属人的良品成于实践且不可教授——超越亚里士多德和休谟的思路

发布时间：2018-06-01 02:26

本文选题：属人的良品 + 常识性实践　；参考：《北京师范大学学报(社会科学版)》2014年02期

【摘要】：属人的良品——无论是道德良品还是非道德良品——都成于(常识性)实践(即可通过〔常识性〕实践培养生成),且不可教授(即不可以知识的形式加以教授)。"成于实践"和"不可教授"可看作是属人的良品的两项基本特征,也可视作是衡量或判断人所内在拥有的某种东西是否成其为良品的两项必要(但非充分)条件或基本标准。凡不成于实践,或可以教授的东西一定不成其为属人的良品。从这种观点看,亚里士多德视野中的自然良品因为不成于实践就不成其为属人的良品,休谟理解的自然良品则应解释为实践(性)良品。此外,技艺虽然也成于常识性实践,但因为可以教授,从而不成其为属人的良品。实际上,技艺的培养恰恰有赖于良品。在这个意义上说,良品比技艺更为根本。再者,亚里士多德把理智良品理解为主要成于教导也是不妥当的。其实,理智良品作为属人的良品之重要一类,不仅成于实践,而且其种也远不仅限于亚里士多德视野中的那几种。
[Abstract]:Personal good-whether moral or unethical-is the result of (common sense) practice, which can be cultivated through practice and cannot be taught (that is, it cannot be taught in the form of knowledge. " "by practice" and "not to be taught" can be regarded as two basic characteristics of a personal good, or two necessary (but not sufficient) conditions or basic criteria to measure or judge whether a certain thing owned by a person is a good one. Anything that is not practical, or which can be taught, must not be a personal good. From this point of view, Aristotle's view of natural good is not a personal good because it is not in practice, and Hume's understanding of natural good should be interpreted as practical (sexual) good. In addition, skills, although also common sense practice, because they can be taught, so it is not a personal good. In fact, the cultivation of skills depends on quality. In this sense, quality is more fundamental than skill. Moreover, Aristotle's understanding of intellectual good as primarily based on teaching is also inappropriate. In fact, as an important category of human good, the intellectual good is not only in practice, but also in Aristotle's vision.
【作者单位】：北京师范大学哲学与社会学学院、价值与文化研究中心;
【分类号】：B502.233;B82-0

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