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政治关联对我国高新技术企业融资约束的影响

发布时间:2018-05-30 02:11

  本文选题:高新技术企业 + 融资约束 ; 参考:《江西财经大学》2017年硕士论文


【摘要】:21世纪的社会是一个科学技术高速发展的社会,随着高新技术在各行各业的广泛应用,人类的生活质量和健康水平有了显著的提升。高新技术企业在促进国民经济发展、增强国家综合实力、改善人民生活中,发挥着越来越重要的作用。我国一直致力于鼓励企业的技术研发,支持高新技术企业的发展。2016年,修订后的《高新技术企业认定管理办法》开始推行,为规范高新技术产业的发展、促进企业科技创新提供了重要的政策支持。企业的发展离不开资金的支持,资金偏好于投向规模大、主营业务稳定的企业,而对规模小、业务不确定性较强的企业却显得非常谨慎。高新技术企业普遍具有规模小、投入成本高、风险大的特征,具有很强的不确定性,相对而言更难获得融资,尤其是银行的信贷融资。因此,国内外许多学者致力于研究高新技术企业的融资约束,试图为企业融资约束问题的解决提供一些切实可行的办法。企业的政治关联已经成为一种普遍现象,经济活动中经常出现企业家积极参与政治活动的事情,比如结交政府官员,参选人大代表或政协委员,聘任离职的政府官员等。国内外学者们对这种现象进行研究,发现政治关联对企业的发展具有很大的帮助,具体表现在:为企业提供产权保护和项目资源,减少企业的信息不对称程度,为企业提供税收优惠、财政补贴等方面。那么,政治关联能否缓解高新技术企业的融资约束呢?如果可以,政治关联缓解高新技术企业融资约束的机制又是什么呢?这就是本文研究的主要内容。本文的研究样本为在我国创业板和中小板上市的高新技术企业。高新技术企业在IPO政策的引导下,主要都集中在中小板和创业板上市,占比78%左右,以此为样本进行研究,具有代表性。本文采用现金-现金流敏感性作为融资约束的衡量工具,以企业董事长和总经理的政治背景作为政治关联的代理变量,把政治关联分解为中央型、地方型、代表型和政府部门型四种。首先通过构建现金-现金流模型,实证分析我国高新技术企业是否存在融资约束,发现我国高新技术企业确实存在显著为正的现金-现金流敏感性;接下来逐一研究不同类型的政治关联对高新技术企业融资约束的影响,关注点在于四种政治关联能否降低企业的现金-现金流敏感性;最后分别研究政治关联对高新技术企业短期借款、长期借款、权益融资和政府补助的影响,以分析政治关联缓解高新技术企业融资约束的具体机制。通过理论研究和实证分析,本文得出以下结论:第一,高新技术企业存在显著为正的现金-现金流敏感性,因此,我国高新技术企业确实存在融资约束;第二,政治关联与经营活动现金流的交叉项显著降低了企业的现金-现金流敏感性,因此,政治关联能够缓解高新技术企业的融资约束;第三,相对于没有政治关联的高新技术企业,有政治关联的高新技术企业能够获得更多的短期借款、权益融资和政府补助,而对长期借款的获得并不显著,因此,政治关联缓解高新技术企业的机制包括短期借款、权益融资和政府补助,但不包括长期借款。
[Abstract]:The society of twenty-first Century is a society with rapid development of science and technology. With the wide application of high and new technology in all walks of life, the quality of human life and the level of health have been greatly improved. The high-tech enterprises play a more and more important role in promoting the development of the national economy, strengthening the national comprehensive strength and improving the people's lives. The country has been committed to encouraging the technology research and development of enterprises and supporting the development of high and new technology enterprises in.2016 years. The revised management methods for the identification and management of high-tech enterprises began to be carried out. It provides important policy support to standardize the development of high-tech industries and promote technological innovation of enterprises. The development of enterprises can not be separated from the support of funds and funds are preferred. Enterprises with large scale and stable business are very cautious to enterprises with small scale and strong business uncertainty. High and new technology enterprises generally have the characteristics of small scale, high cost and high risk, which have strong uncertainty, and are relatively difficult to obtain financing, especially the credit financing of banks. Many scholars are committed to research the financing constraints of high-tech enterprises, and try to provide some practical ways to solve the problem of financing constraints of enterprises. The political connection of enterprises has become a common phenomenon, and the active participation of entrepreneurs in political activities in economic activities, such as meeting government officials and selecting representatives of people's Congress, is a common phenomenon. At home and abroad, scholars at home and abroad have studied this phenomenon and found that political connections are of great help to the development of enterprises. It is manifested in the provision of property rights protection and project resources for enterprises, reducing the information asymmetry of enterprises, and providing tax incentives and financial subsidies for enterprises. So, can political relevance alleviate the financing constraints of high-tech enterprises? If it is possible, what is the mechanism to mitigate the financing constraints of high-tech enterprises? This is the main content of this study. The sample is the high-tech enterprise listed in the gem and the small and medium board in China. The high and new technology enterprise is in IPO Under the guidance of the policy, it is mainly concentrated on the SME board and the gem, accounting for about 78%. This is the representative of the sample. This paper uses the cash cash flow sensitivity as a measure tool for the financing constraints, and takes the political background of the chairman and the general manager as the proxy variable of the political connection, and decomposes the political connection into the political connection. There are four types of central, local, representative and government departments. First, through the construction of cash cash flow model, this paper makes an empirical analysis of the existence of financing constraints in the high-tech enterprises in China, and finds that the high and new technology enterprises in our country have a significant positive cash cash flow sensitivity. The concern is whether the four political connections can reduce the cash cash flow sensitivity of the enterprise, and the effects of the political relevance on short-term borrowing, long-term borrowing, equity financing and government subsidies respectively, in order to analyze the specific mechanism of the political connection to alleviate the financing constraints of high and new technology enterprises. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: firstly, the high and new technology enterprises have a positive cash cash flow sensitivity, therefore, the high-tech enterprises in China do exist financing constraints; second, the cross term of the cash flow of the political connection and the operating activities significantly reduces the cash cash flow sensitivity of the enterprise, therefore, The political connection can alleviate the financing constraints of high-tech enterprises; third, relative to the hi-tech enterprises without political connections, the high and new technology enterprises with political connections can obtain more short-term loans, equity financing and government subsidies, but the acquisition of long-term loans is not significant. Therefore, the political connection alleviated the high-tech enterprises. The mechanism includes short-term loans, equity financing and government subsidies, but not long-term loans.
【学位授予单位】:江西财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D0;F276.44;F275

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