当前位置:主页 > 社科论文 > 政治学论文 >

公务员履责的道德风险及其消减

发布时间:2018-05-15 05:19

  本文选题:公务员 + 道德风险 ; 参考:《湖南师范大学》2012年硕士论文


【摘要】:信息不对称理论是现代信息经济学的核心,它的主要观点是:在社会活动中,各类参与人员所掌握的信息是有差异的,一些参与人员拥有他人所不拥有的信息。信息不对称现象最早是于1963年由肯尼斯·约瑟夫·阿罗首次提出。它涉及到逆向选择、代理人问题以及道德风险三个问题。从公务员角度来看,处于优势的是代理方、服务方,处于劣势的是委托方、被服务方,在公众同公务员的委托——代理关系中,公务员因其是权力的拥有和使用者,具有独特的优势而几乎垄断了代理信息,造成了双边的信息不对称。本文主要以信息不对称理论为基础,来分析研究公务员履责过程中的道德风险及其消减问题。 道德风险指的是“从事经济活动的人在最大限度地增进自身效用的同时做出不利于他人的行动。”或者说是:当签约一方不完全承担风险后果时所采取的自身效用最大化的自私行为。对于公务员来说,道德风险是指他们因利己目的的驱使,使用自己手中的公共权力来谋取个人利益的最大化,从而做出违反社会道德准则的行为。 公务员履责过程的道德风险具有与商业行为不同的特点,因而其消减也更艰难。首先,公务员履责过程引发道德风险的动机更复杂。其次,公务员履责过程覆盖道德风险的手段更隐蔽。复次,公务员履责过程造就道德风险的程度更剧烈。最后,公务员履责过程积就道德风险的影响更深远。 公务员履责过程的道德风险表现为消极不作为、积极作为不当和积极不当作为。 从客观机会来看,公务员履责过程的道德风险首先来源于客观上存在障碍,某些行政工作和行政工作的部分流程存在高难度和行政行为评价标准存疑等,是造成公务员履责过程道德风险的客观事实。 其次是某些现实条件又提供了公务员道德风险行为的免责可能,加剧了道德风险。信息不对称、行为不可逆、满意度模糊和制度不健全等,正由于存在这些条件,一旦公务员放松了对自己的道德要求,其道德风险的滋生就成为自然过程。从公务员角度来看,处于优势的是代理方、服务方,处于劣势的是委托方、被服务方,在公务员同公众的委托——代理关系中,公务员因其是权力的拥有和使用者,具有独特的优势而几乎垄断了代理信息,造成了双边的信息不对称。 我们基于风险控制流程来考虑公务员履责过程的道德风险消减。由于道德风险是客观诱因对主观偏好的不当激发,因此,消减公务员履责过程的道德风险,主要任务是对客观诱因的限制,培养主体坚定意志的目的也在于限制客观诱因的影响,以客观诱因的失效为着力点,我们认为,以流程为逻辑,消减公务员履责过程道德风险的主要途径可概括为以下几个:提升道德风险预估水平、提高道德风险检测频率、厘定道德风险评判标准、实施道德风险有效控制和预留道德风险对冲方式。
[Abstract]:The theory of information asymmetry is the core of modern information economics. Its main viewpoint is that in social activities, the information held by all kinds of participants is different, and some participants have information that others do not have. Information asymmetry was first proposed by Kenneth Joseph Arrow in 1963. It involves three problems: adverse selection, agent and moral hazard. From the perspective of civil servants, it is the agent, the service party and the client who are at a disadvantage. In the principal-agent relationship between the public and the civil servant, the civil servant is the owner and user of the power. It has a unique advantage and almost monopolizes agency information, resulting in bilateral information asymmetry. Based on the theory of asymmetric information, this paper analyzes and studies the moral hazard and its abatement in the process of civil servant's duty. Moral hazard refers to "people who engage in economic activities to maximize their own effectiveness while doing to the detriment of others." Or: selfishness of maximizing utility when the contracting party is not fully exposed to the consequences of risk. For civil servants, moral hazard means that they use their own public power to maximize their personal interests because of their self-interest, and thus act in violation of social moral norms. The moral hazard in the process of civil servant's duty is different from the business behavior, so it is more difficult to reduce the moral hazard. First, the motivation for moral hazard in the process of civil servants' duties is more complex. Second, the process of civil servants to cover the moral hazard of the means more hidden. Over and over again, the process of civil servants' duties creates a greater degree of moral hazard. Finally, the process of civil service accountability on the moral hazard of a more far-reaching impact. The moral hazard in the process of civil servant's duty is negative omission, positive improper behavior and positive improper action. From the perspective of objective opportunity, the moral hazard in the process of civil servants' duties comes from the obstacles objectively, some administrative work and part of the process of administrative work are difficult and the evaluation standard of administrative behavior is doubtful, and so on. It is an objective fact that causes moral hazard in the process of civil servant's duty. Secondly, some practical conditions provide civil servants with the possibility of exemption from moral hazard behavior, which exacerbates moral hazard. Information asymmetry, behavior irreversibility, fuzzy satisfaction and imperfect system, etc., because of the existence of these conditions, once civil servants relax their own moral requirements, the breeding of their moral hazard becomes a natural process. From the perspective of civil servants, it is the agent, the service party and the client who are at a disadvantage. In the principal-agent relationship between civil servants and the public, civil servants are the owners and users of power. It has a unique advantage and almost monopolizes agency information, resulting in bilateral information asymmetry. Based on the risk control process, we consider the moral hazard reduction of civil servants. Since moral hazard is the improper stimulation of subjective preference by objective inducement, therefore, the main task of reducing moral hazard in the process of civil servant's duty is to limit the objective inducement. The purpose of cultivating the firm will of the subject is also to limit the influence of the objective inducement and to focus on the invalidation of the objective inducement. We believe that the process is the logic. The main ways to reduce the moral hazard in the process of civil servants' duty can be summarized as follows: to raise the level of moral hazard prediction, to increase the frequency of moral hazard detection, and to determine the standard of moral hazard evaluation. To effectively control and reserve moral hazard hedging methods.
【学位授予单位】:湖南师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:D035

