公路工程监理道德风险控制的组合策略模型及应用研究

发布时间：2019-05-17 05:14

【摘要】：道德风险问题是当前金融业、保险业、银行业等领域研究的热点问题。文献研究表明：工程建设领域的道德风险问题研究非常匮乏,尤其是针对控制和消除公路工程监理单边道德风险的研究。在公路工程项目建设中,信息不对称导致公路工程监理契约的不完备性,也导致项目业主和公路工程监理双边道德风险存在。有鉴如此,论文研究得出了控制和消除公路工程监理单边道德风险的组合策略模型。论文突破传统的委托代理问题分析思路,在契约关系分析研究中假设公路工程项目建设参与者从“经济人”转换到“社会人”,即项目业主和公路工程监理都是有限理性,双方都有机会主义及自利行为倾向。论文也分析了公路工程项目建设中复杂的委托代理关系：即公路工程项目建设中多委托人与多代理人,项目业主与公路工程监理的多任务目标委托代理关系。论文还分析项目业主和公路工程监理信息不对称性及未来环境不确定性因素：即项目业主和公路工程监理的私人信息不可消除,双方私人信息是导致项目业主和公路工程监理双边道德风险永久存在的关键因素。论文基于项目业主及公路工程监理的双边道德风险视角,对公路工程监理道德风险理论及其模型条件进行了基本假设,在Holmstrom-Milgrom多任务委托代理模型基础上进行拓展,构建了公路工程监理的关系契约模型、监理工作多任务目标关联程度模型、串谋行为博弈模型、最优监督模型、信誉评价模型的组合策略。论文认为要控制和消除公路工程监理单边道德风险,必须建立一套能够约束双方行为的契约关系,又要强化对代理人行为激励诱导及监督,更要对代理人行为进行社会信誉评价机制的组合策略。论文研究组合策略模型之首的最优契约机制,认为应该建立以公路工程监理正式契约为主、关系契约为辅的公路工程监理契约机制,依靠公路工程监理关系契约中“自我履约性”的实施来达到控制和消除公路工程监理的单边道德风险目的：组合策略之二的激励诱导机制,通过对监理工作目标任务的数理分析及关联程度实证研究分析,认为项目业主应该对互补性任务加强激励诱导,通过激励诱导方式解决代理人努力程度问题,促使监理工作目标任务实现,达到控制和消除公路工程监理单边道德风险的目的；组合策略之三的最优监督机制,通过对公路工程监理串谋行为的博弈分析及委托人最优监督效用分析,认为委托人只有加强监督才会有效控制公路工程监理的串谋行为及“不努力”和“不讲真话”行为,达到控制和消除公路工程监理单边道德风险的目的；组合策略之四的信誉评价机制,通过对分析信誉评价对代理人努力程度的影响,认为声誉评价机制能够有效的提高公路工程监理的监理工作努力程度,可以达到控制和消除公路工程监理单边道德风险的目的。论文提出的最优契约、激励诱导、最优监督、信誉评价机制是控制和消除公路工程监理单边道德风险的最佳组合策略；论文认为这种组合策略的运用是信息经济学、委托代理理论、契约理论等在公路工程项目建设领域的有益尝试,是理论应用上的有益创新。论文研究的组合策略模型是有效控制和消除公路工程监理单边道德风险的创新性举措。
[Abstract]:The problem of moral hazard is the hot issue in the current financial industry, insurance industry, banking and other fields. The research of the literature shows that the research of moral hazard in the field of engineering construction is very scarce, especially for the control and elimination of the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision. In the construction of the highway engineering project, the information asymmetry leads to the incompleteness of the highway engineering supervision contract, and also leads to the existence of the bilateral moral hazard of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision. In this way, the paper studies the combined strategy model of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision. The paper breaks through the traditional analysis of the agency problem, and in the study of the contract relation, it is assumed that the construction participants of the highway project from the "economic man" to the "social person", that is, the project owner and the highway engineering supervision are both limited and rational, and both sides have the opportunism and the self-interest behavior tendency. The paper also analyzes the complex principal-agency relationship in the construction of the highway engineering project: the multi-client and multi-agent, the project owner and the highway engineering supervision's multi-task target commission agent relationship. The paper also analyzes the asymmetry of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision information and the uncertainty of the future environment: that is, the private information of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision is not eliminated, The private information of both parties is a key factor leading to the permanent existence of the bilateral moral hazard between the project owner and the highway engineering supervision. Based on the two-sided moral hazard of the project owner and the highway engineering supervision, the paper makes a basic assumption about the moral hazard theory and the model condition of the highway engineering supervision. On the basis of Holmstrom-Milgrom multi-task proxy model, the relationship contract model of the highway engineering supervision is constructed. The combination strategy of the multi-task target association degree model, the conspiracy behavior game model, the optimal supervision model and the reputation evaluation model of the supervision work. In order to control and eliminate the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision, it is necessary to set up a set of contract relation which can restrain the behavior of the two parties, and to strengthen the inducement and supervision of the agent's behavior, and the combination strategy of the social credit evaluation mechanism of the agent's behavior. The paper studies the optimal contract mechanism in the first place of the combination strategy model, and it is thought that the highway engineering supervision contract mechanism, which is based on the formal contract of the highway engineering supervision and the relationship contract, should be established. On the basis of the implementation of the "self-compliance" in the highway engineering supervision relationship contract, the aim of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision is achieved: the incentive and inducing mechanism of the combination strategy two, through the mathematical analysis of the task of the supervision work and the empirical study of the correlation degree, It is considered that the project owner should strengthen the incentive induction to the complementary task, solve the problem of the agent's efforts through the incentive-inducing way, and promote the task of the supervision work, so as to achieve the purpose of controlling and eliminating the single-side moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision; The optimal supervision mechanism of the combination strategy ter, through the game analysis of the supervision of the highway engineering supervision and the analysis of the optimal supervision utility of the client, is of the opinion that only the strengthening supervision of the client can effectively control the collusive behavior and the "do not work hard" and the "to tell the truth" behavior of the highway engineering supervision. To achieve the aim of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision, the four-way credit evaluation mechanism of the combination strategy can effectively improve the supervision work degree of the highway engineering supervision through the analysis of the influence of the reputation evaluation on the agent's efforts, And the purpose of controlling and eliminating the unilateral moral hazard of the highway engineering supervision can be achieved. The optimal contract, incentive-induced, optimal supervision and reputation evaluation mechanism proposed in this paper are the best combination strategies to control and eliminate the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision. The beneficial attempt in the field of highway engineering project construction, such as the contract theory, is a useful innovation in the theoretical application. The combined strategy model of the thesis is an innovative approach to effectively control and eliminate the unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision.
【学位授予单位】：长沙理工大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：U415.12

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