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基于相机续约的政府间博弈研究

发布时间:2019-02-08 16:55
【摘要】:在中国,改革与发展可以说主要是靠政府来推动的,同时,改革与发展中的许多深层次问题也是与政府间的互动交织在一起的。在任命制条件下,上下级政府间存在相机续约的特征。在相机续约的约束机制下,地方政府追求自身效用最大化的前提是首先满足上级的要求。于是上级政府可以通过给予下级一个最优报价来最大化剩余。隶属于同一上级的下级政府间相互博弈。博弈的胜负与地方政府官员的政治前途息息相关。博弈的结果也与中国的经济发展息息相关。 本文关注以下问题:(1)中国的政府结构是什么样的?(2)中国的政府间关系是怎么形成的?(3)上下级政府间和同级政府问的博弈机理是什么?(4)博弈中各级政府采取了什么样的策略,表现出了什么样的行为?(5)政府问博弈对中国经济造成了什么后果?这些后果的深层次原因是什么?解决当前经济发展中的这些问题的方向在哪里? 本文采取理论研究和实证分析相结合的方法,尝试回答上述问题。在理论研究方面建立了政府间博弈的数学模型,在实证分析方面采用的是案例分析的方法,期望用中国经济的事实来检验理论模型的正确性。 通过研究本文得出以下几个结论: (1)“重工业优先发展”战略导致了计划经济的产生。 (2)计划经济的根本弊端是信息成本高昂。 (3)中国通过承包制重新界定了产权,从而搭建了从计划走向市场的桥梁。承包不仅促进了企业的竞争而且促成了政府间的竞争。 (4)建立了基于相机续约的政府间博弈模型,首次提出并证明了中共选拔和任用干部“德才兼备,以德为先”原则的经济学基础。 (5)政府间博弈引发了中国经济结构失衡和地方政府债务危机。主要原因是政府行政成本高昂、国富民穷和政府权力的过分集中。 (6)提出解决问题的方法是:第一,打造有限政府。具体可以从税收法定、预算民主、优化人大常委会人员结构、完善人民监督机制着手。第二,建立法治。从传统的“人格化交易”转变为现代的“非人格化交易”。第三,国资藏富于民。通过股票市场把有自生能力的国有企业股份转让给社会大众,把获得的转让资金分成三个部分,一部分用于帮助地方政府偿还短期贷款利息,一部分充实社保基金,余下的平均划拨到全体公民的银行账户上,分给国民。
[Abstract]:In China, the reform and development can be mainly promoted by the government. At the same time, many deep-seated problems in the reform and development are intertwined with the interaction between the governments. Under the appointment system, there are some characteristics of camera renewal between the upper and lower governments. Under the constraint mechanism of camera renewal, the premise for local government to pursue its own utility maximization is to meet the requirements of the superior first. The higher government can then maximize the surplus by giving its subordinates an optimal offer. Subordinate governments subordinate to the same higher level play games against each other. The outcome of the game is closely related to the political future of local government officials. The results of the game are also closely related to China's economic development. This paper focuses on the following questions: (1) what is the structure of China's government? (2) how does China's intergovernmental relationship come into being? (3) what is the game mechanism between the upper and lower governments and the government at the same level? (4) What strategies have governments at all levels adopted in the game? What kind of behavior did the government show? (5) what are the consequences of the game to the Chinese economy? What are the underlying causes of these consequences? Where are the directions for solving these problems in the current economic development? This paper attempts to answer the above questions by combining theoretical research with empirical analysis. In the theoretical research, the mathematical model of intergovernmental game is established, and the case analysis method is used in the empirical analysis. It is expected that the correctness of the theoretical model can be verified by the facts of the Chinese economy. The conclusions are as follows: (1) the strategy of "heavy industry gives priority to development" leads to the birth of planned economy. (2) the fundamental disadvantage of planned economy is the high cost of information. (3) China has redefined the property right through the contract system, thus building the bridge from the plan to the market. Contracting not only promotes competition among enterprises, but also between governments. (4) the intergovernmental game model based on the camera renewal is established, and the economic foundation of the principle that the Communist Party of China selects and appoints cadres with both morality and ability is put forward and proved for the first time. (5) Intergovernmental game causes the imbalance of economic structure and the debt crisis of local government in China. The main reasons are high administrative costs, rich and poor, and excessive concentration of government power. (6) the methods to solve the problem are as follows: first, build a limited government. We can start from the following aspects: legal taxation, budget democracy, optimization of the personnel structure of the NPC standing Committee, and improvement of the people's supervision mechanism. Second, establish the rule of law. From the traditional "personification transaction" to the modern "non-personal transaction". Third, state assets are rich in the people. Through the stock market, the shares of self-supporting state-owned enterprises were transferred to the public, and the transfer funds were divided into three parts, one to help local governments repay interest on short-term loans, and another to replenish the social security fund. The remaining average is allocated to the bank accounts of all citizens and distributed to the citizens.
【学位授予单位】:武汉理工大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D035

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