诺思悖论:西汉王朝专制主义发展对产权结构的影响

发布时间：2018-06-05 22:07

本文选题：制度变迁 + 产权　；参考：《学术月刊》2014年06期

【摘要】：在封建专制主义的权力垄断下,诺思悖论的表现方式和作用机制存在明显差异:为了维护统治,统治集团会形成歧视性的产权结构;争夺国家治理权处于比经济效率更优先的地位;国家有动机直接通过剥夺进行利益的再分配。西汉初期自由放任的经济实践和相对平等的产权结构产生了良好的经济绩效。随着西汉王朝专制主义中央集权的建立,经济上建立了重农抑商的歧视性产权安排,并通过官营垄断剥夺了民间的经营自主权,以行政效率替代了经济效率。自由放任的经济实践趋于终结,并在王莽时期走向国家干预和产权侵害的极端。西汉王朝的这段历史说明,由于存在交易成本,在不同利益集团的博弈格局下,产权安排不可避免地陷入囚徒困境,有利于长期繁荣的制度不会被选择。
[Abstract]:Under the monopoly of feudal autocracy, there are obvious differences in the manifestation and mechanism of the Norse paradox: in order to maintain the rule, the ruling group will form a discriminatory structure of property rights; Competing for the right to govern is more important than economic efficiency; the state has the motive to redistribute its benefits directly through deprivation. The laissez-faire economic practice and relatively equal property right structure in the early Western Han Dynasty produced good economic performance. Along with the establishment of the centralism of autocracy in the Western Han Dynasty, the discriminatory property right arrangement of emphasizing agriculture and restraining commerce was established economically, and the administrative efficiency was replaced by the administrative efficiency. The economic practice of laissez-faire tended to end, and in Wang Mang period, the state intervention and the infringement of property rights were extreme. The history of the Western Han Dynasty shows that due to the existence of transaction costs, property rights arrangements inevitably fall into the prisoner dilemma under the game pattern of different interest groups, and the system conducive to long-term prosperity will not be chosen.
【作者单位】：复旦大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重大项目“现代产业体系发展的理论与政策研究”(11&ZD142);国家社科基金重点项目“政府主导产业链、供应链和价值链重组以推动产业结构调整优化战略的路径与政策创新研究”(10AZD006) 国家自然科学基金项目“中国农地流转市场的纵向结构与农民交换权利研究:理论模型与政策设计”(70973024)的阶段性成果〕
【分类号】：F129

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