官员独董:“掠夺之手”抑或“扶持之手”

发布时间：2018-07-02 10:37

本文选题：官员独董 + 政治联系　；参考：《管理科学》2017年04期

【摘要】：上市公司聘请离退休官员担任独立董事(简称"官员独董"),在中国乃至世界范围内都是一种普遍现象。上市公司通过聘请官员独董能够建立起与政府部门的政治联系,从而帮助其从政府手中获得各种稀缺资源和优惠政策,同时也需要承担提供就业机会、政府税收、官员政治升迁等多种社会服务和政治任务。官员独董给公司带来了怎样的经济影响,这是学术界和企业界长期热议的焦点问题,但一直没有得到令人信服的科学检验。为了探究官员独董对所任职公司的经济影响,利用2013年10月19日中组部发布的《关于进一步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职(任职)问题的意见》(简称"18号文")作为外生冲击事件,手工收集2013年10月19日至2014年12月31日中国A股上市公司披露的790起独立董事辞职公告,利用事件研究法检验辞职公告的市场反应,以测量官员独董在中国上市公司中发挥的实际作用。研究结果表明,投资者对官员独董的辞职公告事件表现出显著为正的市场反应,而且官员独董辞职事件的正向市场反应明显强于非官员独董辞职事件的市场反应,实际上非官员独董辞职事件的市场反应显著为负,说明相对非官员独董而言,官员独董更多地扮演了"掠夺之手"的角色,进而损害了公司价值。进一步探索公司内外部多个因素对官员独董价值的可能影响,发现如果公司注册地的政府监管强度或者公司注册地所在省市的市场化水平越高,该公司的官员独董辞职公告事件所引发的市场反应就越积极,官员独董的"扶持之手"角色越难以发挥作用,从而更加突显了官员独董的"掠夺之手"角色。但是,并没有发现官员独董的行政级别、行业专长以及公司获得政府补助的情况等内部因素会影响官员独董价值的经验证据。创新之处在于增加了非官员独董群体作为对照样本,从而能够更好地判断和评估独立董事政治联系的经济价值,得到的相关研究结论具有更强的说服力。此外,利用官员独董离职潮事件考察独立董事政治联系的经济价值,不仅丰富和深化了独立董事领域的相关研究,而且拓展了政治联系领域的研究成果,同时又为中组部发布"18号文"的政策意义提供了及时可靠的经验证据。研究结果启示企业不能盲目追求和构建与政府的联系,实际上与政府保持适度的距离将更有利于企业的发展。
[Abstract]:It is a common phenomenon that listed companies employ retired officials as independent directors. The listed companies can establish political ties with government departments by hiring officials as their chief executives, thereby helping them to obtain all kinds of scarce resources and preferential policies from the government. At the same time, they also have to bear the burden of providing employment opportunities and government taxes. Officials political promotion and other social services and political tasks. What kind of economic impact officials have had on the company has long been the focus of debate in academia and business, but has not been tested convincingly by science. In order to explore the economic impact of the executive director on the company, Using the opinions on further standardizing the Part-time (position) of leading cadres in Enterprises issued by the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee on October 19, 2013 (referred to as "article 18"), as an exogenous shock event, Collecting by hand 790 announcements of resignation of independent directors disclosed by listed companies listed in A shares from October 19, 2013 to December 31, 2014, and using the event study method to test the market reaction of resignation announcements, In order to measure the official Dong alone in China's listed companies to play a real role. The results of the study show that investors have shown a significantly positive market response to the resignation announcement of the official Chief Executive, and the positive market reaction to the resignation of the official Chief Executive is obviously stronger than the market reaction to the resignation of the non-official Chief Executive. As a matter of fact, the market reaction to the resignation of non-official chief executive is obviously negative, which shows that the official independent director plays a more role of "plunder hand" than non-official sole director, and thus damages the company value. To further explore the possible impact of many factors inside and outside the company on the value of the sole director of the company, it is found that the higher the level of government supervision in the place where the company is registered or the higher the level of marketization in the province or province where the company is registered, The more positive the market response caused by the announcement of the resignation of the company's chief executive, the more difficult the role of the "supporting hand" of the official sole director was, thus highlighting the role of the "predatory hand" of the official sole director. However, no empirical evidence has been found that internal factors such as executive rank, industry expertise, and the company's access to government subsidies may affect the value of government executives. The innovation lies in the addition of non-official independent groups as a control sample, which can better judge and evaluate the economic value of independent directors' political connections, and the relevant research conclusions are more persuasive. In addition, the economic value of independent directors' political ties has been investigated by using the incident of the departure tide of independent directors, which not only enriches and deepens the relevant research in the field of independent directors, but also expands the research results in the field of political relations. At the same time, it provides timely and reliable empirical evidence for the policy significance of the publication of document 18. The results suggest that enterprises should not blindly pursue and build a relationship with the government. In fact, keeping a proper distance from the government will be more conducive to the development of enterprises.
【作者单位】：厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71572160)~~
【分类号】：F271;F275;F832.51

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