再制造闭环供应链的定价策略与协调机制研究

发布时间：2017-12-27 23:00

本文关键词：再制造闭环供应链的定价策略与协调机制研究　出处：《东南大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着人们环境保护、可持续发展认识的逐步提高,生产企业回收废旧产品用于再制造能够节约资源、增加利润,闭环供应链管理的研究逐步成为了管理学界的研究热点。闭环供应链是将正向物流与逆向物流有机结合,通过产品的正向交付和逆向回收再利用,形成的闭环反馈式循环系统。由于闭环供应链系统涉及多个主体和环节,参与成员也都具有不同的决策目标,在合作过程中会发生利益冲突,导致整条闭环供应链运作效率降低、整体利润下降,在其管理中出现了新问题。本论文采用定性分析与定量分析相结合的研究方法,在契约理论的基础上,以博弈论、最优化方法为工具,深入讨论了闭环供应链定价策略与协调机制,重点研究了不对称信息下闭环供应链的差别定价策略及契约协调机制、需求随机且回收量对回收价格敏感的闭环供应链定价策略与协调机制、不同权力结构下的闭环供应链回收渠道选择及定价决策模型、考虑双向主导相异的闭环供应链物流策略与补贴机制研究等问题。论文的主要研究工作体现在以下几方面:(1)研究了不对称信息下闭环供应链的定价策略及协调机制问题。针对单一制造商和单一零售商组成的二级闭环供应链,利用委托代理分析框架,研究了在信息不对称情况下制造商和零售商之间的利益博弈;分析了制造商如何设计契约,通过零售商的自选择来有效甑别零售商的私有信息。通过研究表明,制造商采用契约菜单的形式,可以有效地避免零售商的道德风险问题,使自己的利润达到最优。最后给出数值算例对结论进行了验证。(2)研究了需求随机且回收量对回收价格敏感的闭环供应链定价决策模型。考虑了一个单一产品供应链,既向市场提供全新产品又提供再制造品,在需求随机且回收量对回收价格敏感的情况下,求解模型进行企业的最优生产和回收决策,使闭环供应链利润最优。分别建立了制造商回收时的集中决策模型与第三方回收时的分散决策模型,给出不同决策模型的最优回收价格及最优产量,为分散决策模型制定契约来协调各方的利益并给出最优契约参数。(3)研究了零售商主导下闭环供应链的回收渠道选择及定价决策问题。运用博弈理论和最优化方法,比较分析了集中决策及三种分散回收模式下的定价决策与系统效益。研究结果表明:在零售商主导的市场结构下,当制造商选择直接回收时,闭环供应链具有较低的销售价格和较高的回收率,制造商利润、零售商利润及系统总利润均最大,对消费者及整个社会更有利。(4)研究了不同权力结构下双渠道闭环供应链的定价决策问题。运用博弈理论,分析了一个在线零售商和一个传统零售商竞争环境下闭环供应链的最优回收率、定价决策与系统效益。研究结果表明:在制造商主导的市场结构中,制造商的收益较零售商主导时高,供应链其他成员的收益及系统的总效益都较小;而在零售商主导的市场结构中,零售商和消费者的收益及系统总效益都较制造商主导时高。(5)研究了正向供应链由制造商主导,逆向供应链由销售商主导情形下闭环供应链的定价策略、物流策略和补贴机制。分析得出,在主导企业和从属企业在物流策略的选取上产生分歧时,主导企业并不能完全采取补贴从属企业的方式来保持供应链的稳定性,因此,由于闭环供应链是由正向和逆向子系统组成的,政府部门应考虑供应链的整体性给予再制造补贴,一方面激励供应链节点企业实施再制造,一方面保持供应链的稳定性。
[Abstract]:With the gradual improvement of people's awareness of environmental protection and sustainable development, the recycling of waste products for manufacturing enterprises can save resources and increase profits. Closed loop supply chain management research has gradually become a research hotspot in the management field. Closed loop supply chain is a closed loop feedback system formed by the combination of forward logistics and reverse logistics, through the forward delivery and reverse recycling of products. Because the closed loop supply chain system involves multiple subjects and links, the participating members also have different decision objectives. In the process of cooperation, interest conflicts will occur, resulting in the whole closed-loop supply chain operation efficiency decreasing and the overall profit decreasing. New problems arise in its management. This paper adopts the method of combining qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, on the base of the contract theory, game theory and optimization method as tools, in-depth discussion of the closed-loop supply chain pricing strategy and coordination mechanism, focus on the closed-loop supply chain under asymmetric information differential pricing strategy and coordination mechanism, and stochastic demand the recovery rate of different power structure recovery price sensitive closed-loop supply chain pricing strategy and coordination mechanism, the closed-loop supply chain recycling channel selection and pricing decision model, considering the problem of two-way leading different closed-loop supply chain logistics strategy and subsidy mechanism research. The main research work of this paper is embodied in the following aspects: (1) the pricing strategy and coordination mechanism of closed loop supply chain under asymmetric information are studied. According to the two level of closed-loop supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer, using the principal-agent theory, study the game between manufacturers and retailers under asymmetric information; analyze the manufacturer to design a contract, to effectively distinguishing the private information of the retailer's self selection by retailers. Through the study, the manufacturer uses the contract menu, which can effectively avoid the problem of the moral hazard of the retailer and make the profit of its own best. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the conclusion. (2) the pricing decision model of closed loop supply chain is studied with random demand and recovery price sensitive to recovery price. Consider a single product supply chain, not only to the market of new products and remanufactured products, in the stochastic demand and recovery rate of recovery of price sensitive, model of optimal production and recovery of enterprise decision-making, the optimal closed-loop supply chain profit. The centralized decision making model for the manufacturer's recovery and the decentralized decision making model of the third party's recovery are established respectively, and the optimal recovery price and the optimal output of different decision models are given. The contract for the decentralized decision making model is used to coordinate the interests of all parties and to give the optimal contract parameters. (3) the selection of the recycling channel and the pricing decision of the closed loop supply chain under the retailer LED are studied. By using the game theory and the optimization method, the pricing decision and system benefit of the centralized decision and three kinds of decentralized recovery modes are compared and analyzed. The results show that: in the market structure dominated by retailers, when manufacturers choose to direct recycling, recovery of the closed-loop supply chain with lower price and higher rate, the profit of the manufacturer, the retailer and the total profit of the system are the largest, more favorable to consumers and the whole society. (4) the pricing decision of double channel closed loop supply chain under different power structure is studied. Based on game theory, the optimal recovery rate, pricing decision and system benefit of an online retailer and a traditional retailer under the competition environment are analyzed. The results show that: in the market led by the manufacturer, the manufacturer is a leading retailer of high income, the total benefit of supply chain system and the other members are less; and in the market structure of the leading retailers in the total income, effect and system of retailers and consumers is a leading manufacturer of high yidu. (5) we studied the pricing strategy, logistics strategy and subsidy mechanism of the closed loop supply chain under the condition that the forward supply chain is dominated by the manufacturer and the reverse supply chain is dominated by the retailer. In the analysis, the leading enterprises and subordinate enterprises in the selection of logistics strategy differences on, leading enterprises and can not completely take subsidies subordinate enterprises to maintain the stability of the supply chain, therefore, the closed-loop supply chain is composed of forward and reverse subsystem, government departments should consider the overall supply chain give on the one hand to encourage manufacturing subsidies, implementation of manufacturing enterprises in supply chain, on the one hand, to maintain the stability of the supply chain.
【学位授予单位】：东南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F274

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