuing operation has a good supervisory effect on the investment efficiency of enterprises, can effectively alleviate the agency conflict and optimize the efficiency of resource allocation.
【作者单位】：北京交通大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科(项目批准号:15BGL051)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：F275;F239.4;F272.91

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