论美国纵向限制法律规范及其对我国的启示

发布时间：2018-03-03 06:06

本文选题：纵向限制　切入点：转售价格维持　出处：《华东政法大学》2010年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 我国正在建设社会主义市场经济,但由于历史和现实的种种原因,市场上存在着各种限制竞争行为,抑制了市场竞争,影响了市场秩序。其中有一种突出的现象就是纵向限制。我国已经出台了《反垄断法》,反垄断执法机构也正在积极拟订规章,但是从现有规范来看,则显得过于原则性,可操作性欠佳,因而规制结果并不乐观。美国作为世界上最早制定反垄断法的国家之一,积累了丰富的反垄断法理论研究与司法实务经验,理应取其精华为我所用,完善我国《反垄断法》的纵向限制规定。本文立足于比较法的视野,主要研究了美国纵向限制的经济学和法学理论,并在此基础上分析了美国纵向限制法律规范的历史演进路径,继而分别阐述了美国的纵向价格限制法律规范及纵向非价格限制法律规范,最后回归到我国《反垄断法》的纵向限制规定及其完善。论文主要从六个方面进行了论述：第一章,美国纵向限制的经济学理论。本文研究了哈佛学派、芝加哥学派及后芝加哥学派的纵向限制观点,分析了其对司法实务的影响。哈佛学派提出了杠杆理论、芝加哥学派阐述了委托—代理和交易成本理论、后芝加哥学派则运用非合作博弈模型来研究各种策略行为。纵向限制竞争效果的经济学解释主要有两种：一种是非效率解释,即纵向限制可以推动零售商卡特尔和制造商卡特尔来反竞争。另一种是效率解释,即通过交易成本、搭便车解释、经销网点假说、质量和时尚的认证假说等理论来说明纵向限制的促进竞争作用。通过对上述问题的研究,本文认为美国的纵向限制经济学理论遵循了效率路径,其中的弊端甚为明显。一方面,它不完善。这种效率路径所力图消除的围绕经销商的关切问题仍将继续出现在各种情况和反垄断以外的法律理论中。另一方面,它也不现实。消费者始终不认为纵向限制会使他们的福利增加。第二章,美国纵向限制反竞争问题的法律理论。本文界定了美国纵向限制的概念及类型,继而研究了解释纵向限制反竞争问题的各种法律理论。首先是解释纵向共谋的高露洁理论、压迫理论及因果关系理论。其次是解释排除竞争者问题的杠杆理论、掠夺性定价理论、提高竞争对手成本理论以及信息不完全理论。基于纵向限制的反竞争效果容易产生判断上的不确定性,所以本文进而研究了美国反垄断法的规制方式,即本身违法规则及合理规则。在这两个规则的适用过程中,又出现了新的变形——非严格本身违法规则和快速合理规则。而在这两个规则的理论研究上,也出现了两分法、三分法、目的分析法及极端举证责任分析法的争鸣。第三章,美国纵向限制法律规范的历史演进路径。本文研究了美国纵向限制的成文法规定：《谢尔曼法》第1条、第2条、《克莱顿法》第3条及《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条。而后,分析了执法部门指南的纵向限制规定,其中典型的有司法部、全美检察长协会的《纵向限制指南》,继而对两者进行了比较。再次,通过里程牌式案例的判决要点串联勾勒了美国纵向限制判例法的基本图景。最后,阐述了美国学界拟议的纵向限制法律规范的综合改革,即引入结构合理规则来规制纵向限制。第四章,美国纵向价格限制的法律规范。首先,论文从《谢尔曼法》第1条着手,通过判例法的发展——基弗—斯特瓦案所揭示的本身违法规则、阿尔布莱特案的本身违法规则到康安案所适用的合理规则全面地展示了最高转售价格的法律规范,并进一步地分析了最高转售价格维持与纵向非价格限制并存的情况。其次,从《谢尔曼法》第1条、第2条以及《克莱顿法》的第3条着手,通过判例法的发展——迈尔斯案所体现出的偶然的本身违法规则、以通用电器案为代表的对代理的利用、以高露洁案为代表的价格协议的证明、丽锦案所适用的合理规则厘清了美国规制转售价格维持、最低转售价格维持的基本脉络,并进而论述了不会被定性为转售价格维持的行为以及纵向价格限制与非价格限制并存时是否本身违法的问题。最后,从《谢尔曼》法第1条规定及合法价格推荐方式的构成要件这两个角度研究了价格推荐制度。第五章,美国纵向非价格限制的法律规范。首先,本文研究了纵向地域和顾客限制。阐述了基本类型,通过怀特汽车公司案、施温案、希尔维尼亚案及希尔维尼亚案后的判决体现了针对这类限制,判例法从本身违法规则进展到合理规则的路径,并比较了纵向地域和顾客限制与其他类型纵向非价格限制的异同,还分析了它们并存时的限制竞争情况。其次,从《谢尔曼法》第1条、《克莱顿法》第3条以及《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条入手,通过美孚石油公司所揭示的数量测试标准和坦帕电器公司所揭示的市场比例测试标准阐述了独家交易对竞争的影响因素,并进一步地比较了独家交易与其他类型的纵向非价格限制以及它们并存时对竞争的限制情况。再次,研究了反垄断法对搭售的评价,通过对搭售要件的分析——两种可分的产品以及搭售协议,搭售的违法性判断——足够的市场支配力、妨碍被搭售品的市场竞争以及作为抗辩的正当商业理由来展示美国对搭售规制的。最后,通过特许经营合同中常包含的排他性交易、地域和顾客限制、营业表征控制、搭售、转售价格维持、竞业禁止等条款来分析美国对特许经营的反垄断法律规范。第六章,我国《反垄断法》的纵向限制规定及其完善。本文首先讨论了《反垄断法》中规制纵向限制的具体条款,主要是14-15条和17-19条。第14-15条规定了纵向垄断协议,本文认为符合我国当前的具体国情,顺应了国际上一般的立法趋势,但是立法模式有缺陷、授权条款不明。第17-19条也有相应条款规制了独家交易和搭售,但是立法缺陷明显,有待完善。而后,探讨了美国纵向限制法律规范对我国转售价格维持、纵向地域和顾客限制、独家交易和搭售所带来的启示。最后,提出针对可行的进一步完善纵向限制规定的方法是由反垄断委员会出台《纵向限制指南》,并阐述了主要内容。
