关怀伦理对自由主义的挑战
发布时间：2018-11-25 21:03
【摘要】：在道德领域,如果关怀伦理想要成为一种可以取代传统主义、理性主义方法的系统方案,它必须令人信服地讨论政治问题。然而我们向来讨论政治权利的典型方式并不是关怀伦理式的,关怀伦理相对于康德式、罗尔斯式理性主义的政治自由主义似乎处于弱势地位。不仅是理性主义哲学家,甚至普通的美国人也认为我们有关于公民自由的基本权利:例如,言论自由和宗教信仰自由。但任何一种发自其原初倾向的关怀伦理都会说这种对于直觉意义上的基本的和独立的权利的强调是错误的,我们应该通过源自于人类情感关联和关心观念的术语来思考政治权利,而这事实上并不是当今大多数美国人的思考方式。自由主义的权利概念在言论自由等重要问题上犯了错误,如果我们把权利建立于对共感的考量和对别人福利的关心就会得到规范意义上正确的结论,因此,关怀伦理能纠正我们在人权或政治权利的基础问题上的错误观念。
[Abstract]:In the field of morality, if caring ethics is to become a systematic solution which can replace the traditional and rationalistic methods, it must discuss the political problem convincingly. However, the typical way of discussing political rights is not caring for ethics. Compared with Kant, the political liberalism of Rawls rationalism seems to be in a weak position. Not only rationalist philosophers but also ordinary Americans believe that we have fundamental rights to civil liberties: for example, freedom of expression and freedom of religious belief. But any kind of caring ethic that comes from its original inclination would say that this emphasis on basic and independent rights in the intuitive sense is wrong, We should think about political rights in terms derived from human affective associations and caring concepts, which are not the way most Americans think today. The liberal concept of rights makes mistakes on important issues such as freedom of speech. If we base our rights on the consideration of empathy and concern for the welfare of others, we can get a normative and correct conclusion. Caring ethics corrects our misconceptions about the basis of human rights or political rights.
【作者单位】： 美国迈阿密大学哲学系;
【分类号】：B82-06
本文编号：2357361
[Abstract]:In the field of morality, if caring ethics is to become a systematic solution which can replace the traditional and rationalistic methods, it must discuss the political problem convincingly. However, the typical way of discussing political rights is not caring for ethics. Compared with Kant, the political liberalism of Rawls rationalism seems to be in a weak position. Not only rationalist philosophers but also ordinary Americans believe that we have fundamental rights to civil liberties: for example, freedom of expression and freedom of religious belief. But any kind of caring ethic that comes from its original inclination would say that this emphasis on basic and independent rights in the intuitive sense is wrong, We should think about political rights in terms derived from human affective associations and caring concepts, which are not the way most Americans think today. The liberal concept of rights makes mistakes on important issues such as freedom of speech. If we base our rights on the consideration of empathy and concern for the welfare of others, we can get a normative and correct conclusion. Caring ethics corrects our misconceptions about the basis of human rights or political rights.
【作者单位】： 美国迈阿密大学哲学系;
【分类号】：B82-06
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