无支配自由的独断论难题

发布时间：2018-05-19 11:51

本文选题：自由 + 无支配　；参考：《道德与文明》2014年02期

【摘要】：以赛亚·伯林对消极自由-积极自由的二分构成了当代政治哲学分析自由问题的经典框架,然而,在晚近西方学界,以菲利普·佩迪特为代表的新共和主义者却提出了无支配的自由概念,认为它既区别于无干涉的消极自由和作为自主的积极自由,又比二者更胜一筹,是第三种自由概念。佩迪特对无支配自由的构建受到许多批评,其中最根本的质疑是,与干涉相比,支配是一种规范概念,必须依赖于某种特定的道德立场。因此,建基于这种概念的无支配自由必然是一种规范的自由概念。这意味着它要么是独断论的,缺乏客观的基础;要么必须被还原为无干涉的消极自由,因此丧失自身的独立性。为了摆脱这种困境,佩迪特做了大量的澄清与建构,试图用推论性的控制和免于异己的控制来定义无支配自由,他的努力虽然证明无支配自由没有预设任何道德立场,不是一种规范概念,但却无法真正证明它是唯一正确的自由概念,因此,无支配自由在另外一个层面上依然面临着独断论的难题。
[Abstract]:Isaiah Berlin's dichotomy of negative liberal-positive freedom constitutes the classic framework for the analysis of freedom in contemporary political philosophy. However, the new republic represented by Philip Pettit put forward the concept of freedom without domination, which is different from the passive freedom of non-interference and the positive freedom as autonomy, and is a third concept of freedom. Pettit's construction of discretionary freedom has been criticized by many people, among which the most fundamental question is that domination is a normative concept compared with interference, and must rely on a certain moral position. Therefore, the discretionary freedom based on this concept is bound to be a normative concept of freedom. This means that it is either arbitrary, lacking an objective basis, or must be reduced to passive freedom without interference, thus losing its own independence. In order to extricate himself from this dilemma, Pettit has made a great deal of clarification and construction, trying to define the freedom of non-domination by means of inferential control and free from the control of dissidents, although his efforts have proved that there is no presupposition of any moral position. It is not a normative concept, but it cannot really be proved to be the only correct concept of freedom.
【作者单位】：浙江大学哲学系;
【分类号】：D081

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