[Abstract]:China is building a socialist market economy, but due to historical and practical reasons, there exist various restrictions on competitive behavior, restrain competition in the market, affecting the market order. One prominent phenomenon is the vertical restrictions. China has promulgated the "anti-monopoly law", the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies also is developing regulations, but the existing norm, is too principle, operability is poor, the results of regulation is not optimistic. The United States is one of the earliest anti monopoly law developed countries in the world, has accumulated a wealth of anti monopoly law theory and judicial practice experience, should take its essence, improve the vertical limit the provisions of China's anti-monopoly law > <. Based on the perspective of comparative law, studying the economics of vertical restraints and law theories, and based on the analysis of the vertical limit The historical evolution path of the legal norms is formulated. Then, the laws and regulations of the US longitudinal price restriction and the vertical non price restriction are expounded respectively. Finally, the vertical restriction and perfection of the "anti-monopoly law" in China are concluded. The paper is discussed from six aspects.
The first chapter, the economics theory of vertical restraints in the United States. In this paper the Harvard School, Chicago school and Chicago school's view of vertical restraints, analyzes its influence on the judicial practice. The Harvard School proposed leverage theory, the Chicago school describes the principal-agent theory and transaction cost, after the Chicago school used a non cooperative game model to study the behavior of a variety of strategies. There are two main types of longitudinal economics to explain the effect of restricting competition: one is the non efficiency of interpretation, namely vertical restraints can promote retailers and manufacturers to anti competitive cartel cartel. The other one is the efficiency of interpretation, namely through the transaction cost, the free rider explanation, distribution network hypothesis, quality certification and fashion theory to explain the role of promoting competition of vertical restraints. The research on the above problems, this paper thinks the economic theory of vertical restraints Follow the path of efficiency, the disadvantage is obvious. On the one hand, it is not perfect. The efficiency of the path of legal theory tries to focus on the concerns of the elimination of dealers will continue to appear in a variety of situations and outside antitrust. On the other hand, it is not realistic. Consumers always do not believe that vertical restrictions will make their welfare.