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前10条

1 郭小聪,聂勇浩;行政伦理:降低行政官员道德风险的有效途径[J];成都行政学院学报(哲学社会科学);2002年06期

2 祝金龙;宋丽成;;公务员激励约束机制的博奕分析——委托代理理论视角[J];当代经济;2006年08期

3 王美文;;公务员责任实现机制探析[J];湖北大学学报(哲学社会科学版);2007年06期

4 张恒;;政府官员的“道德风险”及其防范[J];江苏教育学院学报(社会科学);2010年03期

5 戴萍萍;;社会资本理论综述[J];科技信息(科学教研);2007年15期

6 阮爱莺;公共权力委托代理机制与官员道德风险的防范[J];理论探索;2004年06期

7 张康之;论行政行为的道德判断[J];宁夏社会科学;1999年03期

8 约·斯·穆勒;刘进;;政治经济学定义及研究这门科学的哲学方法[J];海派经济学;2004年03期

9 薛冰;行政经济人假设的方法论反思[J];西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版);2005年04期

10 刘铁红,张德学,刘萍;遏制行政不作为违法的途径[J];行政论坛;2001年05期

相关重要报纸文章 前2条

1 曾业松;[N];光明日报;2003年

2 本报记者 李元浩;[N];工人日报;2009年

相关硕士学位论文 前6条

1 郭晔 ;道德风险论[D];南京师范大学;2003年

2 周虹;中国官德建设研究及当代官德模式构建[D];西安理工大学;2005年

3 沈杰;转型期中国官德失范的制度分析及对策研究[D];河北大学;2005年

4 李云;论公务员的道德责任[D];湖南师范大学;2005年

5 肖波涛;论行政不作为的责任及其法律救济[D];湘潭大学;2005年

6 陈瑶;行政沟通中的信息不对称规避研究[D];中南大学;2010年



本文编号:1891149

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/shekelunwen/zhengzx/1891149.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户af90a***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com