论道德权威的证成

发布时间：2018-06-07 08:50

本文选题：道德义务 + 道德权威　；参考：《社会科学研究》2017年02期

【摘要】：当A发布指令让B做Φ,并且该指令直接引起B负有一种道德义务去做Φ时,A对B拥有道德权威。道德权威的证成有赖于适用于服从者的一个先在的背景义务;根据背景义务的不同性质,道德权威既可以被工具性地证成,也可被非工具性地证成。当服从者负有自然义务,且有充分理由相信权威指令能帮助服从者更好地履行自然义务时,工具性道德权威获得证成;就此而言,约瑟夫·拉兹关于权威的"常规证成命题"过于宽泛。另一方面,当服从者对另外一个主体负有特殊义务,为履行义务又必须遵循该主体之指令,且该指令既非不正义又不超出服从者能力时,非工具性道德权威获得证成。
[Abstract]:When A issues an instruction to B to do 桅, and this directive directly causes B to have a moral obligation to do 桅, A has moral authority over B. The proof of moral authority depends on a pre-existing background obligation which is applicable to the subservient. According to the different nature of the background obligation, moral authority can be proved either by instrumentality or by non-instrumentality. The instrumental moral authority is established when the subservient has a natural obligation and there is good reason to believe that authoritative instructions can help the subservior to better fulfil his natural obligations; for this purpose, Joseph Raz's "conventional propositions" on authority are too broad. On the other hand, when the follower has a special obligation to another subject, and in order to fulfill the obligation, he must follow the instruction of the subject, and the instruction is neither unjust nor beyond the ability of the follower, the non-instrumental moral authority is certified.
【作者单位】：华东师范大学思勉人文高等研究院暨政治学系;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目“当代西方新近政治义务理论研究”(15YJC720038)
【分类号】：B82-05

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