The second chapter, the legal theory of vertical restraints in the United States anti competitive problems. This paper defines the concept and types of vertical restraints in the United States, then studied a variety of legal theory to explain the vertical limit anti competition issues. The first is to explain the vertical collusion theory of Colgate, compression theory and causality theory. Then explain the issue of excluding competitors lever theory. The theory of predatory pricing, improve the competition cost theory and incomplete information theory. To produce anti competitive effects of vertical restraints on judgment based on the uncertainty, so this paper studies the regulation of the United States antitrust law, namely the per se rule and rule of reason. In the course of the application of these two rules, and the emergence of new deformation -- non strict per se rule and fast rule of reason. In the theoretical research on these two rules, also appeared a dichotomy, three points The contention of the law, the objective analysis and the analysis of the extreme burden of proof.
The third chapter, the historical evolution of the U.S. vertical restraints law. This paper studied the law of vertical restraints: < Sherman > first, second <, > third < Clayton law and the Federal Trade Commission Act > fifth. Then, analyzes the vertical restraints law enforcement guidelines, including typical the Ministry of justice, the attorney general of the association of "vertical restraints guidelines", and then the two are compared. Thirdly, by stressing the most important case of vertical restraints outlined the general picture of the case law. Finally, discusses the comprehensive reform of American scholars proposed vertical restraints law, namely the introduction reasonable structure rule of vertical restraints.
The fourth chapter, the legal norms of vertical price restraint. First of all, from the "Sherman law > first to reveal the development of case law -- Keifer Stewart case per se rules, reasonable rules applicable to Albright case per se rules to kang'an case fully demonstrated the highest resale of legal norms the price, and further analysis of the maximum resale price maintenance and non price vertical restraints coexist. Secondly, from the" Sherman law > first, second <, > third to the Clayton method, through the development of case law -- the case of Meyers reflected by the per se rules, by general electric the case as the representative of the agent that use, in the Colgate case as the representative of the price agreement, the reasonable rules applicable case to clarify the regulation of American ledgan resale price maintenance, the lowest price to maintain The basic context, and then discussed will not be characterized as resale price maintenance behavior and vertical price and non price restraint coexist in itself illegal question whether. Finally, the elements of the two angles of the study of the price recommendation system recommended from < Sherman > first article of the law and legal price.
The fifth chapter, the legal norms of non price vertical restraints. Firstly, in this paper the longitudinal geographical and customer restrictions. On the basic types, through the White Motor Co, Schwinn case, Hill case and Hill case after Slovenia Slovenia's decision reflects the path for this kind of restrictions, illegal rules progress from case law to the rule of reason itself, and compared the longitudinal geographical and customer restrictions and other types of vertical non price limits the similarities and differences are analyzed, they restrict competition coexistence. Secondly, from the "Sherman law > first, < > and < third Clayton by the Federal Trade Commission Act > fifth of the number of test standard by Mobil Oil Corp revealed and Tampa electric company revealed the market proportion test standard describes the influencing factors of exclusive dealing on competition, and further compared with other types of exclusive dealing Non price vertical restraints and their coexistence of competition restrictions. Thirdly, study the evaluation of tying the antimonopoly law, through the analysis of the two elements of tying can be divided into products and tying agreements, tying the illegal judgment -- enough market power, impeding the tying product market competition as well as the defend the legitimate business reasons to show us on tying regulation. Finally, exclusive dealing through the franchise contract often contains the geographical restrictions and customer, business representation control, tying, resale price maintenance, non competition provisions of the United States of the franchise to antitrust law.
The sixth chapter, vertical restraints and its improvement of China's "anti-monopoly law". This paper first discusses the "specific provisions of antitrust law > regulation of vertical restraints, mainly is 14-15 and 17-19. The provisions of article 14-15 of the vertical monopoly agreements, this paper argues that in accordance with the specific conditions of our country, conform to the law the general trend of the world, but the legislative mode is defective, the license terms are unknown. Article 17-19 also have the corresponding provisions of regulation the exclusive dealing and tying, but the legislative defects, needs to be improved. Then, discusses the legal norms of vertical restraints on China's resale price maintenance, vertical geographical and customer restrictions, exclusive dealing and tying enlightenment. Finally, put forward the feasible way to improve the method of vertical restrictions by the Anti Monopoly Committee issued" vertical restraints guidelines ", and expounds the main content.

【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D971.2;DD912.29;D922.294

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