现象学伦理学的基本问题

发布时间：2018-06-04 03:24

本文选题：反思描述的伦理学 + 规范伦理学　；参考：《世界哲学》2017年02期

【摘要】：严格意义上的"现象学的伦理学"是一种反思—描述的伦理学。胡塞尔、哈特曼、耿宁的案例为我们提供了现象学伦理学的三种可能性,它们的共同特点都是在现象学反思中进行的对道德意识的有意无意的本质直观。这样一种现象学的伦理学与其说是一种价值伦理学,不如说是一种道德心理学或道德意识现象学。现象学的反思—描述伦理学与近代以来的规范伦理学的区别,非常类似于数学—逻辑学中的直觉主义与形式主义的差异。与后面两种数学理论一样,前面两种伦理学说也不能被理解为是非此即彼、相互排斥的。只是对它们之间的奠基关系的不同理解,会导向在伦理学思考中的两种不同立场:反思—描述伦理学的和规范伦理学的。这两种伦理学需要彼此互补才能最终构成完整的人类道德系统。
[Abstract]:Strictly speaking, the ethics of phenomenology is a kind of reflective-descriptive ethics. The case of Husserl, Hartman and Geng Ning provides us with three possibilities of phenomenological ethics. Their common characteristics are the intentional, unintentional and intuitive nature of moral consciousness in phenomenological reflection. The ethics of such phenomenology is not so much value ethics as moral psychology or moral consciousness phenomenology. The differences between phenomenological introspection-descriptive ethics and normative ethics since modern times are very similar to the differences between intuitionism and formalism in mathematical logic. Like the latter two mathematical theories, the former two ethical theories cannot be understood as either or mutually exclusive. But different understanding of the fundamental relationship between them will lead to two different positions in ethical thinking: introspection-descriptive ethics and normative ethics. These two ethics need to complement each other in order to form a complete human moral system.
【作者单位】：中山大学哲学系;中山大学现象学研究所;
【分类号】：B089;B82-0

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