上市公司审计合谋及对策研究

发布时间：2019-07-05 17:59

【摘要】： 作为独立性最强的注册会计师审计,在自上世纪八十年代至今的二十余年里,为保证我国证券市场的稳定和发展起到了重要的作用。经注册会计师“独立、客观、公正”审计后的会计报表,为报表使用者的正确决策和资源的有效配置提供了可靠的信息,人们形象地将注册会计师称作“经济警察”。但近年来,随着国内外一系列审计舞弊案件,如“安然”、“琼民源”、“银广厦”的曝光,注册会计师独立、客观、公正形象遭到了公众的质疑,严重威胁到证券市场的健康发展及注册会计师行业的形象。本文的研究目的,通过揭示审计合谋产生的动因与机理,提出相关防范措施,进而规范证券市场信用体系,重塑审计公信力,有助于投资者、债权人、政府和其他利益相关者根据高质量的会计信息做出恰当的投资决策。本文采用因素分析、案例分析和博弈分析等方法,对我国上市公司的审计合谋的特征、机理及原因进行了分析,研究发现: 1.上市公司与注册会计师合谋的净收益,与收益系数的二次方成正比,与处罚系数、监管概率及自身对未来的预期成反比; 2.在变动收益下,决定审计合谋发生的条件。注册会计师的分成比例仅与自身的贴现因子成反比,与上市公司的贴现因子成正比;上市公司提高公司业绩的幅度,与收益系数、监管力度、惩罚力度、注册会计师及自身对未来预期相关; 3.通过改变均衡条件,如制订合理的处罚力度、降低收益系数等措施,可以降低甚至避免合谋现象的产生。
[Abstract]:As the most independent CPA audit, it has played an important role in ensuring the stability and development of China's securities market in the more than 20 years since the 1980s. The accounting statements after "independent, objective and fair" audit of certified public accountants provide reliable information for the correct decision-making of statement users and the effective allocation of resources. People vividly call certified public accountants "economic police". However, in recent years, with the exposure of a series of audit fraud cases at home and abroad, such as "Enron", "Qiongmin Yuan" and "Yin Guangxia", the independent, objective and fair image of certified public accountants has been questioned by the public, which seriously threatens the healthy development of the securities market and the image of the CPA industry. The purpose of this paper is to reveal the motivation and mechanism of audit collusion, and to put forward relevant preventive measures, so as to standardize the credit system of securities market and reshape the credibility of audit, which is helpful for investors, creditors, the government and other stakeholders to make appropriate investment decisions according to high quality accounting information. In this paper, the characteristics, mechanism and causes of audit collusion of listed companies in China are analyzed by means of factor analysis, case analysis and game analysis. The net income of the collusion between the listed company and the certified public accountant is proportional to the quadratic power of the income coefficient, and inversely proportional to the penalty coefficient, the supervision probability and its own expectation for the future. Under the variable income, determine the conditions for the occurrence of audit collusion. The proportion of certified public accountants is only inversely proportional to their own discount factor and proportional to the discount factor of listed companies. The extent of improving the performance of listed companies is related to the income coefficient, supervision, punishment, CPA and their own expectations for the future. By changing the equilibrium conditions, such as formulating reasonable punishment and reducing the income coefficient, the phenomenon of collusion can be reduced or even avoided.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F239.4

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