第三方二阶奖惩机制对奖惩规范和合作规范建立的作用

发布时间：2018-06-14 13:30

本文选题：元规范 + 第三方二阶奖惩　；参考：《浙江理工大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：目的：虽然奖惩机制是促进合作规范的建立与维持的有效方法，但奖惩在一定程度上缓解了元素困境的同时，也带来了工具困境，从而导致了二阶公共物品问题。为了寻求解决二阶公共物品问题、建立合作规范的有效机制，，本研究在元规范理论和强互惠理论的基础上，进一步通过对第三方二阶奖惩机制的研究，探索第三方二阶奖惩机制是否有利于奖惩规范和合作规范的建立。方法：采用重复性公共物品游戏实验为基本范式，通过被试内设计和被试间设计两种方法，同时考察第三方二阶奖惩对第二方合作规范和奖惩规范建立的作用问题。结果： (1)绝大部分的被试实施了第三方二阶奖惩，但不实施任何第三方二阶奖惩人数占比多于不实施任何第二方一阶奖惩的人数占比。并且第三方二阶奖惩的次数和花费都小于第二方一阶奖惩的次数和花费。 (2)相较于第三方二阶奖惩机会不存在的情况下，其存在的情况下第二方一阶奖惩更为奖惩分明，而且奖惩合理性更高。 (3)比较第三方二阶奖惩机会存在和不存在的情况下，合作水平和合作一致性都没有明显差异。 (4)二阶奖励的使用次数和花费都显著得多于二阶惩罚，并且有相当部分的人倾向于使用二阶奖励来支持一阶奖励者，或使用惩罚来反对一阶惩罚者。结论： (1)第三方二阶奖惩存在，但第三方二阶奖惩意愿明显低于第二方一阶奖惩意愿； (2)第三方二阶奖惩可以促进奖惩规范的建立； (3)对在重复公共物品博弈的背景下的合作规范的建立并没有立竿见影的效果。 (4)高阶奖惩同样存在奖励和惩罚的非对称性。相较于二阶惩罚，第三方更倾向于使用二阶奖励。
[Abstract]:Objective: although the mechanism of rewards and punishments is an effective method to promote the establishment and maintenance of cooperative norms, to a certain extent, rewards and punishments alleviate the dilemma of elements, and at the same time, it also brings about the dilemma of tools, which leads to the problem of second-order public goods. In order to solve the problem of second-order public goods and establish an effective mechanism of cooperative norms, this study is based on the meta-norm theory and the theory of strong reciprocity, and further studies the second-order reward and punishment mechanism of the third party. This paper explores whether the second-order reward and punishment mechanism of third parties is conducive to the establishment of the norms of rewards and punishments and the norms of cooperation. Methods: the repeated public goods game experiment was used as the basic paradigm, and the effect of the second order reward and punishment on the establishment of the second party cooperation norm and the reward and punishment norm was investigated by two methods: the design within the subjects and the design between the subjects. Results: (1) most of the subjects implemented the second order reward and punishment of the third party, but the proportion of the number of those who did not carry out the second order reward and punishment was more than that of the first order of the second party. And the times and costs of the second-order rewards and punishments of the third parties are smaller than those of the first order rewards and punishments of the second party, and compared with the opportunities of the second-order rewards and punishments of the third parties, In the case of its existence, the second order rewards and punishments are more clearly defined, and the rewards and punishments are more reasonable. 3) compared with the existence and non-existence of the second-order rewards and punishments opportunities of third parties, There was no significant difference in the level of cooperation and consistency. 4) the use and cost of second-order rewards were significantly higher than second-order penalties, and a significant proportion of people tended to use second-order rewards to support first-order rewards. Or use punishment against first-order punishment. Conclusion: 1) the second order reward and punishment exists in the third party, but the willingness of the second order reward and punishment is obviously lower than that of the second party, 2) the second order reward and punishment of the third party can promote the establishment of the norm of reward and punishment. (3) there is no immediate effect on the establishment of cooperative norms under the background of repeated public goods game. Third parties tend to use second-order rewards rather than second-order penalties.
【学位授予单位】：浙江理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：B848

【共引文献】