投资政策不确定性下的企业投资行为:所有制偏向和机制识别

发布时间：2019-04-24 10:39

【摘要】：许多文献指出,企业面临市场不确定性时的最优策略是等待观望。不过,企业采取等待策略应对政策不确定性,至少需要满足具有等待能力和没有信息优势两个前提条件。基于中国投资环境,本文实证结果发现,面临投资政策的不确定性,我国企业的投资行为表现出明显的所有制偏向,即国有企业或隶属中央和省的企业选择跟进、短期增加投资;其他企业则选择等待甚至在短期内减少投资。本文进一步利用SARS疫情冲击度量市场不确定性识别等待能力约束的作用,利用官员更替的IV估计中的局部平均处理效应(LATE)来识别信息优势的作用。实证结果发现,拥有信息优势很可能是国有企业或隶属中央和省的企业在政策不确定时选择积极跟进的原因,而等待能力约束即使会对企业行为产生影响,其作用也不是普遍存在的。
[Abstract]:Many documents point out that the best strategy for enterprises facing market uncertainty is to wait and see. However, when enterprises adopt wait strategy to deal with policy uncertainty, at least they need to meet the two prerequisites of waiting ability and lack of information advantage. Based on the investment environment in China, the empirical results show that in the face of the uncertainty of investment policy, the investment behavior of Chinese enterprises shows obvious ownership bias, that is, the state-owned enterprises or enterprises belonging to the central and provincial governments choose to follow up. Short-term increase in investment; Others choose to wait and even reduce investment in the short term. In this paper, we further use the impact of SARS epidemic situation to measure the role of market uncertainty in identifying waiting ability constraints, and use the local average processing effect (LATE) in the IV estimation of official turnover to identify the role of information superiority. The empirical results show that the advantage of information is probably the reason why the state-owned enterprises or enterprises belonging to the central and provincial governments choose to follow up actively when the policy is uncertain, and even if waiting capacity constraints have an impact on the behavior of enterprises, Its role is not universal.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济发展研究中心;中山大学岭南学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目(批准号为71373186;71373290;71673310) 国家社科基金重大项目(批准号为15ZDA027和16ZDA006)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F275

【相似文献】