论柯恩对罗尔斯差别原则的“动机悖论”反驳

发布时间：2018-01-14 14:04

本文关键词：论柯恩对罗尔斯差别原则的“动机悖论”反驳　出处：《哲学研究》2013年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：正一、基本预设柯恩于2008年出版的《拯救正义与平等》一书试图做两个拯救:一是将均等主义从罗尔斯的差别原则中拯救出来;二是将正义概念从罗尔斯的建构主义正义观中拯救出来。(cf.Cohen,p.2.下引仅标页码)本文主要关注柯恩的第一个拯救。笔者认为,柯恩在这里从运气均等主义的预设入手,对差别原则做了迄今为止最全面、深入甚至最有力的批判。在柯恩看来,差别原则是罗尔斯对运气均等主义与帕累托标准所做的一种妥协,而他的批判表明差别原则所体现的妥协方式存在着内在的动机困境。不过在笔者看来,柯恩的批判只是对差别原则这种特定方式的妥协有效,对妥协本身则并不有效。而帕累托标准存在的问题才是这种妥协本身的真正困境。柯恩设想这种困境的出路在于运气均等
[Abstract]:First, the book "Saving Justice and Equality" published by Cohn in 2008 tries to do two rescues: one is to save the principle of equality from Rawls' principle of difference; The second is to save the concept of justice from Rawls' view of constructivism justice. Cohn here from the presupposition of equalitarianism, to the principle of difference to do the most comprehensive, in-depth and even most powerful criticism. Difference principle is a kind of compromise made by Rawls on the equal luck doctrine and Pareto criterion, and his criticism shows that the compromise mode embodied by the difference principle has the inherent motive predicament, but in the author's view. Cohn's criticism is only a compromise to the principle of difference in this particular way. The problem with the Pareto criterion is the real dilemma of the compromise itself. Cohn assumes that the way out of this dilemma is equal luck.
【作者单位】：华东师范大学哲学系;
【基金】：笔者主持的国家社科基金青年项目“分配正义与社会公平实证研究”(编号10CZX044)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：B82-0;D091
【正文快照】： —、基本预设柯恩于2008年出版的《拯救正义与平等》一书试图做两个拯救:一是将均等主义从罗尔斯的差别原则中拯救出来;二是将正义概念从罗尔斯的建构主义正义观中拯救出来。(cf.Cohen,p.2.下引仅标瓦码)本文主要关注柯恩的第一个拯救。笔者认为,柯恩在这里从运气均等主义的预

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