亚里士多德德性伦理视野下的道德运气问题研究
发布时间：2018-09-06 15:20
【摘要】：伦理学界对有关运气问题的研究的热议,是由威廉姆斯和内格尔于1976年发表同名论文——《道德运气》引发的。本文主要通过威廉姆斯及内格尔的阐释和当代争论的三种反对声音来揭示道德运气的概念及道德运气问题的实质。威廉姆斯通过道德运气的概念,揭示了传统道德体系的能动性局限及其评价困境。以威廉姆斯为代表的运气论者,强调运气干扰的真实性,反对道德评价仅仅局限于纯粹的能动性上。这激起了反对者——激进的动机论和温和动机论、后果论,基于不同的角度与立场的反驳。两种相互冲突的道德直觉之间的自我纠结,使得运气问题在当代伦理中得以凸显。尽管道德运气的概念在当代颇具争议,但运气问题已然成为伦理学难以越过事实。因而,对伦理学来说,重要的不再是运气是否存在,而是我们应当赋予运气多大的伦理价值。与这些相互对立的意见不同,在亚里士多德德性伦理学视野下,不仅正视运气的存在,且较为全面及合理的考察了运气的伦理意义。因此,我们选举了亚氏的伦理视野,通过对其德性观的论述来分析当代道德运气的问题。
[Abstract]:The heated discussion on the issue of luck in ethics was triggered by Williams and Nagle, who published a paper of the same name, "moral luck" in 1976. This paper reveals the concept of moral luck and the essence of moral luck through Williams' and Nagle's explanation and three kinds of dissenting voices in contemporary debates. Williams reveals the limitations of the traditional moral system and its evaluation dilemma through the concept of moral luck. Williams as the representative of luck, emphasizing the truth of the interference of luck, against the moral evaluation is confined to pure initiative. This arouses opponents-radical motivationalism and moderate motivationalism, consequence theory, rebuttal based on different perspectives and positions. The self-entanglement between two conflicting moral intuition makes the problem of luck prominent in contemporary ethics. Although the concept of moral luck is controversial in modern times, the problem of luck has become a difficult fact in ethics. Therefore, what is important to ethics is not whether luck exists, but how much ethical value we should give to luck. In the view of Aristotle's ethics of virtue, we not only face the existence of luck, but also investigate the ethical significance of luck comprehensively and reasonably. Therefore, we elect the ethical vision of Aristotle and analyze the problem of contemporary moral luck through the exposition of his view of virtue.
【学位授予单位】：贵州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：B82-0
本文编号：2226761
[Abstract]:The heated discussion on the issue of luck in ethics was triggered by Williams and Nagle, who published a paper of the same name, "moral luck" in 1976. This paper reveals the concept of moral luck and the essence of moral luck through Williams' and Nagle's explanation and three kinds of dissenting voices in contemporary debates. Williams reveals the limitations of the traditional moral system and its evaluation dilemma through the concept of moral luck. Williams as the representative of luck, emphasizing the truth of the interference of luck, against the moral evaluation is confined to pure initiative. This arouses opponents-radical motivationalism and moderate motivationalism, consequence theory, rebuttal based on different perspectives and positions. The self-entanglement between two conflicting moral intuition makes the problem of luck prominent in contemporary ethics. Although the concept of moral luck is controversial in modern times, the problem of luck has become a difficult fact in ethics. Therefore, what is important to ethics is not whether luck exists, but how much ethical value we should give to luck. In the view of Aristotle's ethics of virtue, we not only face the existence of luck, but also investigate the ethical significance of luck comprehensively and reasonably. Therefore, we elect the ethical vision of Aristotle and analyze the problem of contemporary moral luck through the exposition of his view of virtue.
【学位授予单位】：贵州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：B82-0
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