市场化进程、国企薪酬管制与高管薪酬业绩敏感度

发布时间：2018-12-17 01:32

【摘要】：高管薪酬作为公司治理的一项重要机制,一直备受学术界和政府部门的高度关注。自从2008年美国次贷危机爆发后,高管高额薪酬引起了广泛关注,公司业绩下降而高管薪酬不降反升的现象受到社会激烈的抨击,直接导致各种版本的“限薪令”出台。然而,政府薪酬管制能否有效地提高高管薪酬业绩敏感度?是应该由政府对国有企业高管进行薪酬管制还是让市场决定薪酬?本文从市场化进程视角研究政府薪酬管制对国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感度的影响,以期为改善国有企业高管薪酬的激励效果和完善国有企业高管薪酬激励制度提供理论参考和经验依据。本文采用理论分析与实证研究结合的方法,对薪酬管制背景下国有上市公司的高管薪酬与企业绩效之间的关系进行研究。全文共分五个章节。第一章是绪论,首先阐述本文的研究背景与意义、研究内容和研究方法,提出本文的创新点和研究框架。第二章主要对相关文献进行回顾。第三章运用委托代理理论、最优契约理论、管理层权力理论对高管薪酬业绩敏感度进行理论分析。通过理论分析提出研究假设,并根据假设设计研究模型。第四章主要是实证检验,首先对高管薪酬业绩敏感度和薪酬管制各个代理指标进行描述性统计分析,然后运用回归方法对市场化进程和薪酬管制与高管薪酬业绩敏感度的关系进行实证检验。第五章总结本文主要结论,并根据实证研究结果提出对策建议以及阐述本文的不足与对未来研究展望。本文研究发现:(1)薪酬管制会扭曲高管薪酬业绩敏感度;(2)市场化进程会改善薪酬管制对高管薪酬业绩敏感度的扭曲作用;(3)薪酬管制对中央企业高管薪酬业绩敏感度的扭曲作用大于对地方国有企业;(4)专业委员会的设立使公司治理机制日趋完善。依据研究结果,本文提出以下政策建议,以改善国企高管薪酬激励制度:(1)继续推进市场化改革,营造一个公平竞争的环境;(2)实行差异化的薪酬管制;(3)建立高管薪酬与公司业绩相挂钩的业绩考核制度;(4)继续推进专业委员会的建立以完善公司内部控制体系。
[Abstract]:As an important mechanism of corporate governance, executive compensation has been highly concerned by academia and government departments. Since the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, high executive pay has attracted widespread concern. The phenomenon of corporate performance decline and executive pay rise instead of falling has been severely criticized by the society, which directly led to the introduction of various versions of the "pay restraint order." However, can government pay control effectively improve the performance sensitivity of executive compensation? Should the government regulate the pay of executives in state-owned enterprises or let the market determine the pay? From the perspective of market-oriented process, this paper studies the influence of government compensation regulation on the performance sensitivity of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. In order to improve the incentive effect of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises and improve the incentive system of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises, this paper provides a theoretical reference and empirical basis. In this paper, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of state-owned listed companies under the background of salary regulation is studied by combining theoretical analysis with empirical research. The full text is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. Firstly, the research background and significance, research content and research methods are described, and the innovation and research framework of this paper are put forward. The second chapter reviews the related literature. The third chapter uses principal-agent theory, optimal contract theory and management power theory to analyze the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. The research hypothesis is put forward through theoretical analysis, and the research model is designed according to the hypothesis. The fourth chapter is the empirical test, first of all, the executive pay performance sensitivity and compensation regulation of the various proxy indicators for descriptive statistical analysis. Then the regression method is used to test the relationship between the marketization process and compensation regulation and executive compensation performance sensitivity. The fifth chapter summarizes the main conclusions of this paper and puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions according to the empirical research results as well as the shortcomings of this paper and prospects for future research. This paper finds that: (1) compensation control will distort the sensitivity of executive pay performance, (2) the process of marketization will improve the distorting effect of compensation regulation on the sensitivity of executive pay performance; (3) the effect of compensation regulation on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in central enterprises is more than that on local state-owned enterprises; (4) the establishment of professional committees makes the corporate governance mechanism perfect day by day. Based on the results of the study, this paper puts forward the following policy recommendations to improve the executive compensation incentive system of state-owned enterprises: (1) to continue to promote market-oriented reform, to create a fair competitive environment, (2) to implement differentiated compensation control; (3) establishing the performance appraisal system that the executive compensation is linked to the company's performance; (4) continuing to promote the establishment of the professional committee in order to perfect the internal control system of the company.
【学位授予单位】：江西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F272.92;F276.1

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