政府参与下网民舆论引导机制的演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-05-26 17:47

本文选题：政府 + 网民　；参考：《情报科学》2017年03期

【摘要】：【目的/意义】Web3.0和自媒体时代的到来,我国网民数量不断激增,作为有限理性的网民群体,其舆论导向具有不可控性,所以运用演化博弈论的方法能够从根本上探究舆论演化传播机制和引导机制。【方法/过程】该文首先运用演化博弈的相关理论知识,分析了在没有政府惩罚机制下和有政府惩罚机制下网民群体(正确信息传播者与虚假信息传播者)的博弈关系并建立了双方的演化博弈模型,然后分析了在不同参数范围下网民群体网络舆论的演化规律,最后通过对假设数值进行计算仿真模拟分析得出相关结论和建议。【结果/结论】研究结果表明:网民群体(正确信息传播者与虚假信息传播者)的初始状态以及政府的惩罚机制的力度对网民舆论的引导及舆论走向起着至关重要的作用。
[Abstract]:[purpose / significance] with the arrival of the era of Web3.0 and self-media, the number of Internet users in China is increasing rapidly. As a limited and rational group of netizens, the public opinion orientation is uncontrollable. Therefore, the evolutionary game theory can be used to fundamentally explore the mechanism of public opinion evolution and guidance. [method / process] this paper first applies the relevant theoretical knowledge of evolutionary game. This paper analyzes the game relationship of Internet users (the correct information disseminator and the false information disseminator) in the absence of government punishment mechanism and the government punishment mechanism, and establishes the evolutionary game model of both parties. Then it analyzes the evolution law of Internet public opinion in different parameters. Finally, some conclusions and suggestions are obtained through the simulation and analysis of the hypothetical values. [results / conclusions] the results show that the initial state of the Internet users (the correct information disseminator and the false information disseminator) is as follows: And the government's punishment mechanism plays a vital role in the guidance and trend of Internet public opinion.
【作者单位】：哈尔滨师范大学管理学院;哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL157)
【分类号】：D630;D669

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